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LABOR RELATIONS LAW
1. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. * Borrowing a Statute of Limitation for Section 101(a)(2) Claims:
Reed v. United Transportation Union'
When Congress fails to provide a statute of limitation for a
federal cause of action, a well-established general rule requires
courts to "borrow" the most closely analogous statute of limitation
under applicable state law. 2 Because state statutes and timeliness
rules are drafted with state rather than federal interests in mind,
however, application of the analogous state rule may on occasion
frustrate rather than promote the national policies furthered by the
federal substantive law.' In these instances when the state-law lim-
itation is an unsatisfactory vehicle for enforcing the underlying
federal right, a narrow exception to the general rule requires courts
to reject the state-law analog and instead borrow a time limitation
from elsewhere in federal law. 4 Under this exception, courts adopt
a federal limitation rule when the federal rule clearly provides a
closer analogy than state-law alternatives and when the federal pol-
icies and practicalities of litigation render the federal rule a signif-
icantly more appropriate means to enforce the federal substantive
right. 5
In the 1983 case of DelCostello v. International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, the United States Supreme Court held that an employee's
suit against both his employer and his union fell within the narrow
exception demanding adoption of a federal limitation rule.° The
* By Carolyn E. Bassani, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REvim.
488 U.S. 319, 130 L.R.R.M. 2137 (1980).
2 See id. at 323, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2138; DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters,
462 U.S. 151; 158-59, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739-40 (1983); Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 180 (1976); Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 104 (1971); UAW v. Hoosier
Cardinal Corp., 383 U.S. 696, 704, 61 L.R.R.M, 2545, 2548 (1966).
5 Denniello, 462 U.S. at 161, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2740.
4 See, e.g., Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assoc., Inc., 483 U.S. 143, 150 (1987)
(adopting federal statute of limitation for civil RICO claims); Occidental Life Ins. Co. v.
EEOC, 432 U.S. 355, 368, 14 F.E.P. Cases 1718, 1724 (1977) (applying federal limitation
period to EEOC enforcement actions brought tinder Title1/11 of the 1964 Civil Rights Act);
McAllister v. Magnolia Petroleum Co„ 357 U.S. 221, 224 (1958) (applying federal limitation
period to unscaworthiness action under general admiralty law); Holmberg v. Armhrecht,
327 U.S. 392, 397 (1946) (refusing to apply a state statute of limitation to enforce federally-
created equitable rights).
DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 172, 113 L.R.R.M. a t 2744,
" 462 U.S. 151, 113 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1983).
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suit at issue in DelCostello was a "hybrid" suit formally comprised of
two separate yet interrelated causes of action.' The first cause of
action, brought pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Management
Relations Act ("LMRA"), alleged that the employer had discharged
DelCostello in violation of the company's collective bargaining
agreement. 8 The second cause of action, brought pursuant to the
doctrine of fair representation implicit in the scheme of the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), alleged that the union breached its
duty of fair representation by mishandling DelCostello's ensuing
grievance-and-arbitration proceeding. 9 Neither component of the
hybrid suit contained an expressly applicable statute of limitation.rn
In accordance with the general borrowing rule, the Court was,
therefore, forced to borrow a limitation rule from the statute most
closely analogous to the hybrid claim.
The DelCostello Court considered the applicability of analogous
state-law limitation periods but rejected each as incompatible with
the substantive policies and practical application of the hybrid sec-
tion 301/fair representation claim." Instead, the Court recognized
a stronger "family resemblance" between the breaches of duty al-
leged in the hybrid suit and federal claims of unfair labor practice
governed by section 10(b) of the NLRA.' 2 The Court contended
that because a breach of duty and an unfair labor practice are
substantively related, section 10(b) necessarily provided a closer
analogy to the hybrid claim than did any of the state-law alterna-
tives.'" Additionally, the Court explained that unlike the possible
▪ Id. at 164-65, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2741-42.
▪ Id. at 164, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2741. See Labor Management Relations Act § 301, 29
U.S.C. § 185 (1988).
Id.
Id. at 158, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2739.
" Id. at 165-69, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2742-43. The Court considered the applicability of
the state's 30-day limitation period for vacating arbitration awards but found the period too
short to ensure the aggrieved employee an adequate opportunity to vindicate his or her
rights under the hybrid claim. Id. at 166, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2742. The Court then addressed
the possibility of adopting the state limitation period for legal malpractice, analogizing the
case to a lawyer's mishandling of a commercial arbitration award. Id at 167-69,113 L.R.R.M.
at 2743. Although the Court agreed with Justice Stevens, who proposed this analogy in his
dissenting opinion, that legal malpractice provided the closest state-law analog, the Court
declined to borrow the much longer malpractice limitation because it would preclude the
rapid resolution of labor disputes encouraged by federal law. Id,
12 Id. at 169-70,113 L.R.R.M. at 2743-44. Section 10(h) states in pertinent part that
"no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the [National Labor Relations] Board , . ."
National Labor Relations Act § 10(b), 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1988).
" DelCosiello, 462 U.S. at 169, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2743-44.
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state-latir analogs, section 10(b)'s six-month time limit reflected the
proper procedural balance between the competing federal interest
in promoting stable bargaining relationships and the prompt reso-
lution of labor disputes on the one hand, and the employee's interest
in vindicating his or her rights and avoiding unjust results under
the collective-bargaining system on the other.' 4 For these reasons,
the DelCostello Court concluded that section 10(b) of the NLRA was
the most appropriate borrowed limitation rule for the hybrid section
301/fair representation claim.' 5
In announcing its decision, the Court took pains to narrow the
scope of its holding and create only a closely circumscribed excep-
tion to the general state-law borrowing rule. The Court warned that
the DelCostello decision was "not mean[t] to suggest that federal
courts should eschew use of state limitations periods anytime state
law fails to provide a perfect analogy."'" Rather, the Court stressed
that courts should limit their look to federal law for a borrowed
limitation rule to instances when a federal law clearly provides a
closer analogy than available state-law rules and when the substan-
tive federal policies and practicalities of litigation render the federal
rule a significantly more appropriate means to enforce the federal
right. 17 The Court emphasized that if these two conditions were not
satisfied, the state-law analog must traditionally prevail.'" Thus, the
Court insisted that although the relevant factors in DelCostello dic-
tated adoption of a federal statute of limitation, resort in the first
instance to potential state-law analogs remained the norm.
Despite the Court's admonition that its holding did not displace
the general state-law borrowing rule, the DelCostello decision precip-
itated a split among the federal circuits as to whether section 10(b)'s
six-month provision, though borrowed from federal law, should
similarly be applied to other labor law contexts. One area in which
this split occurred involved union members' claims arising under
Title I, section 101(a)(2), of the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act ("LMRDA")." Section 101(a)(2) prohibits a union
14 Id. at 171, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2744 (citing United Parcel Serv. v. Mitchell, 451 U.S. 56,
70-71 (1981) (Stewart, J., concurring)).
" Id. at 169, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2743-44.
18 Id, at 171, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2744.
' 7 Id, at 172, 113 L.R.R.M. al 2744.
'" See id. at 171-72, 113 L.R.R.M. at 2744.
See Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2)
(1988). Compare Davis v, UAW, 765 F.2d 1510, 1514-15, 119 L.R.R.M. 3572, 3575 (11th Cir.
1985) (applying federal § 10(b) statute of limitation), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1057, 121 L.R.R.M.
2791 and Local Union 1397 v. United StCelworkers of' Am., 748 F.2d 180, 183, 117 L.R.R.M.
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from interfering with its members' rights of freedom of speech and
assembly concerning union matters and safeguards members from
improper disciplinary censure for exercising those rights. 20 Because
Congress did not expressly enact a statute of limitation for section
101(a)(2) actions, courts must borrow the most suitable timeliness
rule from some other source. 21
A majority of circuit courts that considered this issue held that
like the hybrid claim in DelCostello, section 101(a)(2) claims were
similarly governed by the six-month limitation period prescribed by
section 10(b) of the NLRA. 22 Applying DelCostello's "family resem-
blance" analysis, these courts analogized the union's inhibition of
its members' rights of free speech and assembly to an unfair labor
practice. 23 These courts observed that because of this family resem-
blance, the provisions of section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA and those
of section 10(b) of the NLRA addressed the similar policy concern
of protecting individual workers from arbitrary union action. Ac-
cordingly, these courts concluded that this identity of underlying
interests necessarily rendered section 10(b) of the NLRA the most
analogous statute and compelled the court to borrow its six-month
time limitation. 24
3115, 31 17 (3d Cir. 1984) (applying federal § 10(b) statute of limitation) and Vallone v. Local
Union 705, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 755 F.2d 520, 522, 118 L.R.R.M. 2546, 2547 (7th Cir.
1984) (applying federal § 10(b) statute of limitation) with Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union
Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977, 125 L.R.R.M. 2578, 2586 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying state personal
injury statute of limitation) and Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d I, 11, 121 L.R.R.M. 2649, 2657 (1st
Cir. 1986) (applying state civil rights act statute of limitation).
2D Section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA provides:
Freedom of speech and assembly Every member of any labor organization shall have
the right to meet and assemble freely with other members; and to express any
views, arguments, or opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organi-
zation his views, upon candidates in an election of the labor organization or
upon any business properly before the meeting, subject to the organization's
established and reasonable rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: Provided,
That nothing herein. shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organi-
zation to adopt and enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every
member toward the organization as an institution and to his refraining from
conduct that would interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual
obligations.
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2) (1988).
2 Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 321, 130 L.R.R.M. 2137, 2138 (1989).
22 See Davis, 765 F.2d at 1514-15, 119 L.R.R.M. at 3575 (11th Circuit); Local Union 1397,
748 F.2d at 183, 119 L.R.R.M. at 3117 (3d Circuit); Vallone, 755 F.2d at 522, 118 L.R.R.M.
at 2547 (7th Circuit).
22 See Davis, 765 F.2d at 1514, 119 L.R.R.M. at 3575; Local Union 1397, 748 F.2d at 183,
117 L.R.R.M. at 3117; Vallone, 755 F.2d at 521-22, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2547.
24 See Davis, 765 F.2d at 1514, 119 L.R.R.M. at 3575; Local Union 1397, 748 F.2d at 183,
117 L.R.R.M. at 3118; Vallone, 755 F.2d at 521-22, 118 L.R.R.M. at 2547.
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Conversely, a minority of circuits refused to extend DelCostello
beyond the hybrid section 301/fair representation claim. 25 Applying
the underlying policy analysis of DelCostello, these courts reasoned
that denial of free speech was more closely analogous to a civil
rights or state law personal injury claim. As a result, these courts
endorsed the use of statutes of limitation drawn from state law civil
rights or personal injury statutes to govern the union member's
section 101(a)(2) claim . 28
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court in
Reed v. United Transportation Union resolved the circuit courts' con-
flicting interpretation of DelCostello's mandate and determined the
appropriate source for a borrowed limitation period in a section
10l(a)(2) claim. 27 In Reed, the Court held that claims arising under
section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA are governed by state-law general
or residual personal injury statutes of limitation. 28 In so doing, the
Court reaffirmed DelCostello's admonition that when the operative
federal statute is silent with respect to a statute of limitation, de-
parture from the closest state-law analog is the exception rather
than the rule. 29
In August 1982, the plaintiff Reed, a member of the United
Transportation Union (the "union") and Secretary/Treasurer of the
union's Local 1715 (the "local"), petitioned the union to reinstate
reimbursements that the local had paid to him but which the union
had subsequently disallowed." Reed alleged in his petition that the
union's selective application of a "prior approval" policy to deny his
25 See Rodonich v. House Wreckers Union Local 95, 817 F.2d 967, 977, 125 L.R.R.M.
2578, 2586 (2d Cir. 1987); Doty v. Sewall, 784 F.2d 1, 9, 121 L.R.R.M. 2649, 2655 (1st Cir.
1986).
26 See Rodonich, 817 F.2d at 977, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2586 (2d Cir.; applying state personal
injury statute of limitation); Doty, 784 F.2d at I I, 121 L.R.R.M. at 2657 (1st Cir.; applying
state civil rights act statute of limitation).
27 488 U.S. 319, 130 L.R.R.M. 2137 (1989).
21' Id, at 334, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2143.
29 Id. at 324-25, 130 L.R.R.M, at 2139.
5" Id. :id 321-22, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2138. The dispute concerning Reed's reimbursements
first arose when an audit of Local 1715's books and records revealed that Reed had received
$1,200 worth of reimbursement payments from the local for "time lost" carrying out his
union duties. Reed v. United Transp. Union, 828 F.2d 1066, 1067, 126 L.R.R.M. 2478, 2479
(4th Cir. 1987). The auditor disallowed these payments because Reed had failed to obtain
approval for the reimbursements prior to performing the tasks for which the "time lost" was
incurred. The union president upheld the auditor's denial of Reed's reimbursements. The
union president explained that notwithstanding the prior approval requirement, Reed was
not entitled to reimbursement for "time lost" because his salary as an officer of the local was
intended to cover his full performance of the ordinary duties and responsibilities of his
office. Reed, 488 U.S. at 322, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
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reimbursements was intended to punish him for criticizing the lo-
cal's officers, thereby violating his right to freely express his views
on union matters explicitly protected by section 10 1 (a)(2) of the
LMRDA. 3 ' When the union refused to reinstate Reed's reimburse-
ments, Reed filed suit in the United States District Court for the
Western District of North Carolina against the union and three of
its officers. Reed filed the complaint exactly two years after his
attorney's last letter to the union president reasserting Reed's enti-
tlement to the denied reimbursements. 32 The complaint raised
claims under section 1 0 1 (a)(2) of the LMRDA, as well as pendent
state implied contract and quantum meruit claims. 33
The union moved for summary judgment on statute of limi-
tation grounds, arguing that in accordance with the Supreme
Court's reasoning in DelCostello, Reed's section 101(a)(2) claims were
barred by the six-month limitation period prescribed by section
10(b) of the NLRA. 34 The district court denied summary judgment,
holding that Reed's section 1 0 1 (a)(2) claims were not barred because
they were governed by North Carolina's three-year limitation period
for personal injury actions. 35 The United States Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that section 1 0(b)'s six-
month provision was the appropriate borrowed statute of limitation
51 Reed, 488 U.S. at 322, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2138. Reed maintained that no such prior
approval policy had existed or been enforced prior to being applied to him. Reed v. United
Transp. Union, 633 F. Stipp. 1516, 1518 (W.D.N.C. 1986). As evidence of the union's selective
application of the prior approval policy, Reed contended that when he subsequently sought
to enforce the prior approval policy by denying the unapproved reimbursement claims of
the local president and another local officer, the union president overruled the denials and
ordered Reed to pay the reimbursement claims. Reed, 488 U.S. at 322, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
32 Reed, 633 F. Supp. at. 1518.
35 Id. In addition, Reed further alleged that the individual defendants had violated their
fiduciary duties as officers of the union pursuant to Title V of the LMRDA, 29 U.S.C. § 501
(1988). Id. at 1519.
54 Reed, 488 U.S. at 322, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2138.
55 Reed, 633 F. Supp. at 1525. The court noted that the hybrid § 301/fair representation
claim at issue in DelCostello was fundamentally precipitated by a break-down in the labor-
management relationship. In contrast, the court noted that Reed's § 101(a)(2) claim arose
solely out of his relationship with the union and had only a tangential impact, if any, on the
union's relationship with the employer. As a result, the court reasoned that the hybrid claim
and the § 101(a)(2) claim implicated different policy considerations: the purpose of the
hybrid claim was to preserve the labor-management relationship; the purpose of § 101(a)(2)
was to preserve the individual's personal interest in internal union democracy. In this respect,
the court reasoned, a § 101(a)(2) claim more closely resembled a civil rights action than an
unfair labor practice, thereby rendering the statute of limitation applicable to civil rights
actions the most appropriate timeliness rule for an action arising under § 101(a)(2). Id.
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and thus foreclosed Reed from bringing suit under section 101(a)(2)
two years after the alleged injury occurred."
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that claims
arising under section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA are properly gov-
erned by the state's general or residual personal injury statute of
limitation, and, therefore, Reed was not barred from prosecuting
the section 101(a)(2) claims." In an opinion by Justice Brennan, the
Court observed that when Title I of the LMRDA was enacted, it
was introduced under the heading of "Bill of Rights of Members
of Labor Organizations."" The Court reasoned that such a denom-
ination indicated that Congress intended Title l's provisions to serve
in the labor context as the union member's statutory counterpart
to the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution." The Court
noted that the freedom of speech and assembly provisions embod-
ied in section 101(a)(2) of Title I reiterated a fundamental first
amendment value—the right to freely express one's opinions with-
out fear of reprisal. 40 Given this coincidental interest between sec-
tion 101(a)(2) and constitutionally-protected free speech, the Court
concluded that section 10 I (a)(2) was readily analogized to a state
personal injury action.'"
The Court bolstered this analogy by recognizing the "evident
similarities" between the protections afforded by section 101(a)(2)
and those guaranteed by 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 42 Section 1983 prohibits
50 Reed v. United Transp. Union, 828 F.2(1. 1066, 1070-71, 126 L.R.R.M. 2478, 2482
(4th Cir. 1987). Although the court of appeals agreed with the district court that Reed's
claims were similar to a civil rights action, it maintained that it was impossible to divorce the
101(a)(2) claim from the labor-management context within which it arose, Id. at 1070, 126
L.R.R.M. at 2482. The court reasoned that if left unresolved, internal union disputes might
create dissention among the union's members and diminish their confidence in the ability of
the union leaders to manage the union's affairs. The court maintained that such disaffection
would weaken the union and erode its ability to adequately bargain on behalf of its members.
More importantly, the court stated, this instability would distract the union leaders from
performing their sole purpose, that ()I' representing the union members in their relations
with their employer. The court, therefore, concluded that a lengthy limitation period would
frustrate federal policy favoring rapid resolution of labor-related disputes and necessitated
application of the shorter, § 10(b) statute of limitation. Id.
" Reed v. United Transp. Union, 488 U.S. 319, 323, 1'30 L.R.R.M. 2137, 2138 (1989).
38 Id. at 325, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2139.
39 Id .
10 Id.
41 Id. at 326, 130 L.R.R.M. at. 2140. The Court gave no explanation for its analogy
between § 101(a)(2) and personal injury actions, summarily stating, "(wje find it unnecessary
to detail here the elements of this analogy." Id. -
.13 Id. at 327, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2140.
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a person acting under color of state law from impinging upon a
citizen's constitutional rights such as those secured by the first
amendment.43 The Court has traditionally held that the timeliness
of actions brought under section 1983, which lacks an expressly-
articulated statute of limitation, is governed by the state's residual
personal injury statute." Consequently, the Court concluded that
the state's personal injury statute must be similarly borrowed as the
most analogous statute of limitation to govern a union member's
claims arising under section 101(a)(2). 45
The Reed Court reasoned that the underlying federal policies
involved in a section 101(a)(2) claim further compelled the adoption
of the most analogous state-law statute of limitation rather than the
six-month provision prescribed by section 10(b) of the NLRA. 46 The
Court explained that in enacting Title I of the LMRDA, Congress
implied that in the union context, the unfettered freedom to speak
one's mind and criticize the union's policies or leadership is a fun-
damental requisite of union democracy. 47 In this manner, the Court
" Section 1983 provides in pertinent part:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. 1983 (1988).
44 Reed, 488 U.S. at 326, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2140. In the 1985 case of Wilson v. Garcia, the
Supreme Court held that § 1983 claims arc most analogous to, and thereby controlled by,
the statute of limitation for state-law personal injury claims. 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). In
Wilson, the Court considered the most appropriate limitation rule to apply to a plaintiff's
claim that he was injured when a state police officer used excessive force in unlawfully
arresting him. Id. at 263. The Court noted that cases arising under § 1983 present a potentially
broad and diverse spectrum of constitutional claims sounding in tort. Id. at 273. The Court
noted that this strong tort emphasis was consistent with the legislative history surrounding
the enactment of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, codified in § 1983. Id. at 276-77. The Court
observed that Congress enacted the Act to protect Southern blacks from the personal atroc-
ities and discrimination visited on them following the Civil War. As a result, the Court
concluded that personal injury tort statutes furnished the closest analogy to * 1983, which
similarly was intended to protect the personal civil and political rights of the individual. Id.
at 277.
The Supreme Court reiterated' this analogy between § 1983 and personal injury claims
during the Survey year in Owens v. Okure. 488 U.S. 235, 236 (1989). In Owens, a unanimous
Court held that when a state maintains one or more statutes of limitation for certain enum-
erated intentional torts and a residual statute for all other personal injury actions, the residual
statute of limitation is the most appropriate borrowed limitation rule to govern claims brought
under * 1983. Id.
" Reed, 488 U.S. at 334, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2143.
46 Id. at 330, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2141.
47 Id. at 325, 13(1 1...R.R.M. at 2139.
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noted, the rights protected by section 101(a)(2) of the LMRDA
vindicate not only the individual union member's personal right to
speak freely but also serve the public interest in preserving and
promoting union democracy and the union's responsiveness to the
needs of its members.'" The Court observed that this core purpose
of section 101(a)(2)—enhancing union democracy by enforcing the
union member's rights of free speech and assembly—was not an
integral consideration when Congress drafted the NLRA's six-
month limitation on filing charges of unfair labor practice. 49 The
Court maintained that Congress in fact enacted Title 1 of the
LMRDA to remedy what it perceived as the NLRA's failure to
adequately protect the free speech and assembly rights central to a
union's democratic operation.'" The Court concluded that given
these incompatible underlying policies, section 10(b) of the NLRA
was not a significantly more appropriate vehicle to enforce the
federal policies in a section 101(a)(2) claim and thus did not compel
the Court to depart from the more analogous state-law limitation
rule. 5 '
The Reed Court further asserted that unlike section 10(b)'s six-
month provision, the longer limitation periods furnished by state
personal injury statutes were better attuned to the balance of com-
peting interests and practical considerations implicated in a section
101(a)(2) action. 52 The Court conceded that section 10(b)'s six-
month statute of limitation would facilitate the rapid resolution of
internal union disputes. The Court maintained, however, that con-
fining the filing of complaints to such a short prescriptive period
ignored the practical difficulties faced by a section 101(a)(2) plaintiff
in identifying his or her injury, securing an attorney, and deciding
whether or not to litigate and risk antagonizing the union's leaders. 53
Additionally, the Court contended that although the federal interest
in stable collective bargaining relationships and private dispute res-
olution furthered by section 10(b) may be implicated in a section
101(a)(2) action, these interests are not an integral part of the
section 101(a)(2) balance." The Court, therefore, concluded that
section l0(b)'s six-month time bar failed to adequately balance the
" Id. at 325-26, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2139.
" Id. at 332, 130 L.R.R.M, at 2142.
5° Id.
51 14. at 333, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2142.
52 Id. at 327, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2140.
53 14.
59 Id. at 330, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2191.
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private and public interests involved in a section 101(a)(2) action,
serving federal policies that were merely tangential to the more
fundamental rights sought to be promoted by section 10I(a)(2). 55
In the sole dissenting opinion, Justice White agreed that section
101(a)(2) of the LMRDA implicated first amendment concerns but
disagreed that these underlying policy considerations were the pri-
mary thrust of the federal statute." Instead, Justice White con-
tended that Congress' primary purpose in enacting section 101(a)(2)
was to protect the integrity of the collective bargaining process by
ensuring that a union effectively and responsively represents its
members. 57
 He argued that these interests are identical to those
protected by section 10(b) of the NLRA and its insistence on en-
couraging the prompt airing and resolution of labor-related griev-
ances." As a result, Justice White concluded that section 10(b) of
the NLRA, and not section 1983, furnished the better analog and
thus rendered section I0(b)'s six-month statute of limitation the
most appropriate borrowed limitation rule for a section 101(a)(2)
claim. 59
The implications of the Reed Court's holding that state personal
injury statutes furnish the appropriate borrowed limitation rule for
a union member's claim that the union violated his or her section
101(a)(2) rights of free speech and assembly are three-fold. First,
the decision reveals the Supreme Court's interpretation of the core
federal policy underlying Title I of the LMRDA, in which section
101(a)(2) is incorporated. In Reed, eight of the nine Supreme Court
justices agreed that the fundamental purpose of Title 1 is to enhance
union democracy by guaranteeing the union member's rights of
fre,p speech and assembly concerning union matters. Under this
interpretation, implementation of the federal labor policy depends
upon the enforcement of the individual union member's personal
rights. The importance of these individual rights in the labor con-
text compelled the Court to adopt a statute of limitation sufficient
.in length to accommodate the practical difficulties faced by a section
101(a)(2) plaintiff in a suit against his or her union. The Court
55 See id. Justice Scalia filed a brief concurring opinion. in his opinion, Justice Scalia
reiterated the general rule that where a federal statute lacks an expressly-articulated limitation
period, courts must borrow the most analogous state-law statute of limitation. Id. at 334, 130
L.R:R.M. at 2143 (Scalia, J., concurring).
56 Id. at 335, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2143 (White, J., dissenting).
57 Id.
5" Id.
59 Id.
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maintained that because state personal injury statutes of limitation
are invariably longer than section 10(b) of the NLRA's six-month
provision, they afford a plaintiff greater opportunity to vindicate
his or her personal rights and render the state time bar better
attuned to the substantive policies and practicalities of a section
101(a)(2) action. The Reed Court's adoption of the longer limitation
period to protect the plaintiff in a section 101(a)(2) claim suggests
that the Court may adopt a similar pro-plaintiff orientation in de-
termining the applicable statute of limitation in subsequent Title I
claims.
Second, the Reed Court's holding reaffirms the general rule
that when a federal cause of action lacks an express statute of
limitation, resort in the first instance must be to the most analogous
state-law timeliness rule."" In so doing, the Court in Reed reiterated
its earlier admonition in DelCostello that departure from the state-
law analog is exceptional and limited to instances when a much
closer federal analog exists and when the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation render the federal rule a signifi-
cantly more appropriate vehicle to enforce the federal substantive
right."' Following Reed, courts are more likely to show greater de-
ference to state-law statutes of limitation and be more reluctant to
deviate from the general state-law borrowing rule. 62 As a result,
courts are likely to recognize that an exception to the general rule—
thereby requiring application of a federal statute of limitation—is
triggered only when the case falls within the narrowly-prescribed
parameters set forth in DelCostello. Consequently, departure from
"" See id. at 339, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2143.
61 See DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 172, 113 L.R.R.M.
2737, 2744 (1983).
"2 See, e.g., Posaclas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Asociacion de Empleados de Casino de
Puerto Rico, 873 F.2d 479, 483, l31 L.R.R.M. 2223, 2226 (1st Cir. 1989) (applying Puerto
Rico's judicially created 30-day limitation for vacating labor arbitration awards to claims
arising under LMRA § 301); CM v. UAW, 881 F.2d 408, 411, 132 L.R.R.M. 2123, 2126 (7th
Cir. 1989) (applying state's limitation period for personal injury actions to employee's equal
protection claim arising under LMRA § 301 and LMRDA § 101(a)(2)), reversing on remand
818 F.2d 623, 125 L.R.R.M. 2384 (7th Cir. 1987); Hester v. international Union of Operating
Eng'rs, 878 F.2d 1309, 1310, 132 L.R.R.M. 2011, 2011 (11th Cir. 1989) (applying state's one-
year residual personal injury statute of limitation to union member's breach of duty of fair
representation claim against union arising under LMRDA § 411(a)(5) which safeguards
employees from improper disciplinary actions). But see Guidry v. international Union of
Operating Eng'rs Local 406, 882 F.2d 929, 942, 132 L.R.R.M. 2563, 2573 (5th Cir. 1989)
(applying state's one-year personal injury statute of limitation to union member's claims
arising under LMRDA's § 101(a)(2) but applying NLRA § 10(b)'s six-month limitation period
to LMRA § 301 claim).
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the state-law analog in favor of a federal statute of limitation will
be increasingly more exceptional in light of the Reed decision.
Finally, the Court's mandate of the presumptive primacy of the
state-law analog reaffirms a protocol for statutory construction to
guide courts in selecting the most appropriate borrowed limitation
rule. In both Reed and DelCostello, the Supreme Court relied upon
the same selection criteria to isolate the source of the most analogous
timeliness rule. In each case, the Court first determined the nature
of the action by examining the federal policies at issue in the sub-
stantive allegations. After analyzing the potential applicability of
surrogate state-law limitation rules, the Court selected the most
closely analogous state-law statute of limitation. The Court then
examined the extent to which the state-law rule accommodated the
underlying policies of federal labor law and the realities of the
adversary process. In analyzing potential analogs, the Court's pri-
mary directive was to distinguish the statute of limitation that best
promoted union harmony and the integrity of the labor-manage-
ment relationship. Only when the Court found, as it did in Del-
Costello, that application of the state limitation rule would unduly
frustrate this federal policy did its focus shift from state-law to
federal-law timeliness rules. These controlling principles will guide
courts similarly confronted with selecting the most closely analogous
statute of limitation for a federal cause of action that is silent with
respect to a timeliness rule. In the majority of cases, in accordance
with the Reed and DelCostello directives, the state-law analog will
ultimately prevail.
II. REPRESENTATIONAL AND ORGANIZATIONAL ACTIVITY
A. * The Duty of Fair Representation and Union Abuse of the Hiring
Hall System: Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International
Association Local Union No. 6 1
The United States Supreme Court has established that a labor
union has an implied duty of fair representation to its members,
due to its role as their exclusive bargaining agent. 2 The Supreme
Court has defined a union's duty of fair representation as a duty to
treat members without hostility or discrimination, to exercise its
* By Laura E. Sheppe, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
3 110 S. Ct. 424, 132 L.R.R.M. 3001 (1989).
' Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2371 (1967); see also Steele v.
Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192, 198-99, 15 L.R.R.M. 708, 710-1,1 (1944).
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discretion honestly and in good faith, and to avoid arbitrary con-
duct.' In addition to this common law duty of fair representation,
a breach of this duty is also an unfair labor practice under sections
7 and 8(b) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA" ). 4
A conflict has existed concerning who has jurisdiction over
activity that is both a common-law breach and an unfair labor
practice. The United States Supreme Court held in the 1959 case
of San Diego Building Trades Council v. Gannon that neither state nor
federal courts have jurisdiction over activity that is arguably subject
to sections 7 or 8 of the NLRA. 5 The Court reasoned that Congress
created the NLRA to centralize the administration of labor proce-
dures in order to obtain uniform application of national labor pol-
icies. 6
The Court, however, subsequently held in the 1967 case of Vaca
v., Sipes that Congress, in enacting the NLRA in 1947, had not
intended to oust the federal courts from enforcing the duty of fair
representation.' The Vaca Court held that courts have jurisdiction
over suits to enforce collective bargaining agreements even when
the employer's alleged breach of contract is also arguably an unfair
labor practice within the National Labor Relations Board's
("NLRB") jurisdiction. 8 The Vaca Court reasoned that courts con-
tinue to recognize the common-law duty of fair representation that
had developed prior to Congress' granting unfair labor practice
jurisdiction to the NLRB in 1947.9 The Vaca Court concluded,
therefore, that courts share jurisdiction with the NLRB over duty
of fair representation violations."'
In addition to giving rise to both a common-law claim and an
unfair labor practice charge pursuant to the NLRA, a breach of the
duty of fair representation may also violate provisions of the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act ("LMRDA").'' Congress
3 Vaca, 386 U.S. at 177, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2371.
4 NLRB v. Miranda Fuel Co., 140 N.L.R.B. 181, 185, 51 LRAM. 1584, 1587 (1962),
enforcement denied, 326 F.2d 172, 180, 54 L.R.R.M. 2715, 2721 (2d Cir. 1963); see National
Labor Relations Act, §§ 7, 8(b), 29 U.S.C. §1 157, 158(b) (1982).
5 359 U.S. 236, 245, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2842 (1959).
6 Id. at 242-43, 43 L.R.R.M. at 2841.
7 386 U.S. at 183, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2374. In Vaca, a discharged union member brought
a class action against local union officers and representatives for failing to arbitrate adequately
his grievance with his employer in violation of the collective bargaining agreement.
11 Id. at 183-84, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2374.
9 Id. at 181, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2373.
Li Id. at 186-87, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2375.
si LMRDA 101(a)(2), (5), 29 U,S.C. § 411(a)(2), (5) (1982).
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enacted the LMRDA to preserve democratic standards within
unions so that members may maintain control over the purposes
and policies of their organization) 2 Congress designed both the
substantive and procedural aspects of the LMRDA to attain that
goat's Sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA make it unlawful
for a union to "fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline," any
of its members for exercising rights secured under the LM RDA."
Courts have defined inconsistently the term "discipline" in
LMRDA provisions 101(a)(5) and 609.' 5 Some courts have con-
cluded that discipline includes only those actions that affect a union
member's membership status.' 6 The majority of courts, however,
do not view discipline as necessarily limited to restrictions on mem-
bership rights." These courts maintain that a union's breach of the
duty of fair representation can constitute discipline. [ '
Li See Fick, Political Abuse of /tiring Halls: Comparative Treatment under the NLRA and the
LMRDA, 9 Brous. REL. L.J. 339, 360 (1987).
Id. Section 101(a)(2) of the LM RDA, for example, grants union members the right to
express their views, arguments, or opinions, both at their leisure and during union meetings.
LMRDA, § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. 411(a)(2).
1.1
 Section 101(a)(5) provides:
No member of any labor organization may be fined, suspended, expelled,
or otherwise disciplined except for non-payment of dues by such organization
or by any officer thereof unless such member has been (A) served with written
specific charges; (B) given a reasonable time to prepare his defense; (C) afforded
a full and fair hearing.
LMRDA, § 101(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5). Section 609 provides in pertinent part:
It shall be unlawful for any labor organization, or any officer, agent, shop
steward, or other representative of a labor organization, or any employee
thereof to fine, suspend, expel, or otherwise discipline any of its members for
exercising any right to which he is entitled under the provisions of this chapter
LMRDA, § 609, 29 U.S.C. § 529.
15
 See Etelson & Smith, Union Discipline Under the Landrum-Griffin Act, 82 HARv. L. REV.
727, 731 (1969). Courts have experienced some difficulty in determining which union mem-
ber interests a union must injure for an action to come within the "otherwise disciplined"
language of §§ 101 and 609. Id.
16 Id.; see, e.g., Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 438, 110 L.R.R.M. 2321, 2323 (1982)
(holding that discipline refers only to retaliatory actions affecting a union member's rights
or status as a member of the union); Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Intl Ass'n Local
Union No. 6, 849 F.2d 997, 999, 128 L.R.R.M. 2845, 2846 (6th Cir. 1988) (term "discipline"
meant to refer only to punitive actions diminishing membership rights).
17 See Etelson & Smith, supra note 15, at 731.
18 See Guidry v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local 406, 882 F.2d 929, 940-
41, 132 L.R.R.M. 2563, 2569-72 (1989); Murphy v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs,
Local 18, 774 F.2d 114, 123, 120 L.R.R.M. 2837, 2844 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S.
1017, 121 L.R.R.M. 2736 (1986); Keene v. International Union of Operating Eng'rs, Local
624, 569 F.2(1 1375, 1381, 97 L.R.R.M. 3215, 3219 (5th Cir. 1978); Moore v. Local 569 of
the MCI Bd. of Elec. Workers, 653 F. Supp. 767, 771, 125 1..,R.R.M. 2402, 2405 (S.D. Cal.
1987).
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During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court, in
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Association Local No. 6,
held that federal courts have jurisdiction over a duty of fair rep-
resentation claim even if such claim also could give rise to an unfair
labor practice charge before the NLRB. 19 The Court also held that
alleged discriminatory hiring hall practices 2° are not a basis for a
claim under the LMRDA because such conduct does not constitute
discipline within the meaning of sections 101(a)(5) and 609. 21 Con-
sequently, after Breininger, if union officials discriminate against
members through the union hiring hall, federal courts can hear
claims and the NLRB can hear charges by union members that the
union's action is a violation of its duty of fair representation. Courts
will not hold, however, that such discrimination violates the
LMRDA.
Lynn Breininger was a member of Local Union No. 6 of the
Sheet. Metal Workers International Association (the "union"). 22 The
union, under a multi-employer collective bargaining agreement,
managed a hiring hall that referred both union members and non-
union members for construction work. 23 The union referred mem-
bers in one of two ways: either an employer specifically requested
a particular member, or the union began at the top of its out-of-
work list and continued until it found someone to do the job. The
union did not restrict members or employers to the hiring hall as a
source of employment.
Breininger alleged that because of his political opposition to
the union business manager, the union hiring hall officials both
failed to inform him when employers requested him for a job, and
skipped over his name on the out-of-work list when referring in-
dividuals for jobs. 24 He claimed that the union thereby violated its
duty of fair representation. 25 Breininger also alleged that the union,
." 110  S. Ct. 424, 434-35, 132 L.R.R.M. 3001, 3007-08 (1989).
20 As one commentator explains, a "union-operated hiring hall functions as a central
employment clearinghouse. Employers contact the local hiring hall and request the specific
number of workers required for the job; employees available for work register at the hall
and are dispatched to the jobs as needed." Fick, supra note 12, at 342-43; see Bcaird & Player,
Union Discipline of do Membership Under Section 10I(a)(5) of Landrum-Griffin: What is "Discipline"
and How Much Process is Due?, 9 GA, L. Row. 383, 392 (1975).
2 ' Id. at 440, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3012.
22 Id. at 428, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3002.
23 Id. The union maintained a list of individuals who were out of work and wanted job
referrals.
21 Id. at 428, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3002-03.
Id. at 428, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3002. The complaint stated that the union, "in its repre-
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in making job referrals, favored certain members who supported
the present business manager, and that this favoritism was part of
widespread, improper discipline for political opposition in violation
of sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA. 26
 Breininger therefore
alleged that he had been "otherwise disciplined" by the union, acting
by and through its officials. 27
The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio granted the union's motion for summary judgment, and the
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed in a
per curiam opinion.28
 In connection with the fair representation
claim, the appellate court remarked that circuit courts have uni-
formly held that such claims fall exclusively under the jurisdiction
of the NLRB. 29
 With respect to the LMRDA claim, the court held
that Congress intended discipline to refer only to punitive actions
diminishing membership rights. 3° The court stated that hiring hall
practices are not a function of union membership because referrals
are available to both members and non-members. Thus, the Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held that discriminatory hiring hall
practices do not constitute discipline within the meaning of the
LMRDA. 3 '
The United States Supreme Court reversed in part, affirmed
in part and remanded. The Court set down a two-part holding.
First, the Court held that the district court did have jurisdiction
over Breininger's fair representation suit arising from union offi-
cials' alleged discrimination. 32
 Second, the Court held that the
union's alleged action did not constitute discipline under LMRDA
sections 101(a)(5) and 609."
With respect to the first part of its holding, the Court observed
that the circuit court erred in ruling that the district court had no
sentation of 'petitioner,' has acted arbitrarily, discriminatorily, and/or in bad faith and/or
without reason or cause." Id.
26
 Id. at 428, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3002-03.
77 Id. at 428, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3003.
w Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Local Union No. 6, 849 F.2d 997, 998-99, 128
L.R.R.M. 2845, 2845-46 (6th Cir. 1988). The district court decided that the NLRB had
exclusive jurisdiction of Breininger's claim. Id. at 998, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2845. The court stated
that "lilt is well-settled that union discrimination in job referrals is a matter within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB." /d.
23 Id. at 999, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2845.
3° Id., 128 L.R.R.M. at 2846.
31 Id.
Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n Local Union No. 6, 110 S. Ct. 424, 440,
132 L.R.R.M. 3001, 3012 (1989).
33 Id.
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jurisdiction over the duty of fair representation claim." First, the
Court noted that the NLRB had held that a violation of the duty
of fair representation also could be an unfair labor practice under
sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA." Although the Court acknowledged
its previous holding, in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,
that the NLRB preempted state and federal jurisdiction over claims
based on activity arguably subject to section 7 or 8 of the NLRA, 36
the Court also noted its more recent holding in Vaca that the
preemption rule did not extend to suits alleging a breach of the
duty of fair representation. Because this suit involved such a breach,
the Court ruled that the district court was not deprived of jurisdic-
tion."
Second, the Court reasoned that there should be no exception
for hiring hall cases simply because the NLRB allegedly has more
experience with this subject matter." The Court maintained that it
had never suggested that it would reconsider its ruling on jurisdic-
tion based on the subject matter of the fair representation claim."
The Court was unwilling to adopt a legal principle whereby exper-
tise is equated with exclusive jurisdiction because such a principle
would remove an unacceptably large number of fair representation
claims from federal courts. 49
" Id. at 435, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
" Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 429, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3003. In NLRB v. Miranda Fuel, the
NLRB held that employees' rights to:
form, join, or assist labor organizations, or to refrain from such activities, is a
statutory limitation on statutory bargaining representatives, and that § 8(b)(1)(A)
of the Act accordingly prohibits labor organizations, when acting in a statutory
representative capacity, from taking action against any employee upon consid-
erations or classifications which are irrelevant, invidious, or unfair.
l40 NLRB 181, 185, 51 L.R.R.M. 1584, 1587 (1962), enforcement denied, 326. F.2d 172, 180,
54 L.R.R.M. 2715, 2721 (2d Cir. 1963).
Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 429, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3003; see San Diego Bldg. Trades Council
v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 ; 245, 43 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2842 (1959).
37 Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 429, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3003-04; see Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S.
171, 181, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2373-74 (1967). In Vaca, the Court held that courts developed
the duty of fair representation before the NLRB even acquired jurisdiction over union
activities. Vaca, 386 U.S. at 181, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2373. The Court further reasoned that the
NLRB has unreviewable discretion to deny hearing unfair labor practice claims if the NLRB
considered them insubstantial. Id. at 182 & n.8, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2373 & ti.8. This discretion
might cause a union's breach of duty to go unremediecl and thereby frustrate "the basic
purposes underlying the duty of fair representation doctrine." Id. at 182-83, 64 L.R.R.M. at
2374.
°° Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 430-31, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3004.
13 Id. at 431, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3004.
40 Id, at 431, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3005. The Court added that the NLRB has already granted
themselves exclusive jurisdiction over fair representation cases involving racial and gender
discrimination, citing the Miranda Fuel decision. Id.
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Third, the Court refused to define the duty of fair represen-
tation in terms of an unfair labor practice under the NLRA because
such definition would unreasonably narrow the duty of fair repre-
sentation.'" The Court noted that the NLRB had determined that
breaches of the duty of fair representation also constituted unfair
labor practices in an effort to broaden, not restrict, the remedies
available to union members. 42
 The Court reasoned that the com-
mon-law duty of fair representation arises from the NLRA's grant
under section 9(a) of the union's exclusive authority to represent
all the employees in a designated bargaining unit.° According to
the Court, this duty prevents any arbitrary union conduct against
individuals." An unfair labor practice under the NLRA, on the
other hand, is limited to instances where a union discriminates solely
on the basis of union membership or lack thereof. 45
 The Court
reasoned, therefore, that narrowing the duty of fair representation
to the NLRA's definition of unfair labor practices would make the
two redundant despite their different purposes, and would destroy
some of the protections of the broader duty of fair representation. 46
With respect to the second part of its holding, the Court af-
firmed the Sixth Circuit decision to reject Breininger's LMRDA
claim. The Court did not, however, adopt the lower court's reason-
ing that the term discipline refers only to punitive actions diminish-
ing membership rights. 47
 The Court noted that sections l 01(a)(5)
and 609 of the LMRDA make it unlawful for a union to "fine,
suspend, expel or otherwise discipline" any of its members for
exercising rights secured under the LMRDA. 48 The Court reasoned
that by using the phrase "otherwise discipline," Congress did not
41 Id. at 436, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
42 Id.
43 Id. at 436, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3009; see 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1982).	 •
44 Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 436, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3009 (quoting Vaca v. Sipes, 380 U.S.
171, 182, 64 L.R.R.M. '2369, 2373 (1967)). The Breininger Court stated that li[t was because
the national labor policy vested unions with power to order the relations of employees with
their employer that this Court. [in NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. [ found it necessary
to fashion the duty of fair representation." Id. at 436, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3009,(citing NLRB v.
Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 888 U.S. 175, 181, 65 L.R.R.M. 2449, 2451 (1967)).
4 ' id. at 435-36, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3008.
46 Id. at 436, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3008-09.
47 Id. at 438, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3010 (the Court of Appeals reasoned that because "hiring
hall referrals . . are available to non-members as well as to members, and the hiring hall
was not an exclusive source of employment for sheet metal workers, petitioner did not suffer
discrimination on the basis of rights he held by virtue of his membership in the union.").
" Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 435, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3008 (citing 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(5),
529).
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mean to include all acts deterring the exercise of LMRDA protected
rights, but instead intended only to denote punishment that the
union authorized as a collective entity to enforce its rules. 49 The
Court also reasoned that the structure of the LMRDA implies that
discipline involves an established disciplinary process by the union
in its official capacity, rather than ad hoc retaliation by individual
union officers. 5° The Court held that Breininger did not allege acts
by the union amounting to discipline within the meaning of the
statute, because individual union officers, not the union as an entity,
punished him. 5 '
Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Scalia, concurred in the
Court's disposition of Breininger's duty of fair representation claim,
but dissented from the Court's interpretation of the term discipline
in sections 101(a)(5) and 609 of the LMRDA. 52
 According to Justice
Stevens, union discipline is punishment imposed by the union or
its officers to control members' conduct in order to protect the
interests of the union or its membership." Justice Stevens argued
that this definition clearly includes the use of a hiring hall system
to punish members of the union for their political opposition. Fur-
thermore, Justice Stevens reasoned that Congress intended the
LMRDA to prevent unions from disciplining members without pro-
viding adequate procedural protection." The majority's holding
that the LMRDA does not cover informally-imposed punishment as
alleged by Breininger, added Justice Stevens, deprives union mem-
bers of the LMRDA's procedural safeguards when they most need
them. 55
 Using a hiring hall for retaliatory purposes, Justice Stevens
concluded; is a form of discipline even if the hiring hall serves both
49 Id. at 438-39, 132 L.R.R.M. 3010-11. The Court relied on a fifth circuit case holding
that discipline refers only to actions the union undertakes under color of the right to control
its members' conduct in order to protect union or union members' interests. Id. at 439, 132
L.R.R.M. at 3011 (citing Miller v. Holden, 535 F.2d 912, 915, 95 L.R.R.M. 2152, 2154 (5th
Cir, 1976)).
5° Id. at 439, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3011. The Court also looked to the statute's legislative
history to support its interpretation of "discipline." It held that "Congress envisioned 'disci-
pline' to entail the imposition of punishment by a union acting in its official capacity." Id.
Id. at 440, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3012.
52 Id. at 441, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3012 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 442, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3013 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Miller, 535 F.2d at
915, 95 L.R.R.M, at 2154).
" Id. Justice Stevens argued that, for example, an effective method of disciplining union
members would certainly be to injure their employment interests, the interests that are the
prime reason for union membership.
ss Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 443, 132 L.R.R.M, at 3014 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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members and non-members, and even if the decision to punish is
ad hoc and unrecorded by the union.`'"
The Breininger decision ameliorates a union member's ability to
recover against a union for breaching its duty of fair representation
with respect to a job referral system. Breininger affirmed that a union
member can sue a union in federal court as well as bring a charge
through the NLRB for such conduct. Federal jurisdiction offers
plaintiffs two benefits. First, plaintiffs are more likely to have their
claims heard when not restricted to bringing a charge through the
NLRB. If plaintiffs' only form of redress is the NLRB, they may
have no redress at all because the NLRB has discretion to hear only
those claims they decide will advance the public interest in effec-
tuating the policies of the federal labor laws. 57 If employees can sue
in federal court, however, they are guaranteed a hearing by consti-
tutional requirements of due process.
Second, a federal court forum might be more profitable for
plaintiffs. If plaintiffs bring charges under the NLRB, the available
remedies are limited to requiring the union to cease and desist any
conduct violating the NLRA and providing back pay to make plain-
tiffs whole. If plaintiffs sue in federal court they can win damages
far exceeding NLRB compensation.
One downside to federal court jurisdiction, however, exists.
Allowing union members to sue in federal court severely diminishes
the uniformity of national labor policy. Congress enacted the NLRA
to centralize administration and obtain uniform application of labor
procedures. 58 By giving union members federal jurisdiction over
these labor claims, the Court is both diluting the national uniformity
established by the NLRB and allowing the government to intervene
in this area of the law. Such government intervention may prove
harmful to union members in the long run but it is currently out-
weighed by the benefits of federal jurisdiction.
Breininger also ameliorates a union member's ability to recover
against a union for breaching its duty of fair representation with
respect to a job referral system because the duty of fair represen-
tation is no longer limited to the NLRA's definition of an unfair
labor practice. As a result, the union owes a duty of fair represen-
tation to a member or non-member in situations other than union-
5b Id. at 444, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3015 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
" See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 182 & n.8, 64 L.R.R.M. 2369, 2373 & n.8 (1967)
(holding that the NLRB can refuse w hear an employee's charge of an insubstantial injury).
58 See id. at 179, 64 L.R.R.M. at 2372.
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related administration. A union member has an action for job-
referral discrimination pursuant to section 9 of the NLRA, not
sections 7 and 8 that define unfair labor practices. Therefore, de-
spite the dilution of a national uniform labor policy, Breininger
benefits union members by allowing them to sue in federal court
and by not restricting the definition of a union's duty of fair rep-
resentation to the NLRA's definition of an unfair labor practice.
Although the Court allows union members to hold unions liable
for their officers' discriminatory management of a hiring hall re-
ferral system under a duty of fair representation claim, the Court
will not allow unions to be held liable for their officers' improper
actions tinder the LMRDA. The Court concluded in Breininger that
Congress did not intend the phrase "otherwise discipline" to include
all acts that deterred the exercise of rights protected under the
LMRDA, but rather to refer only to sanctions authorized by the
union as a collective entity undertaken under color of the union's
right to control its members' conduct.'" The Court distinguished
such official union discipline from ad hoc retaliation by individual
union officers even though it seemed to recognize that one purpose
of the LMRDA is to provide safeguards against improper discipli-
nary action.° The Court effectively removes these safeguards when
it defines discipline so narrowly as to omit sanctions imposed by
union officials against members holding unpopular political views
and allowing the union thereby to evade the due process require-
ments of section 101(0(5) of the LMRDA.
By barring such LMRDA discipline claims, the Court is not
giving unions free rein to discipline its members unlawfully through
its officers because members retain duty of fair representation
claims. This is no reason, however, for the Court to deny Breinin-
ger's LMRDA claim. Section 101(0(5) of the LMRDA refers to
actionable discipline as being imposed by a labor organization or by
any officer thereof. 6 ' Therefore, Congress clearly intended to hold
unions liable for their officers union-related actions. Union officials
operating a hiring hall in a discriminatory fashion abuse their union
authority. Although it might be burdensome for the union to be
held liable for every employee's improper action, an absence of
liability on the union's part could effectively destroy the purpose of
the LMRDA by only allowing unions to unofficially discipline mem-
5" Breininger, 110 S. Ct. at 438-39, 132 L.R.R.M. 3001, 3010-11.
°'" See id. at 439, 132	 at 3011.
29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(5).
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bers through officers, free of LMRDA regulations. Congress en-
acted the LMRDA with the belief that guaranteeing minimum dem-
ocratic safeguards within unions would enable members to regulate
the unions and prevent corruption and abuse. 62
 Despite members'
other claims against the union for such action, Breininger's interpre-
tation of the "otherwise discipline" language distinguishing between
official union and individual officer actions effectively nullifies the
LMRDA's safeguards.
In conclusion, Breininger holds that federal courts share juris-
diction with the NLRB over breach of the duty of fair representa-
tion claims based on improper discipline imposed unofficially on a
union member by a union official. The Court also holds, however,
that such conduct is not a violation of sections 10l (a)(5) or 609 of
the LMRDA. This opinion affirms the expanding federal jurisdic-
tion over labor law issues for the potential benefit of plaintiffs and,
at the same time, limits the scope of the LMRDA procedural safe-
guards, possibly nullifying them altogether.
B.* Free Speech Protections for Union Officers: Sheet Metal Workers'
International Association v. Lynn'
Under section 101(a)(2) of Title I of the Labor-Management
Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 ("LMRDA"),2
 members of
labor unions are guaranteed the rights of free speech and assembly
with respect to union matters. 3
 Union members may bring a civil
" S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 1.5, reprinted in 1959 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 2318, 2318-21.
* By Jane Guevremont, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 488 U.S. 347, 130 L.R.R.M. 2193 (1989).
2 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1982) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
3
 LMRDA § 101(a)(2), 29 U.S.C. § 411(a)(2), provides:
Every member of a labor organization shall have the right to meet and
assemble freely with other members and to express any views, arguments, or
opinions; and to express at meetings of the labor organization his views, upon
candidates in an election of the labor organization or upon any business properly
before the meeting, subject to the organization's established and reasonable
rules pertaining to the conduct of meetings: [p]rovided, [t]hat nothing herein
shall be construed to impair the right of a labor organization to adopt and
enforce reasonable rules as to the responsibility of every member toward the
organization as an institution and to his refraining from conduct that would
interfere with its performance of its legal or contractual obligations.
Id.
In addition to Title I's guarantee of free speech and assembly, Title I also guarantees
union members equal rights regarding political participation in the union; stability and access
to democratic process in assessing dues, initiation fees and additional assessments; the right
to sue and participate in legal proceedings against the union; and safeguards against im-
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action in federal district court under section 102 of the LMRDA in
order to secure these rights."' Although Title I traditionally pro-
tected the free speech and assembly rights of the rank-and-file
union member,5
 circuit courts disagreed as to whether Title I also
protected the speech of member-officers. 6 This issue was litigated
proper disciplinary action, Id. at §§ 101(a)(1), 101(a)(3)-(a)(5), 29 U.S.C. §§ 411(a)(1),
411(a)(3)-(a)(5).
4 LMRDA § 102, 29 U.S.C. § 412, provides:
Any person whose rights secured by the provisions of this subchapter have
been infringed by any violation of this subchapter may bring a civil action in a
district court of the United States for such relief (including injunctions) as may
be appropriate. Any such action against a labor organization shall be brought
in the district court of the United States for the district where the alleged
violation occurred, or where the principal office of such labor organization is
located,
Id,
5 See Finnegan v. Leu, 456 U.S. 431, 436-37, 110 L.R.R.M. 2321, 2323 (1982); see also
American Fed'n of Musicians v. Wittstein, 379 U.S. 171, 182-83, 57 L.R.R.M. 2566, 2571
(1964).
The scope of free speech protections under the statute is broader than the scope of the
protection guaranteed by the first amendment to the United States Constitution. See Reyes
v. Laborers' Intl Union of N. Am., Local Union No. 16, 327 F. Supp. 978, 979, 77 L.R.R.M.
2729, 2729-30 (1).N.M. 1971), off 'd, 464 F.2c1 595, 597, 80 L.R.R.M. 3215, 3216 (1972), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 915, 82 L.R.R.M. 2998 (1973); see also Steelworkers v. Sadlowski, 457 U.S.
102, 111, 110 L.R.R.M. 2606, 2609 (1982). Under the statute, protected speech includes
speech that is libelous, Salzhindler v. Caputo, 316 F.2d 445, 446, 52 L.R.R.M. 2908, 2908
(2d Cir. 1963). Although the statute allows union members to speak freely without fear of
reprisal from union officials, it does not protect union members from common law actions
for libel or slander. Stark v. Twin City Carpenters Dist. Council, 219 F. Supp. 528, 537, 53
L.R.R.M. 2640, 2647 (1). Minn. 1963),
r>
	 Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 433, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2321; see, e.g., Lamb v. Miller, 660 F.2d
792, 794, 107 L.R.R.M. 3064, 3065 (D.C. Cir, 1981) Cray elected] union official may not be
dismissed for exercising [Title II . . . rights"); Maceira v, Pagan, 649 F.2d 8, 12-13, 107
L.R.R.M. 2408, 2410 (1st Cir. 1981) ("the LMRDA allows an elected official to assert a claim
. charging that removal from his official position violates the LMRDA bill of rights");
Bradford v. Textile Workers, Local 1093, 563 F.2c1 1138, 1142, 96 L.R.R.M. 2690, 2693 (4th
Cir. 1977) ("a union member, by accepting an elective office in the union, does not forfeit
his rights expressly given him as a union member under the Act"); Grand Lodge of the Intl
Ass'n of Machinists v. King, 335 F.2d 340, 344, 56 L.R.R.M. 2639, 2641 (9th Cir.) ("To
exclude officer-members front [guarantees under § 101] would deny protection to those best
equipped to keep union government vigorously and effectively democratic."), cert. denied,
379 U.S. 920, 57 L.R.R.M. 2512 (1964). But see, e.g., Newman v. Local 1101, Communications
Workers, 570 F.2d 439, 445, 97 L.R.R.M. 2606, 26 10 (2d Cir. 1978) ("We do not believe
Title I of LMRDA to insulate union officials, employees, or agents from removal, or to permit
a union representative . . . to freeze himself in office on First Amendment grounds.");
Wambles v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 488 F.2d 888, 889, 85 L.R.R.M. 2328, 2329
(5th Cir. 1974) (extending free speech protections to officers would mean that they had
permanent jobs unless they were dismissed for cause); Sheridan v. United Blid. of Carpenters,
Local No. 626, 306 F.2d 152,157, 50 L.R.R.M. 2637, 2641 (3d Cir. 1962) ("plaintiff's status
as a business agent is not protected by the Act").
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most frequently when officers were discharged from their positions
in retaliation for expressing their beliefs or opinions.'
In 1982, in Finnegan v. Leu,. the United States Supreme Court
addressed the issue of officer removals for the first time. 8 In Fin-
negan, the Court held that a newly elected union president did not
violate the LMRDA when he discharged appointed business agents
who had supported the opposing candidate in an election. 9 The
Court noted that the business agents claimed only an indirect in-
terference with membership rights resulting from the fact that they
were forced to choose between their positions as business agents
and the right to express their views.'° The Court indicated that,
despite this interference, the union president had a justifiable rea-
son for removing the agents from office." The Court reasoned that
giving elected officials the right to select their own staff was consis-
tent with the LMRDA's goal of ensuring that officials are responsive
to the interests of union members." Thus, under Finnegan, ap-
pointed officers were not guaranteed the same broad free speech
protections under Title I of the LMRDA as were rank-and-file union
members. The question of whether a retaliatory removal of an
officer could ever give rise to a cause of action under section 102,
however, remained open." In the period following Finnegan, courts
differed in their interpretation of whether the Finnegan decision
controlled the removal of elected as well as appointed officers.' 4
During the Survey year, the United States Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of whether the retaliatory discharge of an elected
business agent violates Title I of the LMRDA. In the 1989 case of
See Note, Free Speech Rights of Union Officials. Under the Labor-Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act, HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 525, 527 n.8 (citing D. McLauGit LIN & A. SCHOOMAKER,
THE LANDRUM-GRIFFIN ACT AND UNION DEMOCRACY 115 (1979)).
8 456 U.S. 431, 110 L.R.R.M. 2321 (1982).
9 Id. at 432, 442, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2321, 2325.
, o Id. at 440, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2324.
11 See id. at 441, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2324.
12 Id. at 440, 441, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2324. For a discussion of the legislative history of
Title I of the LMRDA, see generally, Rothman, Legislative History of the 'Bill of Rights' for
Union Members, 45 MINN. L. REV. 199 (1960),
" Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 440-41, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2324.
14 See, e.g., Runyan v. United Bhd. of Carpenters, 554 F. Supp. 859, 862 n.3 (D. Colo.
1982) (expressing the view that the result in Finnegan would not have been different had the
plaintiffs been elected rather than appointed); Local 314, National Post Office Mail Handlers
v. National Post Office Mail Handlers, 572 F. Supp. 133, 137 (E.D. Mo. 1983) (finding the
plaintiff's appointed/elected distinction "meritless"); Brett v. Sohio Constr. Co., 113 L.R.R.M.
2345, 2347 (D. Alaska 1983) ("the exception to broad enforcement of Title 1 protections for
speech and advocacy carved by Finnigan v. Len does not extend so far as to preclude elected
job site stewards from remedies under section 102").
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Sheet Metal Workers' International Association v. Lynn, the Court held
that the removal of an elected official in retaliation for exercising
his free speech rights violated Title I of the LMRDA.' 5 The Court
reasoned that discharging an elected official was significantly dif-
ferent from discharging an appointed official because it had a po-
tentially chilling effect on the free speech rights of union mem-
bers.' 6 Consequently, after the Sheet Metal Workers decision, elected
officials who are discharged in retaliation for expressing their beliefs
may state a cause of action under section 102 of the LMRDA.
In Sheet Metal Workers, the members of Local 75 of the Sheet
Metal Workers' International Association (the "local") elected Ed-
ward Lynn to the position of business representative." In response
to the concerns of union members regarding the local's financial
difficulties, Lynn organized a group of union members to review
the situation. Upon discovering that officers of the local were spend-
ing significantly more money than other area sheet metal locals, the
group requested that the local's financial problems be addressed by
reducing expenditures rather than by raising dues. After the union
members defeated three separate proposals to increase dues, Lynn,
along with the local's officers, requested assistance from the inter-
national union's general president.' 6 In response to this request, the
international's president appointed a trustee, charging him with the
authority to manage the affairs of the local, including the power to
suspend union officers pursuant to the Constitution and Ritual of
the Sheet Metal Workers' International Association.' 9
After reviewing the union's financial situation, the trustee de-
termined that raising union dues was necessary in order to alleviate
the local's financial crisis. The local's executive board accepted the
trustee's suggestion and called a meeting of union members to vote
on the proposal. Prior to the vote, the trustee informed Lynn that
he expected Lynn to support the dues increase. Lynn explained
that he would do so only if the trustee also pledged to lower ex-
penditures. Because the trustee refused, Lynn publicly opposed the
dues increase at the union meeting, and the union members de-
feated the proposal. A few days later, the trustee discharged Lynn
15 488 U.S. 347, 349, 130 L.R.R.M. 2193, 2193 (1989)
hi Id. at 355, ISO L.R.R.M. at 2196.
17 Id. at 349, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2193.
18 Id. at 349-50, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2194. The letter requested that the president "im-
mediately take whatever action ... necessary including, but not limited to, trusteeship to put
this local on a sound financial basis." Id.
19 Id. at 350.
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as business agent stating that he was removed "because of his out-
spoken opposition to the dues increase."20
Lynn filed a claim under section 102 of the LMRDA, stating
that the trustee's actions violated section 101(a)(2) of Title I of the
LMRDA. 2 ' The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Cir-
cuit held that the LMRDA protected the elected official from being
discharged in this situation. 22 The United States Supreme Court
affirmed the decision, holding that Lynn's discharge from his
elected position violated Title I of the LMRDA. 23
The Court rejected the international's argument that, because
Lynn's removal neither prevented him from participating in the
union meeting nor interfered with his union membership, Lynn's
removal did not violate his Title 1 rights. 24 Although the Court
acknowledged that Lynn's removal did not directly prohibit him
from exercising his right to free expression, the Court noted that
Lynn's removal was a response to his overt opposition to the trust-
ee's proposal. As such, the Court concluded that Lynn's discharge
had an indirect effect on his free speech, as it would most likely
discourage him from expressing any views that differed from those
of the union leadership in the future. 25
The Court next addressed whether this indirect interference
with free speech was protected under Title 1. 26 The Court explained
that a basic purpose of the LMRDA is to safeguard democratic
governance by ensuring that the interests of union members are
protected through fair elections." In contrasting its decision in
Finnegan, the Court explained that the Finnegan decision, which
allowed the president-elect to remove the past president's appointed
staff, was consistent with the purpose of the LMRDA. 28 The Court
reasoned that a disloyal staff could seriously hinder the plans of the
- president-elect, making his election virtually meaningless. 29 Thus,
although the Court in Finnegan recognized that sanctioning the
removal of appointed business agents who had openly supported
2" Id.
2L Id.
22 Lynn v. Sheet Metal Workers' lnt'l Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1479, 123 L.R.R.M. 3273,
3278 (9th Cir, 1986), aff'd, 488 U.S. 347, 359 (1989).
23 488 U.S. 347, 359, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2197.
24 Id. at 353-54, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2195.
25 Id. at 354, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2195.
26 Id. at 354, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2195-96.
27 Id. at 354, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2196.
28 Id .
29 Id. at 354-55, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2196.
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the incumbent president would hinder their free speech rights, the
Court held that the importance of upholding the union members'
democratic choice outweighed this concern."
The Court in Sheet Metal Workers stressed that the removal of
an elected official differed substantially from the removal of an
appointed official. 3 ' The Court reasoned that when an elected of-
ficial is fired from a position, the union members who voted for
that candidate are also affected in that they are denied the delegate
of their choice. In Sheet Metal Workers, for example, the Court found
that Lynn's discharge during a time of crisis for the local deprived
the union members of Lynn's leadership and expertise. Thus, the
Court concluded that his removal did not further the LMRDA's
purpose of ensuring responsiveness to the interests of union mem-
bers. 32
Additionally, the Court asserted that removing an elected of-
ficial from office would have a more substantial effect on the right
to free expression guaranteed under Title I." The Court reasoned
that the retaliatory discharge of an elected official affected not only
the official's free speech rights, but those of his or her supporters
as well," In this regard, the Court suggested that local union mem-
bers would be hesitant to express their own views after seeing that
Lynn's outspokenness resulted in his removal as a business agent.
The Court explained that in passing the LMRDA, Congress ac-
knowledged that the existence of a democratic union was dependent
upon union members' freedom to express their opinions regarding
union matters without fear of reprisal. Because the trustee's actions
infringed on the free speech rights of union members that Congress
sought to protect by enacting the LMRDA, the Court held that
Lynn's retaliatory discharge gave rise to a cause of action under
section 102.33
Justice White, concurring in the judgment, suggested that the
decision did not depend on whether the discharged officer was an
3° Id. at 355, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2196.
Id.
as Id.
" Id.
54 Id. (citing Hall v. Cole, 412 U.S. I, 8, 83 L.R.R.M. 2177, 2180 (1973)).
55 Id. The Court also rejected the international's claim that Lynn's discharge was justified
because he was removed during a lawfully imposed trusteeship. Id. at 356, 130 L.R.R.M. at
2196. Because the legislative history and language of the LMRDA did not indicate Congress'
intention that a trusteeship should cancel Title I rights, the Court stated that the power
granted to a trustee should be consistent with Title 1 protections. Id. at 356-57, 130 L.R.R.M.
at 2196-97.
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elected or appointed official, but on whether the officer spoke in
his or her capacity as an officer or as a regular union member. 36
Citing Finnegan, Justice White stressed that Title I was enacted to
protect regular union members, not union officers." Justice White
asserted that an officer's status as an elected or appointed official
should have no bearing on a decision where the individual spoke
in his or her official capacity. According to Justice White, the con-
trolling factor in Finnegan was the president's authority under the
union's constitution to appoint and remove officers to ensure that
he or she would have a supportive staff. Justice White stated that
even though the officers in Finnegan conducted their campaign
activities as union members, and thus were entitled to Title I pro-
tection, the union's constitutional grant of authority to the president
was sufficient to dispose of the appointed officer's Title I claim."
Justice White explained that unlike Finnegan, in which the
union's president had the authority to appoint and remove officers,
the trustee's authority in Sheet Metal Workers was restricted to re-
moving officers for cause. 39 "Cause" in this context included incom-
petence or other behavior that interfered with the ability to perform
the duties of the office. Justice White suggested that, in this case,
Lynn's duties as a business agent primarily involved collective bar-
gaining but did not seem to include supporting the dues increase
proposed by the trustee. Justice White concluded that, in this in-
stance, there were no "countervailing interest[s] rooted in union
democracy" that were sufficient to cancel Title I guarantees and,
therefore, he concurred in the judgment. 4°
The Court's decision in Sheet Metal Workers represents the first
time the United States Supreme Court has recognized that section
101(a)(2) of Title I of the LMRDA protects the free speech of
33 Id. at 359, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2198 (White, j., concurring in judgment). The distinction
between membership speech and officer speech was recognized by the United States Court
of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit in Dolan v. Transportation Workers Union, 746 F.2d
733, 742 (I I th Cir. 1984). The Dolan court determined that 'Membership speech' could be
transformed into 'officer speech' "if the officer could reasonably be perceived as speaking
for the union, or if her speech affects performance of her specific duties . . ." Id. The
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected this view in Lynn v. Sheet
Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1472, 1479 n.5, 123 L.R.R.M. 3273, 3277 n.5 (9th Cir.
1986), aff'd, 488 U.S. 347, 359.
37 Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n v. Lynn, 488 U.S. at 359, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2197
(White, J., concurring in judgment).
33 Id.
59 Id. at 360, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2198 (White, J., concurring in judgment).
49 Id.
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elected union officers. The Court in Sheet Metal Workers answered
the question left open in Finnegan as to whether the retaliatory
discharge of a union official could ever give rise to a cause of action
under section 102. As a result of Sheet Metal Workers, elected union
officers discharged in retaliation for expressing their opinion may
state a claim under section 102.
The Sheet Metal Workers decision expanded several principles
set forth in Finnegan. In Finnegan, the Court noted that the dis-
charged union officers claimed that their retaliatory removal re-
quired them to choose between their right to free speech and their
positions as union officers, thus, indirectly affecting their member-
ship rights.'" The Finnegan Court did not address whether the
direct-indirect distinction had any significance in determining
whether a cause of action existed under section 102. In Sheet Metal
Workers, however, the Court acknowledged that even an indirect
interference with an officer's membership rights could give rise to
a section 102 claim.42
Despite the Court's finding that Lynn's removal indirectly af-
fected his membership rights by making him more hesitant to speak
out in the future, the Sheet Metal Workers Court did not automatically
find an infringement of his Title I rights. Rather, the Court focused
on whether the officer's removal would interfere with the purpose
of the LMRDA. 42 In both Finnegan and Sheet Metal Workers, even
when it was clear that the officers' removal affected their personal
freedom of expression, the Court evaluated the effect of the offi-
cers' removal (or retention) on union democracy, an important goal
of the LMRDA.
The Court also indicated that the elected/appointed distinction
was an important element to consider when evaluating the impact
of a retaliatory discharge on union democracy. 44 Where an officer's
removal interfered with this goal, the Court held that the officer
stated a cause of action under section 102. 45 Where an officer's
removal furthered this goal, however, the Court upheld the dis-
charge. 46 Thus, the reasoning of the Court in both Finnegan and
Sheet Metal Workers seems to indicate that the Court will be more
likely, to recognize a cause. of action in officer removal cases where
it Finnegan v. Len, 456 U.S. 431, 440, 110 L.R.R.M. 2321, 2324 (1982).
" See Sheet Metal Workers, 488 U.S. at 354, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2195.
45 See supra text accompanying notes 26-27 for a discussion of the Court's approach.
" Sheet Metal Workers, 488 U.S. at 355, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2196.
45 Id.
48 Finnegan, 456 U.S. at 442, 110 L.R.R.M. at 2325.
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the removal not only affects the officer's freedom of speech, but
also affects the rights of the rank-andfile union member.
III. PERMANENT REPLACEMENTS
A. * The Right to Hire Permanent Replacements: Who is Replaced?
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants'
Since the Supreme Court decision in NLRB v. Mackay Radio &
Telegraph Co., an employer has been allowed to hire permanent
replacements for striking employees in order to maintain its busi-
ness.' The legacy of Mackay stems not from the particular holding, 3
but from dicta in Justice Roberts's majority opinion. 1 Under Mackay
and its progeny, an employer can refuse to reinstate strikers at the
conclusion of an economic strike if it has replaced them with per-
manent employees, 5 or it has another legitimate and substantial
business justification. 6
Although the practice of permanently replacing striking em-
ployees is a significant economic weapon in the hands of employers,
its use is limited in several respects.' First, the employer is limited
* By K. lain McAusland, Editor, BosTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
109 S. Ct. 1225, 130 L.R.R.M. 2657 (1989).
2
 304 U.S. 333, 345-46, 2 L.R.R.M. 610, 614 (1938).
• in Mackay, the Supreme Court affirmed an order of the NLRB requiring Mackay
Radio & Telegraph Co. to reinstate five employees who had been discriminated against
because of their involvement in a union. Id. at 341, 351, 2 L.R.R.M. at 612, 616. During a
strike of point-to-point operators, Mackay replaced the striking operators with employees
from other offices in an effort to maintain its service. When the strike failed, most of the
striking operators were automatically reinstated. However, five operators who had been
prominent in union activities had still not been reinstated three weeks later. Responding to
charges by the union, the NLRB ordered that the five men be reinstated. The Supreme
Court ultimately upheld the NLRB's finding that the refusal to reinstate was discrimination
against union activity and thus an unfair labor practice. Id. at 347, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614.
▪ Justice Roberts stated that it was not "an unfair labor practice to replace the striking
employees with others in an effort to carry on the business." Id. at 345, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614.
He further indicated that it also was not an unfair labor practice "to reinstate only so many
of the strikers as there were vacant places to be filled." Id. at 346, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614 (citations
omitted).
5 See Belknap; Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 504 n.8, 113 L.R.R.M. 3057, 3062 n.8 (1983).
For a discussion of the effect of Belknap on the Mackay doctrine, see Federal Labor Law
Preemption and Right to Hire Permanent Replacements: Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 1983-84 Annual
Survey of Labor Relations and Employment Discrimination Law, 26 B.C.L. REV. 63, 84-87 (1984).
6 NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 379-80, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2738-39
(1967).
7 Mackay, 304 U.S. at 345-346, 2 L.R.R.M. at 614. See generally Weinstein, "Will You Be
a Union Man1 Or Will You Be a Scab?", 7 CAL. LAW. 44 (1987).
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in its incentives to induce workers to replace its striking employees. 8
Second, even when replaced, strikers who have made an uncondi-
tional request for reinstatement remain statutory employees under
section 2(3) of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 9 As a
result, an employer must offer its post-strike vacancies to all quali-
lied former strikers before it can hire any new employees. 10 It is
settled that an employer has the right to replace strikers perma-
nently under Mackay (hereinafter the "Mackay doctrine"). Many of
the consequences of such actions, however, are still at issue.
During the Survey year, in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent
Federation of Flight Attendants ("TWA"), the United States Supreme
Court held that the Mackay Doctrine applies to crossover employees
as well as to permanent replacements." As a result, the TWA Court
refused to order the reinstatement of full-term strikers to displace
the crossover employees: 2
In March, 1984, TWA began negotiations with the Indepen-
dent Federation of Flight Attendants ("IFFA" or the "union") on a
new collective bargaining agreement. is The negotiations, conducted
pursuant to the requirements of the Railway Labor Act ("RLA"),
covered the issues of wages and working conditions." During two
years of negotiations, the parties complied with all of the statutory
procedures for dispute resolution, including the requirements of
direct negotiation, mediation, and a thirty day "cooling off" pe-
riod. 15 But in March 1986, having been unable to reach a settlement,
the union went on strike: 8
8 See NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 225-28, 235-37, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121,
2123, 2127-28 (1963). In Erie Resistor, the Supreme Court upheld the NLRB's ruling that
all employer could not offer twenty years of seniority as an incentive to replacements, even
if such an inducement was needed to hire the replacements and maintain the business. Id.
9 See Estreicher, Strikers and Replacements, 38 LAB. L.J. 287, 289 (1987). The NLRA states
in relevant part: "The term 'employee' shall include any employee ... whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any
unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent
employment . . .." 29 U.S.0 § 152(3) (1988).
w Estreicher, supra note 9, at 289.
" 109 S. Ct. 1225, 1235, 130 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2663 (1989). Crossovers are employees
who are union members before the strike but who either refuse to strike or return to work
before the end of the strike, See id. at 1228-29, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
12 Id. at 1228-29, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
° Id. at 1228, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
" Id. The Supreme Court affirmed the determination of the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit that the clause survived the strike in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Flight
Attendants, 108 S. Ct. 1101, 1101, 127 L.R.R.M. 2740, 2741 (1988).
Lb TWA, 109 S.Ct. at 1228, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
Id.
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During the strike, TWA continued operations by hiring and
fully training approximately 2,350 permanent replacements.'? TWA
also continued to employ approximately 1,280 flight attendants who
either had refused to strike or had abandoned the strike ("crossov-
ers"). TWA informed the striking flight attendants that all strike-
created vacancies would be filled in accordance with the existing
seniority bidding system and that job and domicile arrangements
made according to the system would remain in effect after the end
of the strike. TWA's seniority bidding system guaranteed the senior
flight attendants the opportunity to obtain the most desirable job
assignments, flight schedules, and bases of operation by granting
them priority for arising vacancies. In addition, the bidding system,
part of the collective bargaining agreement existing before the
strike, guaranteed that the junior-most employees would be the first
to be laid off if layoffs became necessary.' 8
By utilizing non-striking flight attendants and replacement
flight attendants, TWA was able to continue its operations and
defeat the strike.' 8 In arbitration after the strike, TWA agreed to
reinstate full-term strikers as vacancies arose with the same seniority
they would have had if there had been no strike." TWA, however,
refused union demands to displace crossovers. As a result, TWA
initially recalled only the 197 most senior full-term strikers; by May
1988, approximately 1,100 of the 5,000 full-term strikers had been
reinstated. 21
The union sued TWA, seeking the reinstatement of more full-
term strikers through displacement of permanent replacements and
junior crossover employees. 22 The union contended that both the
RLA and the terms of the pre-strike collective bargaining agreement
entitled the full-term strikers to reinstatement." On cross-motion
' 7 Id.
IB Id.
12 See id.
'° Id. at 1228-29, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
21 itt..at 1229, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658.
22 Id. at 1229, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658-59. This was the second legal action taken by the
union. The union first brought an action for declaratory judgment, seeking a determination
that the full-term strikers were unfair labor practice strikers, and not economic strikers. As
unfair labor practice strikers, they would have been entitled to immediate reinstatement. See
id. The District Court for the Western District of Missouri held that they were not unfair
labor practice strikers. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc.,
662 F. Supp. 1003, 1006, 127 L.R.R.M. 3266, 3268 (D. Mo. 1988), aff 'd, 878 F.2d 254 (1989),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 840 (1990).
2' TWA, 109 S. Ct. at 1229, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2658-59.
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for partial summary judgment, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Missouri held that the full-term strikers were
not entitled to reinstatement and that TWA was not required to
displace either the junior crossovers or the 1,220 new employees
hired by TWA immediately after the strike began. 24
Both TWA and the union appealed the court's decision. The
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit affirmed that TWA need
not displace the 1,220 new employees. 25 The appellate court, how-
ever, reversed the district court with respect to the junior crossover
employees. In holding that the junior crossovers should be displaced
by more senior full-term strikers, the appellate court relied on both
the union security clause of the pre-strike collective bargaining
agreement and judicial interpretation of the NLRA. 26 The appellate
court concluded that the refusal to displace the junior crossovers
"impermissibly discriminates among union members based on the
degree of their union activity."" The Supreme Court granted a writ
of certiorari solely on the issue of displacement of junior crossov-
ers.28
The Supreme Court reversed the appellate court, 2" holding
TWA did not have to displace junior crossovers in order to reinstate
senior full-term strikers." TWA argued that the Mackay doctrine
applied to crossovers, and that it would be anomalous to allow
strikers to displace junior crossovers when they could not displace
permanent replacements." The union argued that the Mackay doc-
trine is inapplicable to junior crossovers under the NLRA. 32 The
2' Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants, 643 F. Supp.
470, 480, 123 L.R.R.M. 2337, 2345 (W.D. Mo. 1986). The court also held that 463 new hires
who had not been fully trained by the end of the strike could he displaced by lull-term
strikers. Id.
23 Independent Fed'n of Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 819 F.2d 839,
847, 125 L.R.R.M. 2544, 2551 (8th Cir. 1987). The appellate court also affirmed the district
court's ruling that the partially trained new-hires could be displaced. Id.
26 See id. at 843, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2548.
27 Id. The appellate court reasoned that TWA's crossover policy was at odds with the
principles set forth in Erie Resistor. The appellate court noted that the Erie Resistor Court had
disapproved of super-seniority "because the award operated to the detriment of strikers as
compared to non-strikers; it in effect offered an inducement to abandon the strike; and it
created a long term division in the workforce." Id. at 844, 125 L.R.R.M. at 2548.
28
 Flight Attendants v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 108 S. Ct. 1219 (1988).
29 TWA, 109 S. Ct. 1225, 12:35, 130 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2663 (1989). Justice O'Connor wrote
the Court's opinion, in which Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White, Stevens, Scalia,
and Kennedy joined. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
" Id, at 1230, 130 L.R.R.M, at 2659.
Id, at 1230, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2659-60.
37 Id. at 1230-31, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
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union. also argued that differences between the NLRA and RLA
rendered the Mackay doctrine inapplicable to junior crossovers cov-
ered by the RLA. In distinguishing junior crossovers from the
permanent replacements discussed in Mackay, the union relied pri-
marily on the Supreme Court's decision in NLRB v. Erie Resistor
Corp." In Erie Resistor, the Court held that granting super-seniority
status to replacements to induce them to work was an unfair labor
practice." The Erie Court regarded the super-seniority policy as a
far greater encroachment on employee rights than permanent re-
placement alone, and therefore decided that the policy could not
be justified by the employer's business interests." The Court also
held that, given the discriminatory impact of the policy, the strikers
did not have to prove that the employer intended to discriminate
against them." Because the discriminatory impact of the policy was
not justifiable by business necessity, the Court upheld the Board's
decision."
In addressing the applicability of Erie Resistor to the crossover
issue, the TWA Court examined two main issues. First, the Court
noted that the grant of super-seniority in Erie Resistor affected all
strikers—including those that were reinstated—in contrast to per-
manent replacement, which does not affect those strikers who are
reinstated." The Court noted that, in TWA's case, reinstated full-
term strikers lost no seniority relative to new-hires and crossovers.
By reasoning that, after reinstatement, senior full-term strikers were
in exactly the same position to outbid juniors for assignments or to
displace juniors, the Court concluded that the union's decision to
strike did not affect the seniority of reinstated full-term strikers. 39
Second, the Court noted that the grant of super-seniority in
Erie Resistor was a continuing disadvantage to strikers, and thus a
source of cleavage in the workforce long after the end of the strike. 40
33 Id. at 1231, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
" NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 225-27, 237, 53 L.R.R.M. 2121, 2123,
2128. Erie Resistor involved an employer's hiring of permanent replacements during a strike.
Id. at 223, 53 L,R.R.M. at 2122. In order to guarantee job security to the replacements, in
light of previous layoffs, the employer offered them 20 years of seniority. At the end of the
strike, many full-term strikers were reinstated, but, because they had less seniority than the
replacements, many reinstated strikers were laid off within one year. Id. at 224, 53 L.R.R.M.
at 2122-23.
" Id. at 232, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2126.
w See id. at 231, 53 1...R.R.M. at 2125.
" See id. at 236-37, 53 L.R.R.M. at 2127-2g.
" 7'WA, 109 S. Ct. 1225, 1231, 130 L.R.R.M, 2657, 2660 (1989).
" Id.
40
 Id. at 1232, 130 L.R.R.M, at 2660-61.
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The TWA Court also noted that the anti-union effects of intra-
union competition and cleavage in the workforce were secondary
effects of economic weapons, fairly within the arsenal available to
employers during a period of self-help.'" Noting that some amount
of cleavage was inevitable from the division between strikers and
non-strikers, the Court held that the cleavage created by TWA's
crossover polky was insufficient to bring it within Erie Resistor's
proscription. 42
Holding that neither of Erie Resistor's rationales for limiting an
employer's permanent replacement policies was applicable, the TWA
Court declined to expand Erie Resistor to prohibit TWA's crossover
policy."The Court stated that there was no impermissible discrim-
ination in the filling of available positions based upon union activity.
The Court reasoned that the positions occupied by junior crossovers
and permanent hires were simply not available positions. The Court
determined that no discrimination had occurred because the strike-
caused vacancies had been filled by application of the pre-existing
neutral seniority program.'"
The Court also rejected IFFA's argument that it should distin-
guish crossovers from permanent replacements under Mackay. 45
The Court reasoned that distinguishing crossovers from new hires
would penalize non-strikers, solely to benefit strikers. The Court
recognized that the displacement of permanent replacements was
often the result of agreements that followed a successful strike, but
held that neither the federal common law under the NLRA nor the
Act itself required such a result." Lastly, the Court rejected the
4 , Id. at 1232, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
42 Id. at 1231-32,130 L.R.R.M. at 2660-61. The union argued that the TWA crossover
policy would create a cleavage between junior crossovers and reinstated full-term strikers
long after the termination of the strike because the desirable work allocations were unlikely
to be vacant to be bid upon for a considerable time after the end of the strike. If junior
crossovers had filled all the desirable positions during the strike and they could maintain
these positions after the strike, then senior full term strikers would not be able to obtain
these positions. The union also argued that resentful rifts would be created because the
crossover policy created a competition among strikers to return to work and avoid displace-
ment, undermining collective action protected by the RLA. Id, at 1231-32, 130 L.R.R.M. at
2661.
" Id. at 1232, 130 L.R.R.M, at 2661.
44 Id.
45 Id. at 1233, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
46 Id. at 1233, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2661-62. The Court stated:
We see no reason why those employees who chose not to gamble on the success
of the strike should suffer the consequences when the gamble proves unsuc-
cessful. Requiring junior crossovers, who cannot themselves displace the newly
hired permanent replacements . . . to be displaced by more senior full-term
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union's argument that, even if permissible under the NLRA, self-
help available to employers was limited by the RLA. 47 The union
had argued that the TWA crossover policy influenced or coerced
TWA employees not to strike, or to abandon the strike, and that
this represented an attempt to induce the TWA employees not to
remain members of the union in contravention of the RLA. 48 The
Court first noted that, although helpful in interpreting the RLA,
the NLRA should not be imported wholesale because of significant
differences between the statutory schemes. 49 The Court then dis-
missed the union's argument, interpreting the protections of the
RLA as directed primarily to the protection of pre-certification
rights of unorganized employees. 50
 The Court stated that its prior
decisions had held that the avenues of self-help available under the
RLA were greater than those available under the NLRA. 5 '
Moreover, the Court stated that after the statutory procedures
of the RLA have been exhausted, it is not the role of the government
to intervene on behalf of either bargaining party. 52 The Court noted
that the RLA did not provide any guidance as to the permissible
scope of self-help. The Court added that this lack of guidance did
not amount to congressional approval of all forms of self-help, but
did indicate that the Court should only limit self-help where it would
strike a fundamental blow to either a union or an employer. 53 Be-
cause the statutory scheme of dispute resolution under the RLA
strikers is precisely to visit the consequences of the lost gamble on those who
refused the risk.
Id. at 1233,130 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
47
 Id. at 1233-34, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2662.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 1233, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2662. The Court used as an example the fact that the
detailed panoply of law governing secondary picketing under the NLRA was not applicable
to disputes governed by the RLA. Id. (citing Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal, 394 U.S.
369, 383, 70 L.R.R.M. 2961, 2966 (1969)).
5° Id. at 1234, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2662. The Court noted that the purpose of the section
was to ensure proper representation of labor in the procedural framework that the RLA
provides for dispute resolution and to ensure that the labor representative was nut improperly
influenced or controlled by the employer. Id. at 1234, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2662-63.
51
 Id. According to the TWA Court, "parties who have unsuccessfully exhausted the
Railway Labor Act's procedures for resolution of a major dispute ... [may] employ the full
range of whatever peaceful economic power they can muster, so long as its use conflicts with
no other obligation imposed by federal law." Id. (citing Trainmen, 394 U.S. at 391-92, 70
L.R.R.M. at 2969).
52 Id. at 1234, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2663.
" Id. at 1235, 130 L.R.R:M. at 2663. The Court reasoned that judicial intervention is
only appropriate where the statutory dispute resolution system would otherwise be put in
jeopardy. Id.
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had been followed in its entirety and the crossover policy was a
permissible, peaceful use of economic power, the Court concluded
that judicial intervention was inappropriate. 54
The Supreme Court concluded that the crossover policy was
not illegal under either the RLA or the NLRA. 55 The Court decided
that the policy was neutral because it applied a pre-existing agree-
ment to all working employees. Further, the Court concluded that
the cleavage and competition produced were permissible secondary
effects of TWA's use of peaceful economic power. 56
Justice Brennan, writing in dissent, disagreed with the majori-
ty's characterization of the case. 57 Justice Brennan asserted that the
issue was not whether crossovers had some right to employment at
the end of a strike, but rather, whether an employer could discrim-
inate between crossovers and full-term strikers in the allocation of
jobs at the conclusion of a strike. He concluded that such discrim-
ination was inherently destructive of the right to strike. 58
Justice Brennan characterized the Mackay decision as only a
narrow exception to the N LRA's proscription of anti-union discrim-
ination—an exception justified solely because of an employer's need
to maintain the business. 59 According to Justice Brennan, there was
no such justification for the discrimination between crossovers and
full-term strikers; TWA's crossover policy did not fall within Mack-
ay's narrow exception and was thus prohibited. 6°
Justice Brennan argued that, under Mackay, the treatment of
permanent replacements should differ from crossovers. 6 ' Justice
Brennan reasoned that the crossover policy created competition
between strikers to abandon the strike and avoid replacement, and
thus divided the strikers. By contrast, the use of permanent replace-
ments only produces a group incentive to return to work. Justice
Brennan asserted that this divide and conquer technique was in-
herently destructive of union activity and collective bargaining. Jus-
" Id.
55 Id.
56 Id,
57 Id. at 1235, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2663-64 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
" Id. Unlike the majority, the dissent asserted that the protection of an employee's right
to strike was a fundamental role of 2(4) of the RLA. Id. at 1235-36, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2664
(Brennan, J., dissenting). The majority had emphasized that § 2(4) was directed primarily to
protection of the pre-certification and organization of labor and not to the right to strike.
See supra note 50 and accompanying text,
59 Id. at 1236-37, 1238, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2664, 2665 (Brennan, j., dissenting).
66 Id. at 1237-38, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2665-66 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 1238, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2666 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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tice Brennan concluded, however, that the infringement of em-
ployee rights caused by TWA's crossover policy made it a forbidden
labor practice. 62
In a separate dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that the Su-
preme Court's past RLA decisions had attempted to strike a balance
between the business needs of an employer and the long-term sta-
bility of labor relations." As an example of this balance, Justice
Blackmun looked to the principles espoused in NLRB v. Fleetwood
Trailer Co."
In Fleetwood, the Supreme Court stated that an employer's re-
fusal to reinstate strikers could be considered discriminatory unless
the employer could justify its actions because of business necessity.
The Court stated that the hiring of permanent replacements was
one situation in which an employer had "legitimate and substantial
business justifications."65 Justice Blackmun contended that the TWA
case ought to be remanded in order to determine whether the
crossover policy adopted by TWA also had such business justifica-
tions.66
The Supreme Court's decision in TWA is significant because it
increases the power of permanent replacement as an economic
weapon against strikes. In TWA, the Court held that, under both
the RLA and NLRA, crossovers need not be displaced in order to
reinstate full-term strikers at the conclusion of a strike. 67 This de-
cision expands the Mackay doctrine regarding permanent replace-
ments and limits the protection of striker seniority developed in
Erie Resistor. The effect of the TWA Court's expansive reading of
the Mackay doctrine is that an employer need not displace crossovers
in order to reinstate full-term strikers, even where the crossovers
are junior to the full-term strikers.
However facially similar the positions of crossover and new-
hire may be, the rationale used to protect the positions of crossovers
52 Id. at 1239, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2666 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
ea
	
at 1240, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2667 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
64 Id. at 1244, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2670-71 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See Fleetwood, 389
U.S. 375, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737 (1967); see also NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26, 65
L.R.R.M. 2465 (1967).
" Fleetwood, 389 U.S. at 379, 66 L.R.R.M. at 2738.
" TWA at 1248, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2673 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). On this point, Justice
Blackmun disagreed with Justice Brennan who categorically denied the legality of the cros-
sover policy, finding that it could not be justified by the business necessity of TWA. Id. at
1246, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67 TWA at 1235, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2663.
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in TWA is widely divergent from that which sanctioned the employ-
ment of permanent replacements in Mackay. Under Mackay, it k not
an unfair labor practice to hire replacement workers in "an effort
to carry on the business" because the employer has "the right to
protect and continue his business by supplying places left vacant by
strikers."68 In TWA, the Court based its decision on two factors: that
the positions occupied by crossovers are not available to be filled;
and that the crossovers' right not to strike protects them from the
risk of displacement. 69 Neither of these arguments is consistent with
the original rationale of Mackay.
The majority gives little reason for why crossovers should be
guaranteed the same protections as new-hires under Mackay. The
majority accepts TWA's argument that to require that crossovers be
displaced when new hires cannot be displaced would be anoma-
lous:7° The Court, however, finds nothing anomalous about allowing
juniors to displace their seniors by crossing the picket line even
though this effectively strips the senior strikers of their rights under
the seniority bidding plan. Although the Court did not find any
anti-union discrimination on the part of TWA, it is clear that cross-
overs do not support the union as strongly as full-term strikers.'"
As a result, the crossover policy operates de facto to discriminate
against employees because of their degree of union activity. The
Court previously noted that direct evidence of discriminatory intent
was unnecessary where an employer's actions have obvious discrim-
inatory impact. 72
The TWA Court should have made an independent determi-
nation of whether the TWA crossover policy had legitimate and
substantial business justifications." The Supreme Court has previ-
ously held that an employer could not differentiate between striking
and non-striking employees unless the action had legitimate and
substantial business justifications." Although the Court has also held
that hiring permanent replacements is a legitimate and substantial
business justification for refusing to reinstate strikers, the position
68 NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333,345,2 L.R.R.M. 610,614 (1938).
69 See TWA, 109 S. Ct at 1232,130 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
7° Id. at 1230,130 L.R.R.M. at 2660.
7 ' Id. at 1232,130 L.R.R.M. at 2661.
72 See Supra notes 33-37 and accompanying text for a discussion of Erie Resistor.
7' Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, urged the application of this test. See supra notes
63-66 and accompanying text.
74 NLRB v. Great Dane Trailers, 388 U.S. 26,27-35,65 L.R.R.M. 2465,2466-69 (1967).
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of crossovers is not identical to the position of permanent replace-
ments. 75
 Although it mentioned the business justification standard,
the majority in TWA did not apply it to the crossover policy adopted
by TWA. 76
 In assuming that crossovers were analogous to new-
hires, the Court decided that a de novo determination regarding
crossovers was unnecessary because hiring of permanent replace-
ments has legitimate and substantial business justifications. 77
Only Justice Blackmun in his dissent both stated and applied
the business justification analysis. Justice Blackmun concluded that
there was insufficient evidence by which to judge the employer's
business justifications for the crossover policy. 78
 The majority com-
pletely ignored the substantial and legitimate business justification
analysis because the right not to strike and the tenurial rights of
crossovers do not fit such an analysis.
Although decided under the RLA, the holding of TWA will
apply to future cases brought under the NLRA. The TWA decision
permits employers to continue to employ junior crossovers at the
end of a strike and refuse to reinstate senior full-term strikers. The
Court implied that this is a natural progression of the Mackay de-
cision; it is not. The basis of the Court's decision was the importance
of the employee's right not to strike, which is far removed from the
business necessity rationale of Mackay. In effect, the Court created
a new doctrine that protects crossovers from displacement because
of their right not to strike.
The TWA Court declined to apply Erie Resistor, which limited
the ways in which an employer could give incentives to employees
who worked during a strike. Erie Resistor's grant of super-seniority
was so inherently destructive of employee rights that proof of the
employer's discriminatory intent was unnecessary. The Court made
it clear that discriminatory motivation could be inferred from dis-
criminatory impact.
In TWA, the Court held that the employer, acting under a
neutral plan, can remove all of the accrued benefits 79 of seniority
78 NLRB v, Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375, 380-81, 66 L.R.R.M. 2737, 2739
(1967).
76 The Court cited Fleetwood merely as an affirmation of the Mackay rule, See TWA, 109
S. Ct. 1225, 1230, 130 L.R.R.M. 2657, 2660 (1989).
" See id. at 1235, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2663.
78
 See id. at 1246, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2672 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan,
• who joined in parts of Justice Blackmun's dissent, did not concur with Justice Blackmun with
regard to application of the substantial business justification test. See id.
79
 The benefits I refer to here are not the ability to outbid others for positions, but the
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and distribute them to the non-striking employees." The Court
allowed the form of the employer's actions to triumph over their
function, and turns a blind eye to the realities of the situation. In
effect, the TWA Court ignored the teachings of Erie Resistor partic-
ularly with respect to the discriminatory impact of TWA's crossover
policy.
The Court also ignored the legitimate and substantial business
justification standard. This omission arose, in part, because the
rationale behind the Court's decision is the right not to strike, rather
than business necessity. This rationale reveals that factors other than
business necessity may be determinative with respect to who is re-
placed at the termination of a strike. The Court's emphasis of the
right not to strike as a factor in this analysis demonstrates that the
Court is willing to expand that right to the detriment of its inverse—
the right to strike.
IV. SECTION 1983
A. * Emergence of a Section 1983 Cause of Action under the NLRA:
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles'
The United States Supreme Court has stated that parties to
collective bargaining are guaranteed not only those rights which are
specifically enumerated in the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA" or the "Act"), but also those rights which are implicit in
the Act.' The Supreme Court has also held that individual states
are preempted from interfering with the rights secured by the
NLRA." If a state does interfere with a right secured by the NLRA,
a party to collective bargaining has two potential remedies. First, a
party may petition a federal district court for declaratory or in-
ultimate consequences of seniority, such as the actual occupancy of a desirable domicile and
job security.
82 See TWA, 109 S. Cl. at 1235, 130 L.R.R.M. at 2663,
* By Thomas Hennessey, Editor, BosToiv CoLLEGE Law REVIEW.
I 110 S. Ct. 444, 132 L.R.R.M. 3015 (1989).
2 See, R. GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW, ch. XXXII § 1 (1976) (describing
preemption based upon state violations of the explicit provisions of § 7 and § 8 of the NLRA,
which outline specific labor practices that are deemed permissible); Golden State Transit
Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (Golden Slate 1), 475 U.S. 608, 614, 121 L,R.R.M. 3233, 3236
(1986) (describing preemption based upon state and municipal violations of congressional
intent which is implicit in the NLRA).
3 Golden State I, 975 U.S. at 613, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3235-36.
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junctive relief. 4 Second, a party may have a claim for compensatory
damages under 42 U.S.C. section 1983 ("section 1983") if a state
violates any rights secured by the Constitution or by federal laws.5
The Supreme Court, however, has concluded that not every viola-
tion of federal statutory law will give rise to a damage claim under
section 1983. 6
 In 1989, the Court, for the first time, combined
section 1983 jurisprudence with the labor law preemption doctrine,
creating a claim for compensatory damages under section 1983. 7
In the labor context, the Supreme Court has held that the rights
guaranteed by the NLRA prohibit states from interfering with col-
lective bargaining disputes. 8
 In the 1976 decision of Machinists , v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Commission, the United States Su-
preme Court established a preemption doctrine that prevents state
interference with labor disputes that Congress intended to be left
unregulated. 9
 In Machinists, the union sought to apply economic
pressure on the employer during collective bargaining by refusing
to allow union members to work overtime."' The employer peti-
tioned both the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the
state's employment relations commission to enjoin the union's activ-
ity." Although the NLRB dismissed the complaint, the state com-
mission granted an injunction under a state statute that prohibited
concerted union activities, apart from strikes, that were designed to
disrupt productive activity.' 2 In overturning the state employment
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (Golden Stale II), 110 S. Ct. 444,
452, 132 L.R.R.M. 3015, 3022 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
5 Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or
causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
6 See, e.g., Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass'n, 453 U.S.
1, 19 (1981) (claims for damages due to violation of federal law under § 1983 are subject to
recognized exceptions); see also infra notes 16-19 and accompanying text fur a discussion of
the analysis applied to determine whether a § 1983 cause of action is available.
7 Golden State II, 110 S. Ct. at 453, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3020 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
8 Golden Stale I, 475 U.S. 608, 619, 121 L.R.R.M. 3233, 3238 (1986).
9 Id. at 614, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3236 (in Golden Stale I, the Court discussed the practical
consequences of the Machinists preemption doctrine).
1 ° Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Cotnin'n, 427 U.S. 132, 139, 92
L.R.R.M. 2881, 2881-82 (1976).
" Id. at 135, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
12 Id. at 135-36, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2882.
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commission, the Supreme Court reasoned that the use of economic
weapons by either party to a labor dispute is "part and parcel" of .
the process of collective bargaining.'' Although the Court held that
states are preempted from. regulating rights secured by the NLRA,
it did not address whether such illegal state regulation also gave
rise to damages under section 1983. 14
Outside of the labor context, the Supreme Court has concluded
that claims for deprivations of federal statutory rights are available
under section 1983.' 5 In the 1981 case of Middlesex County Sewerage
Authority v. National Sea Clammers Association, the United States Su-
preme Court established a two-step analysis to determine whether
a plaintiff may assert a claim under section 1983.' 6 In National Sea
Clammers, the damages claim was based on an alleged violation of
federal clean water statutes clue to the pollution of plaintiffs' clam-
ming grounds.' 7 The Court stated that a plaintiff must first show a
violation of some federal right in order to maintain a section 1983
cause of action.' Once the plaintiff establishes such a violation, the
defendant may demonstrate that Congress intended to foreclose a
section 1983 remedy by providing a comprehensive enforcement
mechanism in the legislation.'• Applying this analysis, the Court
denied a section 1983 claim, concluding that the comprehensive
enforcement mechanisms in the clean water statutes at issue were
evidence of Congress's intent to foreclose other remedies. 2°
During the Su. rvey year, the United States Supreme Court, in
Golden State Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State II), ex-
amined the preemption doctrine in conjunction with section 1983
jurisprudence. 21 The Court held that when a state interferes with a
collective bargaining right secured by the Act, a party to the bar-
gaining may seek compensatory damages against the state under
section 1983. 22
Golden State II involved a dispute between the Teamsters Union
and Golden State Transit Corporation CGST"), in which the City
' 3 Id. at 149, 155, 92 L.R.R.M. at 2885, 2889.
' 4 Golden Slate II, 110 S. Ct. 444, 453-54, 455, 132 L.R.R.M. 3015, 3020, 3022 (1989)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
It. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4 (1980); 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
11 453 U.S. 1, 19-21 (1981).
12 Id. at 4-5.
12 Id. at 19.
42 Id. at 19-20.
2" Id. at 20-2 I .
21 110  S. Ct. at 447-48, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3016.
11 Id. at 450, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3018.
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of Los Angeles intervened." In 1980, GST applied for a renewal
of its cab franchise from the city. While the franchise renewal was
still being considered by the city, the Teamsters struck GST. The
Teamsters argued against renewal of the franchise at the city coun-
cil's public hearing on the franchise issue. The council voted to
temporarily extend the franchise, but conditioned the renewal on
a settlement of the labor dispute within a specified period. The
period expired without a settlement and the council held a second
public hearing. The Teamsters again publicly opposed the franchise
renewal, and the council voted against GST's motion to extend the
franchise. 24
 GST then initiated a suit against the City of Los Angeles
in federal district court. 25
The district court found that the labor dispute had motivated
the city's denial of the franchise renewal. 26 The court stated that by
considering the labor dispute, the city had denied GST a permissible
economic weapon, thereby violating the preemption doctrine estab-
lished in Machinists. Because the NLRA preempted the city's denial
of the franchise renewal, the district court entered a preliminary
injunction against the city." In addressing the city's appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit overturned
the district court, holding that the record indicated that the city's
decision was motivated solely by permissible concerns of municipal
transportation. 28
On appeal by the union, the Supreme Court, in Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles (Golden State I), disagreed, reason-
ing that the preemption doctrine of Machinists applied to the labor
dispute between the Teamsters and GST. 29 The Court held that the
economic weapons the union employed during the dispute were
permissible, and that the city's intervention destroyed the balance
of power intended by Congress under the Act. 3° On remand, the
district court enjoined the city to reinstate the franchise, but denied
the claim for compensatory damages under section 1983 which GST
23
 See Golden State I, 475 U.S. 608, 609 -II, 121 L.R.R.M. 3233, 3234-35 (1986) (the
predecessor case to Golden State II, in which the Supreme Court described the factual basis
of the labor dispute).
24 Id. at 610-11, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3234-35.
25 Id.
2° Id. at 611, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3235.
27 Id. at 611-12, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3235.
28 Id. at 620, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3238 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
29 Id. at 614, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3236.	 •
3° Id. at 619, 121 L.R.R.M. at 3238.
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had asserted." The circuit court affirmed the district court's deci-
sion, and the city again appealed the decision to the Supreme
Court. 32
In Golden State II, the Supreme Court established a private cause
of action for compensatory damages under section 1983 when a
state violates a right secured by the NLRA." The Court applied its
two-prong analysis set forth in National Sea Clammers in deciding
that an enforceable remedy exists under section 1983, arising out
of violations of the Act." The Court stated that the plaintiff must
first establish the violation of a federal right that Congress intended
the NLRA to protect." The Court noted that, in order to establish
a protectable.right, the plaintiff must demonstrate a definitive right
binding upon the governmental unit, rather than a mere expression
of congressional preference." Similarly, the Court stated that the
right asserted must not be vague, and must be judicially enforceable.
The Court then affirmed that where a right is demonstrated, the
defendant is free to show that Congress foreclosed the section 1983
remedy by creating a comprehensive enforcement scheme for the
claimed right. 37
Applying the first prong of the test, the Golden State II Court
concluded that the city's interference with the collective bargaining
process constituted a violation of federally protected rights under
the A\ILRA. 38 The Court reasoned that, in enacting the NLRA,
Congress had done more than merely occupy the field of labor
relations. Rather, the Court stated, Congress had established sub-
stantive rights benefiting the parties subject to collective bargaining
against both each other and the state. The Court determined that
the rights protected by the Act are not solely those enumerated in
the Act, but are all of those rights that Congress intended to protect
from governmental interference. Specifically, the Court stated that
the Machinists doctrine prohibits state interference with rights Con-
gress intended to confer through the NLRA. 39 Thus, the Court
" Golden State II, 110 S. Ct. 444, 446-48, 132 L.R.R.M. 3015, 3016 (1989).
32 Id.
3' Id. at 452, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3019.
34 Id. at 448, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3016-17.
35 Id. at 448,132 L.R.R.M. at 3016.
30 Id. at 448, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3016-17.
" Id. at 448,132 L.R.R.M. at 3017.
3" Id. at 450, 132 L.R.R.M, at 3018.
" Id. at 451, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3018-19; see also Machinists v. Wisconsin Employment
Relations Comm'n, 427 U,S. 132, 149-151, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2886-2887 (1976) (explaining
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reasoned, Congress meant to create a zone free from governmental
regulation, even though more peaceful measures may be available
to the parties. 4° Similarly, the Court rejected the state's argument
that Congress's failure to prohibit explicitly certain state activities
implied that state intervAtion was permissible. The Court held
instead that rights implicit in the legislation were to receive protec-
tion equivalent to the protection given to those rights specifically
enumerated in the NLRA. 4 '
Addressing the second prong of the analysis, the Court stated
that the City of Los Angeles had failed to show a comprehensive
scheme of federal enforcement that would preclude a private rem-
edy under section 1983. 42 The Court recognized that the NLRA
grants the NLRB exclusive jurisdiction to restrict unfair labor prac-
tices by both unions and employers. The NLRB, however, has no
power to prohibit governmental interference with activities that are
protected by the NLRA. According to the Court, remedies for such
interference originate from private claims under the preemption
doctrine, which may give rise to injunctive or declaratory relief."'
The Court concluded that the broad remedial scope of section 1983
was not precluded by other enforcement mechanisms in the NLRA,
and therefore recognized a private right of action under section
1983 for violation of the implicit and explicit provisions of the
NLRA. 44
justice Kennedy, joined by Chief justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, dissented from the majority's holding. The dissent ob-
served that the Supremacy Clause prohibited the city from inter-
fering in collective bargaining."' The dissent, however, concluded
that the city's mere misapprehension of the bounds .of federal and
state power should not give rise to a private cause of action under
section 1983.46
In addressing the preemption doctrine, the dissent reasoned
that the interest protected under the doctrine is immunity from
that the sources of congressional intent may be found in the decisions of the NLRB, the
rules of statutory interpretation, and court decisions interpreting the NLRA).
" Golden Stale II, 110 S. CL at 451, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3019.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 449-50, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3017.
" Id. at 455, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3022 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (recognizing that plaintiffs
may vindicate Machinists preemption claims by seeking declaratory and injunctive relief in
district court).
44
 Id, at 450, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3018.
45 Id. at 453, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3020 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
45 Id.
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state action, not a substantive right. The dissent stated that, al-
though GST was properly relieved from the state's interference
during collective bargaining, compensatory damages were inappro-
priate. The dissent relied upon the legislative history of section
1983, as originally enacted, to argue that the framers contemplated
"rights" to mean only those rights secured by the Constitution. 47
The dissent recognized that recent Court decisions had expanded
"rights" to include statutorily created entitlements as well, but con-
cluded that the NLRA secured no such entitlement. The dissent
reasoned that the Supremacy Clause, as applied to the NLRA, was
designed to draw the bounds of federal and local jurisdiction, not
to establish damages for parties involved in labor disputes when
those boundaries are crossed. Thus, the dissent would have limited
GST's remedies to declaratory or equitable relief through powers
granted to the district courts under various federal jurisdictional
statutes."
In Golden Slate II, the Court combined the preemptive rule of
Machinists with section 1983 jurisprudence to create a new private
cause of action under the NLRA. 49 The right created in Golden State
11 is consistent with other economic rights that the Court has
deemed worthy of protection under section 1983. 50 Furthermore,
protection of collective bargaining through a private cause of action
is a necessary measure to encourage the furtherance of Congress'
intent in enacting the NLRA. The extension of the Machinists rule
to section 1983 creates a right designed to benefit the economic
interests of both parties to collective bargaining.
The COurt, in Golden State II, recognized the important role
that the use of economic weapons has in the collective bargaining
process.'' Regulation of these economic weapons through state ac-
" Id. at 454, 132 L.R.R.M, at 3021 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
48 Id. at 455-56, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3022 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
' 9 See id. at 450, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3018.
5" See, e.g., Wright v. Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 419, 432 (1987).
(holding that federal housing benefits are sufficiently specific and definite to qualify as
enforceable rights under § 1983); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1980) (holding that
state recission of Social Security benefits violated federal statutory rights protected by § 1983).
5L Golden State II, 110 S. Ct. at 452, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3019 ("the interests in being free
of governmental regulation of the 'peaceful methods of putting economic pressure upon one
another,' is a right specifically conferred on employers and employees by the NLRA"). Outside
of the labor context, the Court has held that § 1983 protects rights beyond those encompassed
in equal protection or civil rights legislation alone. See Thihoutot, 448 U.S. at 5 (under § 1983,
states may be made to respond to damages not only for violations of civil rights, but for
violations of federal constitutional and statutory rights as well). The Court has recognized
that certain economic rights guaranteed by federal statutes, were intended to remain free
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tion constitutes more than mere jurisdictional infringement. Such
regulation threatens to upset the balance of rights which assures an
equitable economic outcome through collective bargaining. 52 The
right to bargain collectively is inextricably bound to the relative
economic positions of the parties to the dispute. Thus, the right to
use relative strength during collective bargaining can be seen as an
implicit entitlement of economic rights granted through the NLRA.
The circumstances of Golden State II provide an excellent ex-
ample of the economic entitlement implicitly granted in the NLRA.
In Golden State II, the city's actions caused a total cessation of the
plaintiff's business, while allowing the union to negotiate with car-
riers who could have succeeded GST's franchise. 53 Given the poten-
tial economic ramifications to either a union or an employer that
may result from the regulation of otherwise permissible economic
weapons, it is difficult to distinguish the rights secured by the NLRA
from more direct economic rights, such as welfare or housing as-
sistance, which are protected under section 1983. The dissent rec-
ognized, but disagreed with, the judicial expansion of section 1983
to protect federal statutory entitlements from state interference. 54
The dissent's narrow interpretation of both the legislative history
of section 1983, and the rights secured by the NLRA, however,
ignores the logical conclusion that collective bargaining rights are
equivalent to a federal statutory entitlement of economic position
during a labor dispute.
Furthermore, in the absence of a section 1983 cause of action,
local or state agencies have little incentive to refrain from interfer-
ing in divisive collective bargaining situations. Although the NLRA
has sole jurisdiction to curtail unfair labor practices between labor
and management, it has no jurisdiction over cases where local agen-
cies have prohibited otherwise permissible collective bargaining de-
vices. 55 Prior to Golden Slate II, the sole remedy was injunctive relief
based on the preemption doctrine. Such relief, however, fails to
account for the economic damage that may be incurred by either
labor or management while the preemption action is pending.
In cases such as Golden State II, local elected bodies may have
an obvious political bias to favor the party with the greatest relative
from state or local regulation. See Wright, 479 U.S. at 421-22, 432 (federal housing benefits);
Thiboutot, 448 U.S. at 3, 4 (welfare payments under the Social Security Act).
52
 Golden State II, 110 S. Ct. at 450, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3018.
Golden State I, 475 U.S. 608, 610, 121 L.R.R.M. 3233, 3234 (1980),
M Golden State II, 110 S. Ct. at 454, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3021.
55 Id. at 450, 132 L.R.R.M. at 3017-18.
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political power. Prior to Golden State II, this inclination was not offset
by a concomitant penalty should the local action be deemed to
violate the NLRA. Golden State II provides just such a disincentive
against capricious local action, thereby encouraging more prudent
consideration on the part of local bodies before they intervene in
legal collective bargaining disputes.
The extension of a private right of action under section 1983
to cover violations of the Machinists preemption doctrine also creates
a nonpartisan rule of law favoring neither management nor labor
but benefiting both. The incorporation of the Machinists rule assures
that the right of an employer to maintain an action for damages
(where a state body interfered with the employer's permissible eco-
nomic weapons) extends to labor as well.'" Golden State II thus pro-
tects both parties to collective bargaining from interference with
the rights intended to be conveyed through the NLRA without
imposing an obvious bias in favor of either labor or management.
In Golden State II, the Supreme Court held that a party to
collective bargaining may maintain a private cause of action under
section 1983 should a state violate a right secured by the NLRA.
The Court recognized the economic rights that Congress sought to
secure through the NLRA by maintaining the availability of certain
economic weapons for use by either party during collective bar-
gaining. The decision thus provides a necessary disincentive to ca-
pricious local activity that may be spurred by political motivations
or by the mere disregard of the jurisdictional limitations which the
NLRA seeks to impose.
V. RAILWAY LABOR Act.
A. *. The Supreme Court's New Standard of Review for Resolving
Disputes Under the RLA: Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association'
The Railway Labor Act of 1926 ("RLA") seeks to prevent strikes
and to promote stability in the railroad and airline industries by
56 Machinists held that economic weapons employed by either labor or management were
intended to be free from local interference. Consequently, the rule of' Golden State II would
have allowed the union in Machinists to maintain a private cause of action for damages
suffered as a result of the state's denial of employees' right to refuse overtime. Machinists v.
Wisconsin Employment Relations Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132, 154-55, 92 L.R.R.M. 2881, 2889
(1976),
* By Mark W. Mancinelli, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
109 S. Ct. 2477, 131 L.R.R,M. 2601 (1989).
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imposing a duty upon management and labor to make every rea-
sonable effort to settle disputes that relate to their collective bar-
gaining agreements. 2 The procedure for resolving disputes arising
under the RLA hinges upon whether the disagreement between
management and labor gives rise to a "major" or a "minor" dispute. 3
The characterization of a dispute as "major" or "minor" also deter-
mines whether a contested employment change can be made before
the dispute is resolved through the procedures established by the
RLA.4
A "major" dispute under the RLA occurs when one party at-
tempts to implement policy changes that are outside the scope of
the rights contained within the parties' existing collective bargaining
agreement.5 When a dispute is "major," the RLA requires the parties
to complete an exhaustive process of negotiation, mediation, and
arbitration in order to encourage voluntary resolution of the dis-
pute. 6 During this conciliation period, either party may obtain an
injunction to prevent the other party from unilaterally implement-
ing employment practices that are not within the terms of the
parties' existing collective bargaining agreement.'
In contrast, "minor" disputes involve disagreements over the
meaning or proper application of terms already contained in the
2 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-188 (1981). Section 152 of the RLA provides:
It shall be the duty of all carriers, their officers, agents. and employees to
exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements concerning
rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes, whether
arising out of the application of such agreements or otherwise, in order to avoid
any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier growing out
of any dispute between the carrier and the employees thereof.
Id.	 152.
Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 722-23, 16 L.R.R.M. 749, 754-
55 (1945). The language of the RLA does not explicitly distinguish between "major" and
"minor" disputes. See. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Norfolk & Western Ry., 833 F.2d
700, 704, 126 L.R.R.M. 3121, 3123-24 (7th Cir. 1987). The Supreme Court created the
distinction between "major" and "minor" disputes in Elgin, 325 U.S. at 722-23, 16 L.R.R.M.
at 754-55.
1 Brotherhood of Maintenance of Way Employees, Lodge 16 v. Burlington N.R.R. Co.,
802 F.2d 1016, 1021, 123 L.R.R.M. 2593, 2597 (8th Cir. 1986).
5 Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723, 16 L.R.R.M. at 754-55. According to the Elgin Court, "major"
disputes look to the "acquisition of rights for the future, not to rights claimed to have vested
in the past." Id.
5
 Burlington, 802 F.2(1 at 1021, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2597. For details of the procedure for
resolving "major" disputes, see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co.,
394 U.S. 369, 378, 70 L.R.R.M. 2961, 2964 (1968).
Burlington, 802 F.2c1 at 1021, 123 L.R.R,M, at '1597. The parties' duty to maintain the
status quo during the resolution of "major" disputes arises under the RLA, 45 U.S.C. §§ 156,
160 (1981); see Detroit & Toledo Shore Line R.R. Co. v. United States Transp. Union, 396
U.S. 142, 150-53, 72 L.R.R.M. 2838, 2841-42 (1969).
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existing collective bargaining agreement. 8 Under the RLA, parties
must settle "minor" disputes through compulsory arbitration con-
ducted by the National Railway Adjustment Board (the "NRAB"). 9
During the arbitration period, an injunction is not available to the
disputing parties, and thus, either party may implement a contested
employment policy change at any time.i°
The distinction between "major" and "minor" disputes is a
recurring issue in a wide variety of lawsuits between management
and labor in the railroad and airline industries." Although this
distinction is fundamental in determining the procedure for resolv-
ing management-labor disputes, the federal circuit courts have ap-
plied various standards for determining whether a dispute is "ma-
jor" or "minor" under the RLA. 12 Prior to 1989, the United States
Supreme Court had not ruled on the proper standard for distin-
guishing between "major" and "minor" disputes.
During the Survey year, in Consolidated Rail Corporation v. Railway
Labor Executives' Association, the United States Supreme Court
adopted a standard for distinguishing between "major" and "minor"
disputes under the RLA.I 3 In Consolidated Rail, the Supreme Court
8 Elgin, 325 U.S. at 723, 16 L.R.R.M. at 754-55. As the Court articulated in Elgin,
"minor" disputes involve claims to "rights accrued, not merely to have rights created for the
future." Id., 16 L.R.R.M. at 755.
° Burlington, 802 F.2d at 1021, 123 L.R.R.M. at 2597.
10 Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co., 845 F.2d 420,
424, 128 L.R.R.M. 2030, 2033 (3d Cir. 1988).
" See, e.g., id. at 428, 128 L. R. R. M. at 2036 (railroad's decision to sell assets with resultant
elimination of jobs is a "major" dispute); Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs v. Boston &
Maine Corp., 788 F.2d 794, 798-99, 122 L.R.R.M. 2020, 2023 (1st Cir. 1986) (railroad's
operational changes resulting in lower wages constituted "major" dispute); Radin v, United
States, 699 F.2d 681, 683, 112 L.R.R.M. 2560, 2562 (4th Cir. 1983) (employee discharge
grievance gives rise to a "minor" dispute).
12 For example, in the 1972 case of International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers v.
Washington Terminal Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit held that a "minor" dispute arises if it is "reasonable" to believe that the terms of an
existing collective bargaining agreement cover a new policy change. 473 F.2d 1156, 1173-
75, 82 L.R.R.M. 2030, 2042, 2044 (D.C. Cir. 1972). By comparison, in the 1988 case of
Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers v. Burlington Northern Railroad Co., the United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that a contested change in employment practices gives
rise to a "minor" dispute whenever the change is "arguably" within the terms of the parties'
existing agreement. 838 F.2d 1087, 1091, 127 L.R.R.M. 2812, 2815 (9th Cir. 1988). Similarly,
in the 1987 case of National Railway Labor Conference v. International Association of Machinist
and Aerospace Workers, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit created its
version of the test, holding that a "minor" dispute arose when one party sought to implement
new employment practices unless it was "frivolous" or "obviously insubstantial" to believe
that the change in employment practices was within the terms of the existing collective
bargaining agreement. 830 F.2d 741, 746, 126 L.R.R.M. 2615, 2618 (7th Cir, 1987).
" 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2479, 2482, 131 L.R.R.M. 2601, 2601, 2604 (1989).
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held that whenever a contested change in employment practices is
"arguably" within the parties' existing collective bargaining agree-
ment, the change gives rise to a "minor" dispute, and therefore, the
change can be implemented before an arbitrator determines
whether it is actually permitted under the terms of the parties'
existing agreernent. 14
In 1976, Consolidated Rail Corporation ("Conrail") imple-
mented a medical procedure requiring its employees to undergo
physical examinations that included a urinalysis for blood sugar and
albumin.' 5
 In general, the urinalysis that Conrail's physical exami-
nation procedures required did not extend to testing urine for the
presence of drugs.i° Employees who failed to meet Conrail's medical
standards following a physical examination could be suspended
without pay until they were able to pass Conrail's physical exami-
nation. t7
On February 20, 1987, Conrail unilaterally altered its medical
testing procedures by adding a drug testing component to its pre-
existing urinalysis test.'s As part of the new drug screening pro-
gram, Conrail could suspend employees who tested positively for
the presence of drugs unless they provided a drug-free urine sam-
ple within forty-five clays after receiving the results of their initial
drug test.' 9
 Conrail could discharge employees who did not provide
a drug-free urine specimen within the proscribed time limit. 20
14 Id. at 2484, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
15 Id. at 2485, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2606. Under Conrail's medical policy, employees sub-
mitted to physical examinations periodically, upon return to duty, and as a follow-up pro-
cedure when an employee's medical condition justified an examination. Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at
2606-07.
18 Id. at 2486, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2607. Conrail's policy permitted a drug screening of the
urinalysis only when, in the judgment of the examining physician, the employee may have
been using drugs. Id. Drug screens were, however, a regular part of an employee's "return
to duty" examination if the employee had faced prior suspension from work due to a drug-
related problem. Id.
IT Id. The suspension period was apparently unlimited, and thus, Conrail's policy did
not require the discharge of employees who failed to provide a satisfactory urine specimen
within a specified period of time. See id. at 2487, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2608.
18 Id. at 2486, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2607. Conrail's new policy required drug testing in both
periodic and return to duty examinations. Id. In addition, Conrail's new policy required drug
tests in follow-up examinations for all employees returning to duty after a drug related
suspension. Id.
19 Id. An employee who tested positively for drugs could also seek counselling at Conrail's
Employee Counselling Center. Id. If the counselling service revealed that the employee had
an addiction problem, the employee could enter an approved treatment program. Id. An
employee who entered a treatment program was then given 125 days to provide a drug-free
urine sample. Id.
2° Id. at 2487, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2608.
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Following the implementation of Conrail's new drug testing
program, the Railway Labor Executives' Association (the "union")
filed suit against Conrail in the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania, seeking an injunction to prevent
Conrail from administering the disputed tests. 2 ' The union con-
tended that Conrail's new drug testing policy created a "major"
dispute under the RLA. 22 Consequently, the union argued that the
court should issue an injunction pending the results of the concil-
iation process required to resolve "major" disputes." The district
court rejected the union's claims, however, and held that the new
drug testing policy gave rise to a "minor" dispute because the policy
was "arguably" justified under the implied terms of the parties'
existing collective bargaining agreement. 24
The union appealed the district court's decision to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. 25 The circuit court
concluded that Conrail's drug testing program gave rise to a "major"
dispute because there was no evidence that the parties had "argu-
ably" agreed on several important changes resulting from the in-
troduction of the new drug testing policy. 26 Thus, the circuit court
2 ' Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Consolidated Rail, No. 86-2968 slip op. (E.D. Pa.
April 28, 1987). The Railway Labor Executives' Association is an unincorporated association
which consists of the chief executive officers of 19 labor associations that represent Conrail's
employees. Consolidated Rail v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n„ 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2479, 131
L.R.R.M. 2601, 2601-02 (1989).
22 Consolidated Rail, No, 86-2968 slip op. at 1.
21 Id, at 2-3.
2' Id. at 3. The district court based its conclusion on several -findings. First, the court
found that Conrail and the union had a long standing medical policy that included procedures
to ensure that employees were medically fit to perform their jobs. Second, the court found
that the union had always recognized Conrail's right to discharge employees who were unable
to perform their ditties safely. In view of these findings, the district court concluded that
Conrail's drug testing program was merely a further refinement of its prior practices that
was consistent with its right to promote the safety of its operations. Thus, the district court
found that the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agreement "arguably" permitted
the disputed policy change. Id.
" Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n. v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 845 F.2d 1187, 128
L.R.R.M. 2168 (3d Cir. 1988).
26 Id. at 1193-94, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2173-74. In particular, the Sixth Circuit court noted
that Conrail's new drug testing program permitted drug testing without individual suspicion.
Id. at 1193, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2173. Moreover, the court noted that the parties' past practices
did not indicate an agreement on the type of. drug test to be used, the methods for confirming
positive results, and confidentiality protections. Id. at 1194, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2174. According
to the circuit court, Conrail's new drug testing program would only give rise to a "minor"
dispute if the implied terms of the existing collective bargaining agreement "arguably"
justified the program. Id. at 1190-91, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2171. The circuit court then explained
that finding a policy change to be "arguably" within the implied terms of a collective bar-
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reversed the district court's denial of injunctive relief, and re-
manded the case to the district court for further proceedings. 27
Conrail appealed the circuit court's decision to the United States
Supreme Court. 28
In Consolidated Rail, the Supreme Court reversed the appellate
court's decision and held that when management claims that a term
of an existing collective bargaining agreement gives it discretion to
change employee working conditions without prior negotiations,
management's change creates a "Minor" dispute if the terms of the
agreement "arguably" justify the contested change. 29 The Supreme
Court reasoned that a prior course of dealings between the parties
to a collective bargaining agreement may indicate that management
has a range of discretion in determining the extent to which it can
modify its employment practices without prior negotiations. 3" Con-
sequently, the Consolidated Rail Court held that when a collective
bargaining agreement "arguably" gives management a range of
discretion to implement a change in its employment practices, the
contested policy change gives rise to a "minor" dispute. 3 ' The Court
concluded that under such circumstances, management is free to
implement a disputed policy change before the NRAB concludes
that the policy change is actually within the terms of the parties'
existing agreement. 32
The Court in Consolidated Rail began its analysis by examining
the characteristics that distinguish "major" disputes from "minor"
ones." The Court explained that "minor" disputes differed from
"major" disputes because "minor" disputes can be conclusively re-
solved by interpreting the terms of the parties' existing collective
bargaining agreement. 34 Examining decisions from several circuits,
the Court concluded that "a relatively light burden" existed for the
party attempting to show that the terms of the existing agreement
justified the contested change. 33
gaining agreement is equivalent to concluding that the parties reached a "meeting or the
minds' onthe general issue of the policy change. Id. at 1193, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2173.
27 Id. at 1195, 128 L.R.R.M. at 2174.
28 Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n., 109 S. Ct. 2477, 131
L.R.R.M. 2601 (1989).
29 Id. at 2484, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
3° Id. at 2483-84, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
31 Id. at 2483-85, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605-2606.
'° Id. at 2484, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605-06.
" See supra notes 5-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the distinction between
"major" and "minor" disputes under the RLA.
54 Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2479-81, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2602-04.
35 Id. at 2482, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2604.
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The Court then examined the varied circuit court standards
used to determine whether the terms of a collective bargaining
agreement justified a contested change in employment policies. Syn-
thesizing the circuit court standards, the Consolidated Rail Court
concluded that when an employer asserts a claim that the existing
collective bargaining agreement gives it discretion to make a partic-
ular change in working conditions without prior negotiations, the
contested change gives rise to a "minor" dispute if the implied terms
of the parties' agreement "arguably" justify the claim." Alterna-
tively, the Court held that a "major" dispute arises when a claim
that the implied terms of the agreement cover the policy change is
"frivolous" or "obviously insubstantial." 37
The Court acknowledged that the new "arguably" standard
would delay the collective bargaining process until the parties ex-
hausted the arbitration process for "minor" disputes." The Court
reasoned, however, that such a delay was consistent with the policies
of the RLA because it would force the parties to make full use of
the NRAB's arbitration procedures." The Court concluded that
such use would diminish the risk of interruptions in commerce by
preventing the parties from resorting to self help, something the
parties cannot attempt until they complete the collective bargaining
procedure required for resolving "major" disputes." In addition,
the Court noted that referring arbitrable matters to the NRAB
would promote the maintenance of collective bargaining agree-
ments by assuring that expert arbitrators in the common law of the
particular industry interpret and enforce the parties' agreement."
The Consolidated Rail Court concluded, therefore, that the "argua-
bly" standard was consistent with the RLA's purposes of preventing
strikes and promoting industry stability.42
Before it examined the terms of the parties' collective bargain-
ing agreement, the Court distinguished the method of interpreting
collective bargaining agreements from traditional contract interpre-
tation, observing that a collective bargaining agreement is a gener-
alized code of terms covering a wide range of situations that the
36 See id. ai 2482, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2604.
" Id.
36 Id. at 2484, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605.
" Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 2606.
40 Id.
Id.
43 Id.
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drafters of the agreement cannot foresee.'" The Court explained
that because a collective bargaining agreement covers the whole
employment relationship, its interpretation requires resort to the
common law of the particular industry." In addition, the Court
noted that the practice, custom, and usage of a particular industry
was significant in interpreting the collective bargaining agreement:"
Finally, the Court observed that the unique nature of a collective
bargaining agreement did not require that the parties reach a
"meeting of the minds" on all of the terms of the agreement. 46
Turning to the parties' arguments, the Consolidated Rail Court
noted Conrail's contention that the new drug testing component to
the urinalysis test was "arguably" within the terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement. 47 The Court then noted the union's
challenges that Conrail's new drug testing program was a material
departure from the parties' past practices, and therefore was not
part of the existing collective bargaining agreement:" After exam-
4' Id. at 2485, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2606.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 2488, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2608. The Court also addressed the significance of
discretionary terms in interpreting collective bargaining agreements. Id. at 2983, 131
L.R.R.M. at 2605. The Court explained that collective bargaining agreements frequently
contained express or implied terms designed to give one party a measure of discretion within
a specific area of activity. Id. Noting that the principles of labor law did not prohibit bargaining
for flexible terms, the Court concluded that discretionary terms were not subject to a higher
degree of interpretive scrutiny than other terms in a collective bargaining agreement. Id. at
2483, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605. In reaching this conclusion, the Court reasoned that to subject
discretionary terms to a higher degree of interpretive scrutiny would be unlawful because it
would not result in equal treatment of discretionary and non-discretionary terms. Id. The
Court concluded, therefore, that when a party to a collective bargaining agreement bargains
for a term that gives it a range of discretion to change employment conditions without prior
negotiations, such a term cannot be subject to a degree of interpretative scrutiny higher than
the scrutiny applied to a non-discretionary term. Id,
47 Id. at 2487, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2607-08. According to Conrail, the parties had a long-
established practice that permitted Conrail unilaterally to establish and change its "fitness for
duty" standards, alter its medical testing procedures, and change its policies requiring removal
of employees that Conrail considered unfit for duty. Id. Conrail contended that its past
practices indicated that drug use was relevant to job fitness. Id. In addition, Conrail claimed
that the prior course of dealings between the parties indicated that Conrail's physicians had
discretion to implement the new drug testing program as a component of their medical
examinations for job fitness. Id.
Id. Specifically, the union contended that Conrail's new drug testing program intro-
duced drug tests without cause, created the potential for employee terminations, and con-
stituted a new regime for regulating the off-duty conduct of Conrail's employees. Id. at 2487,
131 L.R.R.M. 2607-08. Consequently, the union argued that Conrail's new program was
such a significant departure from the party's past practices that it was not "arguably" within
the terms of the parties' existing agreement. Id. at 2487, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2608.
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ining the parties' arguments, the Court addressed the union's con-
tention that the drug testing program materially changed the work-
place in light of the parties' prior conduct." First, the Court rejected
the union's contention that Conrail's new drug testing program
changed the work environment by
 introducing a new regulation
affecting the off-duty behavior of employees. 50 The Court explained
that prior to enacting the new drug testing program, Conrail had
a well-established policy that recognized the relevance of drug use
in testing employees for medical fitness. 51
 The Court reasoned that
this policy greatly weakened the union's contention that Conrail's
new drug testing program regulated the employees' off-duty con-
duct for the first time. In addition, the Court explained that because
Conrail's pre-existing medical policy also detected physical problems
linked to off-duty behavior, the off-duty effects of Conrail's new
drug testing program were not clearly distinguishable from Con-
rail's pre-existing medical policy. 52
 Thus the Court rejected the
union's contention that Conrail's new drug testing program was not
"arguably" within the terms of the parties' existing collective bar-
gaining agreement.
The Court then dismissed the union's claim that Conrail's new
policy was not "arguably" within the terms of the parties' existing
agreement because the new policy would result in drug testing
without cause." The Court distinguished between "cause" in the
medical context and the legal concept of "cause" or "individualized
suspicion."54
 According to the Court, the "cause" a physician would
rely on to determine whether to perform the contested drug tests
would depend on factors such as the expected incidence of the
medical condition detected by the test, the likely benefits of detec-
tion, and the cost, accuracy, and medical risk of the test. The Court
explained that, considering the parties' prior course of conduct, it
was within Conrail's discretion to alter the nature of its medical
policy based on changes in the variables that make up a determi-
nation of medical "cause." The Court concluded, therefore, that
the "cause" aspect of Conrail's new drug testing program, in light
49 Id.
5°
 Id., 131 L.R.R.M. at 2609.
51 Id, at 2488, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2609.
62 Id.
53 Id. at 2488-89, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2609.
54 Id. at 2489, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2608-09.
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of the parties' past practices, was "arguably" within the terms of the
parties' existing agreement."
Finally, the Consolidated Rail Court rejected the union's argu-
ment that Conrail's new drug testing program was not "arguably"
within the terms of the parties' existing agreement because it created
the potential for employee termination. The Court explained that
Conrail did not claim a right of discharge after an employee failed
one drug test under the new policy. 56 Instead, the Court noted that
Conrail's new policy permitted employees who tested positively for
drugs to choose to enter into rehabilitative treatment. 57 According
to the Court, this indicated that Conrail's new drug testing program
had a medical rather than disciplinary goal. In addition, the Court
explained that although only employees who tested positively for
drugs would face the possibility of dismissal, Conrail's need to en-
' sure that its employees were drug free created a medical reason
sufficient to permit Conrail to treat employees who tested positively
for drugs differently from employees who tested positively for other
medical problems. 58 In light of the parties' past practices, the Court
thus held that it was "arguably" within the terms of the parties'
collective bargaining agreement for Conrail to change the terms of
its medical policy to create the possibility for employee termina-
tions." Consequently, the Court concluded that Conrail's new drug
testing program gave rise to a "minor" dispute under the RLA, and
therefore, that Conrail could implement the policy change prior to
a NRAB determination that the contested change was permitted
under the parties' collective bargaining agreement.
In dissent, Justice Brennan rejected the majority's opinion, and
concluded that Conrail's drug testing program gave rise to a "major"
dispute under the RLA. 6° Justice Brennan reasoned that Conrail's
drug testing program introduced significant changes into the work-
ing environment, most notably the testing of employees for drug
use without cause, and the possibility that employees who tested
positively for the presence of drugs would face discharge. 6 ' Justice
Brennan contended that the Court should not rely on the union's
acquiescence in Conrail's prior medical policy to infer that the union
53 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 2489, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2609.
58 Id.
39 Id.
6° Id. at 2489, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 2490, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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also agreed to submit to suspicionless drug testing which included
the potential for employee terminations, and which was imple-
mented solely on management's terms.°2 Accordingly, Justice Bren-
nan explained that it was "frivolous" to believe that Conrail's new
drug testing program was within the terms of the parties' existing
collective bargaining agreement.° As a result, Justice Brennan con-
cluded that the Consolidated Rail Court should have issued an in-
junction to prevent Conrail's unilateral imposition of the contested
drug tests until the conclusion of the mediation process required
for "major" disputes. 64
The Supreme Court's decision in Consolidated Rail affects dis-
pute resolution under the RLA in two respects. First, where an
employer has an existing medical policy requiring urinalysis, the
federal courts are unlikely to find that the addition of a drug
screening test gives rise to a "major" dispute unless the new test
constitutes a significant departure from the employers pre-existing
medical policy. Second, by concluding that a prior course of dealings
may give management discretionary authority to implement policy
changes under the implied terms of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the Court's decision in Consolidated Rail suggests that it will
be increasingly difficult for parties to establish that a disagreement
between management and labor constitutes a "major" dispute under
the RLA. As a result, both management and labor are more likely
to implement unilateral policy changes before they resolve their
disputes through the RLA's compulsory arbitration procedures."
It will be increasingly difficult for parties to establish that a
disagreement between management and labor gives rise to a "ma-
jor" dispute under the RLA because, by adopting the "arguably"
standard, the Consolidated Rail Court embraced the least restrictive
standard contemplated in the previous decisions of the federal cir-
cuit courts." In holding that a contested policy change gives rise to
a "minor" dispute if the new policy is "arguably" within the parties'
agreement, the Consolidated Rail decision subjects the contested pol-
icy change to a minimal level of interpretative scrutiny under the
' 12 Id.
Id. at 2490,131 L.R.R.M. at '2610-11 (Brennan, J., dissenting). •
64 Id.
"5 See supra note 48 for a discussion of the changes introduced into the work-place as a
result of the implementation of Conrail's new drug testing program.
4° See supra note 12 for a discussion of the standards that the federal courts have used
to distinguish between "major" and "minor" disputes.
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parties' existing agreement. 67 The Court further illustrated the min-
imal interpretive analysis that will justify a contested policy change
by concluding that a "relatively light burden" exists for the party
seeking to justify the disputed policy change under the terms of the
existing agreement. 68
Moreover, the Consolidated Rail Court's expansive view of the
rights contained within a collective bargaining agreement com-
pounds the difficulty faced by a party attempting to establish the
existence of a "major" dispute under the RLA. As noted by the
Consolidated Rail Court, other courts had held that a prior course of
dealings between parties was relevant in interpreting the terms of
the parties' existing collective bargaining agreement. 69 By conclud-
• ling that a prior course of dealings may indicate that one party has
a range of discretion to implement new employment policies uni-
laterally, the Court's opinion in Consolidated Rail broadens the scope
of rights contained within a collective bargaining agreement, and
places increased importance on the parties' prior conduct in deter-
mining the breadth of the agreement. 7° The Consolidated Rail Court
illustrated its more expansive notion of the rights contained within
the implied terms of a collective bargaining agreement by conclud-
ing that implementation of a new employment policy does not
require that parties to the agreement reach a "meeting of the minds"
on the resulting change in employment conditions. 7 '
The Court's opinion in Consolidated Rail is problematic because
it fails to provide courts with a framework for determining when a
prior course of dealings gives rise to either an implied term or a
discretionary right under the parties' existing collective bargaining
agreement. Under the Court's analysis, the union's failure to contest
Conrail's past medical policy changes indicates that Conrail had a
discretionary right to implement additional changes in its medical
policy without negotiating the changes with the union. 72 Justice
67 See supra text accompanying notes 33-37 for the Supreme Court's adoption of the
"arguably" standard in Consolidated Rail.
" See supra text accompanying note 37 for a discussion of the burden on the party
seeking to justify a policy change with reference to the terms of an existing collective
bargaining agreement.
69 See supra text accompanying note 45 for a discussion of the use of the parties' past
dealings in interpreting collective bargaining agreements.
7° Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 109 S. Ct. 2477, 2483,
2487-89, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2601, 2605, 2607-09 (1989).
71 See supra text accompanying note 46 for the Supreme Court's rejection of a "meeting
of the minds" requirement in interpreting a collective bargaining agreement.
72 Consolidated Rail, 109 S. Ct. at 2483, 2487-88, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2605, 2607-09.
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Brennan's dissenting opinion illustrated the weakness in this anal-
ysis. According to Justice Brennan, the mere fact that the union did
not contest previous non-drug related changes in Conrail's medical
policy did not justify the conclusion that the union agreed to the
numerous changes Conrail introduced into the employees' working
conditions through its new drug testing program. 73 The majority
answered this contention by concluding that, despite the many
changes resulting from Conrail's new drug testing program, these
changes were not so significant, in view of the parties' past practices,
that they were not at least "arguably" within the terms of the parties'
existing agreement. 74 As Justice Brennan implied, this rather con-
clusory analysis rests on a value judgment that discounts significant
differences in the nature and consequences of instituting a program
of drug testing without cause. 75
Moreover, although the majority claimed that its decision in
Consolidated Rail advances the RLA's policies by channeling disagree-
ments between management and labor into the compulsory arbitra-
tion process required for "minor" disputes, 76 the Court's holding
may lead to more numerous disputes between management and
labor. According to the majority's reasoning, Conrail "arguably" had
a discretionary right to enact its new drug testing program because
the union failed to contest prior changes Conrail had made in its
medical policy. 77 Following this rationale, the union has an incentive
to contest every policy change that management implements in
order to forestall the possibility that management will gain a discre-
tionary right to implement policy changes without prior negotia-
tions. Consequently, instead of furthering the RLA's purpose of
promoting stability in the railroad and airline industries, the Court's
decision in Consolidated Rail may result in an increased number of
disputes between management and labor.
In summary, the Court's opinion in Consolidated Rail signifi-
cantly diminishes the likelihood that a disagreement between man-
agement and labor will give rise to a "major" dispute under the
RLA. By adopting the "arguably" standard, the Consolidated Rail
Court has instructed courts to use minimal scrutiny when they assess
whether a contested policy change is within the terms of the parties'
76 Id. at 2490, 131 L.R1R.M. at 2610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
74 Id. at 2489, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2609.
m Id. at 2490, 131 L.R.R.M. at 2610 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
76 Id. at 2484, 131 L.R.R.M, at 2605-06.
77 Id. at 2488, 131 L.R.R.M. 2608-09.
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existing collective bargaining agreement. In addition, the opinion
endorses an expansive view of interpreting collective bargaining
agreements that includes adding implied and discretionary terms
to the agreement based on the parties' prior course of dealings.
The Court's decision will therefore make it increasingly difficult for
parties to show that disputes between management and labor are
"major" within the meaning of the RLA. Consequently, the Court's
decision in Consolidated Rail will allow both management and labor
to implement policy changes unilaterally before the NRAB deter-
mines whether the terms of the parties' collective bargaining agree-
ment permit the contested changes.
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EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW
1. PROCEDURAL DEVELOPMENTS
A. * Timeliness of Filing Title VII Discrimination Charges in Seniority
Systems: Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the "Act" or "Title
VII") prohibits intentional discrimination by employers on the basis
of race,.color, religion, sex, or national origin.' In the 1971 case of
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., the United States Supreme Court broadly
defined the scope of Title VII actions by recognizing discrimination
in the consequences of employment practices, rather than relying
strictly on whether there was•discriminatory motivation behind the
employment practices. 2 In Griggs, black employees challenged a
power company's requirement of a high school diploma or passing
of intelligence tests as a condition of employment or transfer for
certain jobs—a requirement which rendered a disproportionately
large group of blacks ineligible for certain jobs. 3 The Court noted
that even though the company did not adopt the requirements with
the intent to discriminate against blacks, practices which appear
"fair in form, but discriminatory in operation," unless justified by a
business necessity, are proscribed by the Act.'
* By Jennifer Locke, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
1 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982). Section 703(a) provides in pertinent part:
(a) It shall he unlawful employment practice for an employer —
(l) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise
to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of
employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an em-
ployee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
2 401 U.S. 424, 432, 3 FEP Cases 175, 178 (1971). In Griggs, the Court held that Title
VII requires the "removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification," Id. at 431, 3 FEY Cases at 177; see also Brodie, The Role of Fault and
Motive in Defining Discrimination: The Seniority Question Under Title VII, 62 N.C.L. REV. 943,
956 (1984).
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 425-26, 429, 3 FEP Cases at 175-76, 177.
4 Id. at 431, 432, 3 FEP Cases at 178. This "discriminatory effects unjustified by business
necessity" theory was subsequently followed in Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 247, 12
FEP Cases 1415, 1422 (1976), and Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U,S. 405, 422, 425,
10 FEP Cases 1181, 1189, 1190 (1975).
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- Since 1971, the Court has moved away from its original Griggs
holding in a series of cases, especially with respect to its treatment
of seniority systems in employment. Through its interpretations of
section 703(h), 5
 which addresses the legality of certain seniority
systems, and Title VII generally, the Court has afforded seniority
systems special treatment under Title VII and narrowly defined the
instances in which an employee may successfully challenge an al-
legedly discriminatory seniority system.6
 First, the Court interpreted
section 703(h) to immunize "bona fide" seniority systems, those
without a discriminatory purpose, from challenge even though
these systems may have discriminatory impact or perpetuate pre-
Act discrimination.? Second, the Court refused to allow a Title VII
5
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982). Section 703(h) states in pertinent part;
Mt shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to apply
different standards of compensation, or different terms, conditions, or privi-
leges of employment pursuant to a bona fide seniority or merit system .. .
provided that such differences are not the result of an intention to discriminate
because of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin . , . .
Id. This section was first interpreted in 1968, when a federal district court held that a seniority
system which perpetuated the effects of pre-Act discrimination was not "bona fide" and
therefore entitled to § 703(h) protection. See Quarles v. Phillip Morris, Inc., 279 F. Supp.
505, 517, 1 FEP Cases 260, 270 (E.D. Va. 1968). In Quarles, the court stated that the
differences in the terms and conditions of employment for whites and blacks were a result
of intentional discrimination in hiring policies prior to the 1966 enactment of Title VII. Id.
"Congress did not intend," wrote Judge Butzner, "to freeze an entire generation of Negro
employees into discriminatory patterns that existed before the act." Id. at 516, 1 FEP Cases
at 269.
6 See Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, 28 FEP Cases 1073, 1079-80 (1982);
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69, 28 FEP Cases 713, 715-16 (1982);
United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560, 14 FEP Cases 1510, 1513 (1977); International
Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 356, 14 FEP Cases 1514, 1527 (1977).
7
 Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 356, 14 FEP Cases at 1527. In the 1977 case of Teamsters, the
Supreme Court held that a claim of a seniority system having a discriminatory impact must
be accompanied by proof of a discriminatory purpose. Id. The Court reasoned that even
though the seniority system in question, as a result of pre-Act hiring discrimination, did
currently confer the choicest jobs and greatest job security to white employees, section 703(h)
of Title VII conferred a measure of immunity on bona fide seniority systems. Id. at 349-50,
14 FEP Cases at 1525. The Court then defined a bona fide seniority system as one: 1) which
applies equally to all races and ethnic groups; 2) whose division into separate bargaining
units is rational, in accord with industry practice, and consistent with National Labor Relation
Board precedents; 3) which does not have its genesis in racial discrimination; and 4) which
was negotiated and maintained free from any illegal purpose. Id. at 355-56, 14 FEP Cases
at 1527.
Justice Marshall vigorously dissented to the Court's reading of section 703(h). Id. at 390,
14 FEP Cases at 1542 (Marshall, Y., dissenting). Justice Marshall argued that Teamsters'
seniority system should be excluded from section 703(h), because it involves intentional
discrimination, which, even though it occurred pre-Act, is specifically excluded front section
703(h) immunity. Id. at 381-82, 14 FEP Cases at 1538 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The majority
opinion, the dissent warned, allows employees who were victims of pre-Act discrimination to
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action predicated on a past illegal policy, which is no longer in
existence, if such a policy was not challenged within the prescribed
statutory period. 8 Third, the Supreme Court held that a court may
not infer a discriminatory purpose in a seniority system merely from
statistics showing a discriminatory impact upon a particular group. 9
Rather, the Court held that there must be a finding of actual intent
to discriminate on the part of those who negotiated or maintained
the seniority system, and that such a finding is a pure question of
fact."' Finally, the Court extended section 703(h) protections to
cover not only pre-Act seniority systems but also seniority systems
adopted after the Act, even if they perpetuate past discrimination
but do not have a discriminatory intent."
advance into more desirable positions only at the expense of their seniority. This would
result, according to the dissent, in employees remaining locked into their old jobs because
they are unwilling to pay this price, or cause employees who transfer to fall to the bottom of
the ladder in their new positions, behind white employees with less overall seniority. Id. at
387-88, 14 FEP at 1540-41 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
8 United Air Lines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553, 560, 14 FEP Cases 1510, 1513 (1977). In
Evans, the Supreme Court held that a facially-neutral seniority system may not be currently
challenged based on an illegal discriminatory policy which is no longer in existence. Id. The
Court first noted that United Air Lines seniority system was "neutral," in that it treated all
similarly situated employees alike. Id. at 558, 14 PEP Cases at 1512. The Court further noted
that a discriminatory event which currently impairs the application of such a neutral seniority
system cannot be the basis of a "continuing violation" of Title VII. Id. If the employee does
not challenge the discriminatory event within the statutory time period, the Court concluded,
an employer is entitled to treat it as if it were lawful. Id.
Swint, 456 U.S. at 289, 28 PEP Cases at 1079-80.
0 Id. The Teamsters discriminatory purpose requirement was expanded in the 1982 case
of Swint, wherein the Supreme Court held that absent a discriminatory purpose, the operation
of a seniority system is not an unlawful employment practice even if it has discriminatory
consequences or perpetuates pre-Act discrimination. Id. at 277, 28 PEP Cases at 1074.
Discriminatory intent, the Court held, cannot be presumed merely by a showing of a disparate
impact upon a particular group. Id. at 289, 28 PEP Cases at 1079. The Court concluded that
there must be a factual finding of actual intent to discriminate on racial grounds on the part
of those who negotiated or maintained the system. Id., 28 FEP Cases at 1079-80.
As in Teamsters, Justice Marshall again dissented, claiming that section 703(h) should not
immunize seniority systems that perpetuate past discrimination "simply because the plaintiffs
are unahle to demonstrate to this Court's satisfaction that the system was adopted or main-
tained for an invidious purpose." Id. at 294-95, 28 PEP Cases at 1082 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). Placing this burden on the plaintiff, the dissent noted, frustrates the intent of
Congress and acts to freeze an entire generation of minority group members into discrimi-
natory patterns that existed before the Act. Id. (citing Quarles v. Phillip Morris, 279 F. Supp.
505, 516 (E.D. Va. 1968)).
American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 69, 28 FEP Cases 713, 715-16
(1982). In Patterson, the Supreme Court further extended section 703(h) protection to se-
niority systems adopted after Title VII was enacted as well as to pre-Act systems. Id. The
Court held that the language of section 703(h) did not distinguish between pre- and post-
Act seniority systems, and therefore it was not intended to be merely a grandfather clause
designed to protect existing practices from the operation of the Act. Id.
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During the Survey year, in Lorance v. AT & T Technologies, Inc.,
the United States Supreme Court further restricted challenges to
seniority systems by holding that the limitations period governing
a discrimination claim based on a facially neutral seniority system
begins to run at the time the system is adopted, rather than when
its application is felt by employees. 12 The petitioners in Lorance
brought their claim of discrimination in 1983 when they were de-
moted pursuant to a seniority system that had been changed in
1979 as part of a collective bargaining agreement." The Court held
that because the alleged intentional discriminatory policy that sub-
sequently resulted in their demotion was instituted in 1979, the
statute of limitations barred their claim." In so doing, the Court
refused to consider the application of the allegedly discriminatory
seniority system as a continuing violation of Title VII, and instead
sought to strike a balance between the interests of those who are
protected by Title VII and the interests of those who rely, perhaps
for years, upon the validity of the facially lawful seniority system."
In Lorance, the three Female employees ("petitioners"), mem-
bers of Local 1942, International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers
(the "union"), had worked at AT&T's electronic- manufacturing
plant as hourly wage employees since the early 1970s." The se-
niority system in place until 1979 gave competitive seniority to all
workers based on the number of years they had spent in the plant,
regardless of the particular job that they performed. Workers who
were promoted to the more highly skilled and better paying "tester"
positions retained their plantwide seniority. Between 1978 and
1980, the petitioners were promoted to tester positions. In July of
1979, however, a collective bargaining agreement between AT&T
and the union altered the seniority calculations for testers, so that
the testers' seniority would be determined by the length of time
spent in a particular job, rather than the number of years spent in
the plant. The agreement also specified that after working for five
years as a tester and completing a prescribed training program,
' 2 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2268-69, 49 FEP Cases 1656, 1661 (1989). Under Title VII, an
employee claiming an unlawful employment practice must file a charge with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") within 180 days of the alleged unfair
employment practice unless the complainant has first instituted proceedings with a state or
local agency, in which case the period is extended to a maximum of 300 days. 42 U.S.C.
2000e-5(e) (1981).
Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2264, 49 FEP Cases at 1657.
Id. at 2265, 49 FEP Cases at 1658.
0 Id. at 2269, 49 FEP Cases at 1661.
' 6 Id. at 2263, 49 FEP Cases at 1656-57.
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employees could regain their full plantwide seniority. In 1982, due
to economic conditions, AT&T demoted the three petitioners on
the basis of their low seniority in the tester positions. i 1 The company
could not have demoted the petitioners if the former seniority
system had still been in effect.
In April of 1983, the petitioners filed complaints with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), alleging that the
present system was the product of an intent to discriminate on the
basis of sex."' The EEOC issued right-to-sue letters and the peti-
tioners filed suit in the District Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, seeking certification as class representatives for female em-
ployees in the AT&T plant who had lost plantwide seniority or who
had been deterred from seeking promotions to tester positions
because of the new seniority system. 19 The district court granted
AT&T's motion for summary judgment on the ground that the
petitioners had not filed their complaints with the EEOC within the
statute of limitations. 20 The United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the limitations period began
to run at the time the employees became subject to a facially neutral,
but discriminatory, seniority system that the employee knows or
reasonably should know is discriminatory. 2 '
The United States Supreme Court, granting certiorari in order
to resolve the circuit conflict as to when the limitations period begins
to run, held that it is the adoption, not the application, of a discrim-
inatory but facially neutral seniority system which triggers the stat-
ute of limitations. 22 Justice Scalia, writing for the majority, began
"	 at 2264, 49 FE!' Cases at 1657.
'" Id.
19 Id. The petitioners alleged in their complaint that men had traditionally held almost
exclusively the choice tester positions, whereas women principally held the lower-paying non-
tester jobs. Petitioners further alleged that in the 1970's, female employees had increasingly
been qualifying for the tester positions and exercising their seniority rights to become testers.
The petitioners claimed that the 1979 change in the seniority system was the result of a
conspiracy to protect the incumbent male testers from the effects of the female testers'
greater plantwide seniority, and to discourage women from entering the traditionally-male
tester jobs, Id.
" Id. The district court, as well as the circuit court, declined to rule on whether the
applicable limitations period was 180 or 300 clays because both courts concluded that the
petitioners' claims were time-barred in either case. Id. at 2264 n.2, 49 FEP Cases at 1657
zr Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, 827 F.2d 163, 167, 44 FEP Cases 998, 1001 (7th Cir.
1987).
22 Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2264, 49 FEP Cases at 1657. The conflict in the circuits revealed
contrasting views of when the statute of limitations is triggered. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit in Lorance if. AT&T Technologies held that the limitations
period is triggered when an employee is first subjected to a facially-neutral seniority system
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his discussion by noting that because section 706(e) of Title VII
requires a charge of an unlawful employment practice be filed
within the applicable time period of its occurrence, the Court must
first identify the exact unlawful employment practice. 23 The Court
further noted that although the petitioners' claim would ordinarily
suffice under section 703(a) of Title VII, which makes it an unlawful
employment practice to discriminate in any employment context
because of an individual's sex, or to classify employees in any way
that would deprive them of opportunities or otherwise adversely
affect their status because of their sex, Title VII affords seniority
systems special treatment." Under section 703(h), the Court stated,
it is not an unlawful employment practice for an employer to pro-
vide different terms, conditions, or privileges pursuant to a bona
fide seniority system, as long as these differences are not the result
of an intent to discriminate on the basis of sex. 25 According to the
majority, the Court has in earlier decisions construed this to mean
that operation of a seniority system cannot be an unlawful practice,
even if it has discriminatory consequences, unless it has a discrimi-
natory purpose and a finding of an actual intent to discriminate
on the part of those who negotiated the seniority system."
that he or she knows, or reasonably should know, is discriminatory; subsequent applications
of the seniority system will not trigger the limitations period anew. 827 F.2d at 166-67, 44
FEY Cases at 1000-01 (7th Cir. 1987).
In contrast, other circuit courts have held that the maintenance of discriminatory policies
constitutes continuing violations, triggering the limitations period anew each time the em-
ployer commits an act in furtherance of these policies. See, e.g., Gray v. Phillips Petroleum
Co., 858 F.2d 610, 614, 49 FE? Cases 67, 70 (10th Cir. 1988) (employees may challenge
discriminatory policies which result in continuing violations even though the policy may have
adversely affected the employee at a much earlier date and the limitations period had run);
Cook v. Pan American World Airways, 771 F.2d 635, 646, 38 FEP Cases 1344, 1353 (2d Cir.
1985) (limitations period commences when last discriminatory act in furtherance of contin-
uous practice or policy of discrimination takes place), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1109 (1986);
Morelock v. NCR Corp., 586 F.2c1 1096, 1103, 18 FEP Cases 225, 229 (6th Cir. 1978)
(maintenance of a seniority system which discriminates on the basis of age constitutes con-
tinuing violation of Age Discrimination in Employment Act), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 906 (1979);
Cedeck v. Hamiltonian Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 551 F.2d 1136, 1137, 14 FEP Cases 1571,
1572 (8th Cir. 1977) (limitations period triggered at date of last act committed pursuant to
unlawful employment practice); Clark v. Olinkraft, Inc., 556 F.2d 1219, 1222, 15 FEP Cases
374, 376 (5th Cir. 1977) (discrimination in promotion and pay constitutes a continuing
violation of Title VII), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
25 Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2264, 49 FEP Cases at 1657.
24 Id. at 2264-65, 49 FE? Cases at 1657-58.
25 Id. at 2265, 49 FEP Cases at 1658.
26 Id. (citing Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82, 14 FEP Cases 1697,
1704 (1977)).
25 Id. (citing Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 289, 28 FEP Cases 1073, 1080
(1982)).
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The petitioners' claim, the Court stated, is not that the seniority
system treated similarly situated employees differently or operated
in an intentionally discriminatory manner, but rather that the sys-
tem's differential impact on the sexes had its genesis in unlawful sex
discrimination. 28 Justice Scalia stated that the petitioners' claim was
essentially that the change in the seniority rules was an intentionally
discriminatory alteration in their contract rights, resulting from a
conspiracy to protect incumbent male testers. 29 After delineating
the petitionerS' claim, the Court held that because the diminution
in employment status occurred in 1979, and the petitioners did not
file their claim until 1983, section 706(e)'s period of limitations
barred the petitioners' claim.'"
The Court reasoned that although it might be possible to view
this situation as a continuing violation, which occurred not only
when the collective bargaining agreement altered the seniority sys-
tem, but also when each of its effects impacted the employees, the
Court has rejected this theory in previous decisions. 3 ' The Court
cited to Delaware State College v. Ricks, where it held that communi-
cation of an allegedly discriminatory denial of tenure to the peti-
tioner was the act which triggered the section 706(e) limitations
period, not the subsequent termination of employment one year
later." The Ricks Court held that courts must focus on the time of
the original tenure decision, which was the actual discriminatory act,
instead of the termination of employment, which was only a conse-
quence of the tenure decision. 33
The Lorance Court further noted that in United Air Lines v.
Evans the Court also refused to allow a claim which was based on a
present effect of a past discriminatory act." The Court explained
that in Evans, the airline company had discriminatorily forced the
petitioner to resign, and upon rehiring denied her seniority credit
for her years of prior service. The Lorance Court noted that the
petitioner's claim in Evans, like the petitioners' claim in the instant
25 Id. (citing international Md. of Teamsters v. United States, 931 U.S. 324, 356, 14
FEY Cases 1514, 1527 (1977)) (emphasis added).
29 Id. (emphasis in original).
30 Id.
31 Id. at 2265-66, 49 FEP at 1658.
33 Id. at 2266, 49 FEP Cases at 1658-59 (citing Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S.
250, 258, 24 FEP Cases 827, 830 (1980)).
35 Id., 49 FEP Cases at 1659 (citing Ricks, 449 U.S. at 258, 24 FEP Cases at 830) (emphasis
in original).
34 Id. at 2266-67, 49 FEP Cases at 1659 (citing United Airlines v. Evans, 431 U.S. 553,
560, 14 FEP Cases 1510, 1513 (1977)).
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case, was based wholly on a discriminatory act occurring well outside
the period of limitations, and that there was no continuing viola-
tion . 35
The Lorance Court explained that rather than interpreting sec-
tion 703(h) as requiring proof of discriminatory intent when chal-
lenging a bona fide seniority system, it might also be possible to
interpret section 703(h) as an affirmative defense to a Title VII
challenge for bona fide seniority systems. 36 The Court stated that
even if read in this manner, which is perhaps its "most natural"
interpretation, the statute of limitations would still begin to run
from the time the impact is felt. According to the Court, previous
cases that require proof of discriminatory intent in Title VII chal-
lenges to seniority systems have foreclosed this interpretation."
Turning to these precedents, Justice Scalia noted that the Court
has interpreted section 703(h) as a provision describing illegal em-
ployment practices in seniority systems, not as an affirmative de-
fense to an unlawful employment practice." Justice Scalia further
noted that the Court has held discriminatory impact in seniority
systems not to be sufficient to invalidate the system, without proof
of actual intent to discriminate. 39 Accordingly, the Lorance Court
concluded that the petitioners' claim depended on proof of discrim-
inatory intent at the time the seniority system was adopted, and in
order to be valid it must have been brought within the limitations
period. 40
The Court then cited . to a case decided under the National
Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), considered a model for Title VII's
remedial provisions, in which the Court held that the limitations
period runs from the date the system is adopted.'" The Court noted
that both the NLRA and Title VII require that an employee must
File an administrative complaint before lodging a civil action against
a private party and both have a statute of limitations within which
55 Id. at 2267, 49 FE? Cases at 1659.
36 Id.
57 Id.
58 Id. (citing Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 758, 12 FEP Cases 549, 553
(1976).
39 Id. (citing American Tobacco Co. v. Patterson, 456 U.S. 63, 65, 28 FEP Cases 713,
714 (1982); Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 277, 28 FEP Cases . 1073, 1074 (1982);
Trans World Airlines v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 82, 14 FEP Cases 1697, 1705 (1977);
California Brewers Ass'n. v. Bryant, 444 U.S. 598, 610-11, 22 FEP Cases 1, 61 (1980)).
46 Id., 109 S. Ct. at 2267, 49 FE? Cases at 1660.
' t Id. (citing Local Lodge 1424, 1nel Ass'n of Machinists v. NLRB, 362 U.S. 411 (1960)).
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the employee must file this administrative complaint. 42 The Court,
relying on this NLRA case, stressed that because the petitioners'
claim was dependent on the alleged illegality of the signing of the
union contract, the statute of limitations began to run at the date
that contract was signed."
The Court stated that its interpretation of the trigger date of
the limitations period was harmonious with section 706(e)'s general
purpose in preventing the prosecution of stale claims, and with the
"special treatment" accorded seniority systems under. • section
703(h). 44 According to the Court, this interpretation would operate
to balance the interests of those employees who work for many
years in reliance upon the validity of a facially lawful seniority
system, and those whom Title VII seeks to protect against discrim-
ination.
A facially discriminatory seniority system which treats similarly
situated employees differently can be challenged at any time, the
Court noted, but a facially neutral system which was adopted with
an unlawful discriminatory motive can only be challenged within
the prescribed limitations period after its adoption." To allow chal-
lenges to a facially neutral seniority system past the limitations
period, wrote Justice Scalia, might alter entitlements for years after
the system's adoption, and disrupt the reliance interests that section
703(h) was designed to protect." The implications of such an inter-
pretation, the Court noted, would allow a plaintiff to sue for any
nondiscriminatory effect that could be attributed to the 1979 change
in the seniority plan--such as being demoted, not being promoted,
not being awarded a sufficiently favorable pension, or being laid
off—far into the future. 47 The Court declined to follow this ap-
proach because it was inconsistent with prior decisions and had very
disruptive implications."
Justice Marshall, in a dissenting opinion, argued that the ma-
jority opinion, which requires employees to sue in anticipation that
they may be actually harmed by an intentionally discriminating
" Id. at 2267-68, 49 FEP Cases at 1660.
45 Id. at 2268, 49 FEP Cases at 1660.
44
 Id. at 2268-69, 49 HP Cases at 1661.
45
 Id,
411 Id.
47 Id.
Id. Justice Stevens wrote a separate concurring opinion to assert his belief that the
Court had misconstrued Title VII in Patterson and Ricks, but that the Court correctly applied
those decisions in the current case. Id. at 2269, 49 FEP Cases at 1661 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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seniority system or "forever hold their peace," is both glaringly at
odds with the purposes of Title VII and not supported by the text
of the statute or by precedent. 49
 Justice Marshall stated that the
majority decision, which continues the process of immunizing se-
niority systems from Title VII requirements, requires employees to
anticipate future adverse effects of a seniority system regardless of
how likely or unlikely they may be, and to bring lawsuits to prevent
these effects. 5° Justice Marshall further stated that the goals of
Congress in enacting Title VII never included conferring absolute
immunity on discriminatorily adopted seniority systems that survive
the limitations period. 5 '
Justice Marshall agreed with the majority's concession that a
plausible reading of section 703(a)(1) of Title VII, which deals with
disparate treatment, would consider violations to have occurred
both at the time the discriminatory system was adopted as well as
when each concrete effect of that discriminatory system is felt. 52
Justice Marshall disagreed, however, with the majority's position
that a facially neutral seniority system should be treated differ-
ently.53 The dissent argued that each time a discriminatory seniority
system is applied, an independent unlawful employment practice
takes place, and the limitations period is triggered anew. 54
 This
"continuing violation" theory, the dissent maintained, ensures that
victims of discrimination will be able to seek redress, thus furthering
the equal opportunity goals of Title VII. 55
Justice Marshall further rejected the decision in that it required
that challenges to an intentionally discriminatory but facially neutral
42 Id. at 2270, 49 FEN Cases at 1661-62 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justices Brennan and
Blackmun joined Justice Marshall in his dissent.
sa ld. at 2273, 49 FEP Cases at 1664 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51 Id., 49 FEY Cases at 1662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 Id. See supra note 1 for the text of § 703(a)(1).
Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2271, 49 FEP Cases at 1663 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54 Id. at 2270, 49 FEN Cases at 1662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
53 Id. at 2270-71, 49 FEN Cases at 1662 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted
that the majority opinion is one in a series of decisions wherein the Court has diminished
the application of Title VII to seniority systems. The dissent stated that in Hardison and
Swint, the Court conferred special treatment for bona fide seniority systems pursuant to
section 703(h), holding that their operation cannot be an unlawful employment practice even
if they have discriminatory consequences, unless they also have a discriminatory purpose.
Later, continued the dissent, the Court in Patterson held that § 703(h) also protects seniority
systems put into place after the enactment of Title VII. Id. at 2271, 49 FEP Cases at 1662
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original). These decisions as well as the decision in the
instant case have flouted the intent of Congress, declared the dissent. Id. at 2270-71, 49 FEN
Cases at 1662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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system be brought at the moment of its adoption, whereas a facially
discriminatory seniority plan can be challenged at any time. 5" Justice
Marshall contended that this distinction ultimately rewards employ-
ers who disguise their discriminatory intent in a facially neutral plan
even though it may have identical effects to a facially discriminatory
plan.57
Justice Marshall wrote that the precedents relied upon by the
majority, Evans and Ricks, do not compel the majority's decision. In
Evans, the dissent noted, the plaintiff alleged that the discriminatory
impact of her prior discharge was enhanced when she returned to
work and the neutral seniority system would not give her credit for
the time she lost between her discharge and subsequent reinstate-
ment. According to the dissent, the Evans Court's holding, that the
plaintiff could not challenge a neutral seniority system based upon
a past event which has no present legal significance, should not be
controlling in this case where the petitioners' claim is that AT&T's
discriminatorily adopted seniority system is not neutra1. 5"
In distinguishing Ricks, Justice Marshall noted that the Ricks
Court held that the statute of limitations began to run at the time
the plaintiff was notified of his alleged discriminatory denial of ten-
ure, rather than when he was terminated a year later." Again,
according to the dissent, this was in direct contrast to the facts of
this case where the petitioners were given no advance warning. Both
Evans and Ricks, the dissent stated, stand for the proposition that
neutral employment practices, which are not a result of discrimi-
natory intent, even though they may passively perpetuate the con-
sequences of prior time-barred discrimination, are not actionable
wrongs under Title VII. These precedent cases, according to the
dissent, do not address seniority systems set up in order to discrim-
inate, such as the one in the present case"
56 Id. at 2271, 49 FEP Cases at 1663 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
av Id.
56 Id. at 2272, 49 FEP Gases at 1663 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
56 Id. (emphasis added).
60 Id. (emphasis in original). Justice Marshall also wrote that because the final case relied
upon by the majority, Machinists, arose under a different statute, the NLRA, and involved a
union security clause rather than a seniority system, it should not be considered controlling
precedent. In Machinists, the dissent noted, the enforcement of the clause affected all non-
union employees alike and it was obvious who it would effect and what impact it would have.
In contrast, the dissent argued, AT&T's seniority system at the time of its adoption only
theoretically hurt particular female employees, but was designed to have a lung-range dis-
criminatory impact on women employees as a group. Id., 49 FEP Cases at 1664 (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
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The Supreme Court's decision in Lorance presents three distinct
problems. First, it requires employees to anticipate a potential ad-
verse impact each time a seniority system, or a modification of an
existing system, is adopted and, at that point, to initiate a lawsuit,
regardless of whether it has actually affected them or not." This
change will certainly breed premature lawsuits and needless litiga-
tion.62
 Second, it is unclear whether employees who have not been
adversely affected, and who may not at the time of the system's
adoption even be in a position'to be affected in the future, will have
standing to challenge the system. 63 Third, the Lorance decision ul-
timately confers absolute immunity upon facially neutral seniority
systems, regardless of discriminatory intent, if they survive the first
300 days after their adoption."
Once a facially neutral system survives the 300 day limitations
period, it can create a chilling effect on the groups that are vulner-
able to its discriminatory impact. Employees who are hired more
than 300 days after the adoption of such a facially neutral system
will never be able to challenge it. For example, female employees
in the AT&T plant may decide not to seek the higher-paying tester
positions for fear of losing the plantwide seniority, and its attendant
privileges and benefits, which they have accumulated. This appears
contrary to the intent of Congress in enacting Title VII, which the
Court in an earlier decision interpreted "to prohibit all practices in
St Id., 49 FEP Cases at 1663 (Marshall, J., dissenting). As Justice Marshall wrote, "em-
ployees must now anticipate, and initiate suit to prevent, future adverse applications of a
seniority system, no matter how speculative or unlikely these applications may be." Id. In the
lower court, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, in rejecting the system's adoption
as the trigger date for the limitations period, wrote, "[w]e can see no reason why they [the
two petitioners who were not testers at the time the new system went into effect) should have
been required to contest a seniority system that did nut apply to them." Lorance v. AT&T
Technologies, 827 F.2d 163, 166, 44 FEP Cases 998, 1000-01, (7th Cir. 1987).
62 Lorance, 827 F.2d at 167, 168, 44 FEP Cases at 1001 (majority opinion and Cudahy,
J., dissenting).
"' See Lorance, 109 S. Ct. 2261, 2270, 49 FEP Cases 1656, 1662 (1989) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). As noted by Justice Marshall, two of the petitioners were not testers at the time
the change in the seniority system was adopted, and did not advance into that position until
several months later.
In American Tobacco Co, a. Patterson the Court stated,
[F]or the purpose of construing § 703(h), the proposed distinction between
application and adoption on its face makes little sense. The adoption of a seniority
system which has not been applied would not give rise to a cause of action. A
discriminatory effect would arise only when the system is put into operation
and the employer 'applies' the system.
456 U.S. 63, 69-70, 28 FEP Cases 713, 716 (1982) (emphasis added).
Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2270, 49 FEP Cases at 1662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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whatever form which create inequality in employment opportunity
due to discrimination on the basis of . . . sex. . . ."65
The Court has previously recognized how important the pro-
visions of seniority systems are to individual employees, and is
clearly concerned about disrupting the interests of those who have
relied upon a system believed to be valid. 66
 By interpreting section
703(h) as protecting a facially neutral system unless discriminatory
intent can be proven within the statutory limitations period, how-
ever, the Court's decision "operate[s] to 'freeze' the status quo of
prior discriminatory employment practices," an approach which the
dissenters have found unpalatable. 67
Furthermore, the Court has created a distinction between fa-
cially neutral and facially discriminatory systems, even though they
may have been adopted with the same discriminatory intent and
may have identical discriminatory effects.6 8 Allowing challenges to
facially discriminatory systems at any time, but requiring challenges
to facially neutral systems only within a statutory period, in effect,
rewards employers or unions clever enough to hide their intent in
a facially neutral guise."'"
The Court should have adopted the "continuing violation" the-
ory argued by the petitioners, wherein each time a discriminatory
seniority system is applied, an unlawful employment practice under
section 703(a)(1) takes place and the statutory limitations period is
triggered anew. 7° This approach may soon become law, as Congress
has reacted to the Lorance decision by including provisions in the
Civil Rights Act of 1990, which would, among other things, expand
" See Franks v. Bowman Tratisp. Co., 424 U.S. 747, 763, 12 FEP Cases 549, 555 (1976)
(citations omitted). The Court further stated that Congress has "ordained that its policy of
outlawing such discrimination should have the 'highest priority.'" Id. (citations omitted).
The Court in Franks stated, "[sleniority systems and the entitlements conferred by credits
earned thereunder are of vast and increasing importance in the economic employment system
of this Nation," and, "[miore than any other provision of the collective [•bargaining) agree-
ment . . . seniority affects the economic security of the individual employee covered by its
terms." 424 U.S. at 766, 12 FEP Cases at 556 (quoting Aaron, Reflections on the Legal Nature
and Enforceability of Seniority Rights, 75 14Aay. L. REV. 1532, 1535 (1962)).
66 See Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2269, 49 FEP Cases at 1661; Franks, 424 U.S. at 766, 12 FEP
Cases at 556.
1i7 See International Kid. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 349, 14 FEP Cases
1514, 1524-25 (1977) (citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 430 (1971)); Pullman-
Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 295, 28 FEP Cases 1073, 1082 (1982) (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
" Lorance, 109 S. Ct. at 2271, 49 FE? Cases at 1663 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
"9 Id.
70 See id. at 2270, 49 FEP Cases at 1662 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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the rights of employees to challenge seniority systems created for
discriminatory reasons. 7 ' Until such time, however, practitioners
should be aware that they must file challenges to facially neutral
seniority systems within the specified statutory period after their
adoption, regardless of whether any actual harm is likely to occur
or has occurred.
11. SEX DISCRIMINATION
A. * BFOQ Defense Extended to Fetal Protection Policies:
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc.'
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, an employer
may not discharge or refuse to hire any person because of that
person's sex. 2 In 1978, Congress amended Title VII by adding the
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, which provides that the term "sex"
71 H.R. 4000, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 7(a), S. 2104 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. § 7(a) (1990).
The Civil Rights Act of 1990, which passed both the House and the Senate, has been vetoed
by President Bush. N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1990, at A1, co1.4. If this veto is overridden by
Congress, the Act would amend section 706(e) as follows:
(1) by striking out "one hundred and eighty days" and inserting in lieu
thereof "2 years";
(2) by inserting after "occurred" the first time it appears "or has been
applied to affect adversely the person aggrieved, whichever is later,";
(3) by striking out ",except that in" and inserting in lieu thereof ". In"; and
(4) by striking out "such charge shall be filed" and all that follows through
"whichever is earlier, and".
Id.
The Civil Rights Act would amend section 703(h) as follows:
Where a seniority system or seniority practice is part of a collective bargaining
agreement and such system or practice was included in such agreement with
the intent to discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin, the application of such system or practice during the period that such
collective bargaining agreement is in effect shall be an unlawful employment
practice.
Id. § 7(b), S. 2104, 101st Cong., 2nd Sess. 7(h).
* By Pamela M. Maloney, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 886 F.2d 871, 50 FEP Cases 1627 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
2 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988). Title VII
provides in relevant part:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to fail or
refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges
of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin . .
Id.
December 1990]	 ANNUAL SURVEY OF LABOR LAW	 251
includes pregnancy, childbirth, and related medical expenses. 3 An
employer charged with violating the provisions of Title VII regard-
ing sex discrimination may raise two defenses. First, Congress cre-
ated a statutory defense that entitles an employer to discriminate
on the basis of sex if an employer proves that such discrimination
is based on a bona fide occupational qualification ("BFOQ"). 4 This
qualification must be reasonably necessary to the normal operation
of the employer's business. Courts have traditionally required em-
ployers to show a, BFOQ in disparate treatment claims where the
challenged employment practice is discriminatory on its face.&
addition to the BFOQ defense, the judiciary has created a less
stringent "business necessity" defense that is applicable in instances
of disparate impact where the employer's practice applies to all
employees equally, but which, in fact, impacts only one class of
employees. 6
Employees have invoked Title VII to challenge the validity of
employers' fetal protection policies.? A fetal protection policy in-
volves an employer's classification of pregnant and fertile women
who are prohibited from working in jobs that the employer deter-
mines pose a risk to the health of a fetus. 8 The policy necessarily
applies only to women, and under traditional Title VII analysis,
3 Id. § 2000e(k). The Pregnancy Discrimination Act provides:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include, but are not limited
to, because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical
conditions shall be treated the same for all employment-related purposes ..
as other persons not so affected but similar its their ability or inability to work
. .
Id.
Id. 2000e-2(e)(1). This section provides:
WI shall not be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to hire and
employ employees , . on the basis of religion, sex, or national origin in those
certain instances where religion, sex or national origin is a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that partic-
ular business or enterprise . .
Id,
5 See, e.g., Levin v. Delta Airlines, 730 F.2d 994, 997, 34 FEP Cases 1192, 1194 (5th Cir.
1984).
6 See, e.g., Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798, 3 FEP Cases 653, 657-58
(9th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971); see also Williams, Firing the Woman to
Protect the Fetus: The Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals Under
Tide VII, 69 GEO. L.J. 641, 668-69, 671 (1981).
7 See, e.g., Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1593, 1546-97, 34 FEP Cases 445,
446-48 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1176, 30 FEP Cases 889, 892-
93 (4th Cir. 1982).
8 See, e.g., Wright, 697 F,2d at 1182, 30 FEP Cases at 897-98.
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courts would subject the policy to scrutiny under the BFOQ stan-
dard.9
 Recognizing that the ability to bear a child rarely impinges
upon a woman's ability to perform a particular job, the United
States Courts of Appeals for the Fourth and the Eleventh Circuits
have held that such policies are unlikely to meet the BFOQ stan-
dard. ' 9
 Rather than decide that the policies were necessarily dis-
criminatory, however, both circuit courts extended the availability
of the "business necessity" defense to employers defending fetal
protection policies.'
In addition, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC") has endorsed the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit decisions.' 2•
g See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F.2d 871, 908-09, 50
FEP Cases 1627, 1655-56 (7th Cir, 1989), cert. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
1 ° Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1549 & n.9, 34 FEP Cases at 449 & n.9; Wright, 697 F.2d at 1 185-
86 n.21, 30 FEI' Cases at 900-01 n.21.
" See Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1552-54, 34 FEP Cases at 451-53; Wright, 697 F.2d at 1 185-
87, 30 FEP Cases at 900-02.
In Wright, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit justified extension
of the business necessity defense by stating that a challenge to a fetal protection policy was
more like a disparate impact case than a disparate treatment case, thus allowing the employer
to raise that defense. Id. at 1185, 30 FEP Cases at 900. The Wright court noted that "business
necessity" includes employment practices that are implemented to provide for safe job
performance. Id. at 1188, 30 FEP Cases at 900. The business necessity defense in the fetal
protection context, as outlined by the Wright court, places the burden of proof upon an
employer to show that the exposure of female workers to toxic hazards creates a significant
risk of harni to the unborn children of such workers. Additionally, the employer must prove
that exposure of male workers to toxic substances does not present similar risks to the
offspring of those males. In order to meet the burden, the employer must present indepen-
dent, objective evidence of the risk of harm, The evidence, however, need only demonstrate
that there is a "considerable body of opinion" that the risk exists and is primarily limited to
female employees. Id. at 1191, 30 FEP Cases at 905. Finally, the employer must show that
the protection policy is effective. By proving these elements, the defendant presents a prima
facie business necessity defense that can only be rebutted if the plaintiff can show that there
are alternative practices that would be as effective in protecting unborn children of employees
from health risks and that would create a lesser disparate impact on women.
In Hayes, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals used the framework of the business
necessity defense presented in Wright to establish that a fetal protection policy is neutral if it
is proved that only female, not male, employees who are exposed to toxic hazards pose a
substantial risk to unborn offspring. Hayes, 726 F.2d at 1548 & n.8, 34 FEP Cases at 448.
The Hayes court reasoned that, if scientific evidence showed that the risk applied only to
women carrying a fetus and not to men who may have offspring, then the policy was facially
neutral, having a disproportionate impact on women. The policy, which clearly affects only
women, can be considered neutral because "it effectively and equally protects the offspring
of all employees." Id. at 1548, 34 FEP Cases at 448. Although the court determined that the
BFOQ defense is the only one available where the employer fails to establish that the
employment practice is neutral, the court embraced the business necessity defense for all
other fetal protection policy cases. /d. at 1547-48, 34 FEP Cases at 447-48.
12
 Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Policy Statement on Reproductive and
Fetal Hazards Under Title Vii (approved Oct. 3, 1988).
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The EEOC recognized that fetal protection policies that exclude
only women from "hazardous" jobs violate Title VII." The Com-
mission noted that the BFOQ defense would normally be the only
one available to an employer because of the overt discrimination in
fetal protection policies affecting only women.' 4 In endorsing the
circuit courts, however, the EEOC affirmed that in the interest of
protecting unborn children, an employer may find it necessary to
restrict women from certain categories of employment. The EEOC
advocated that the framework established by the Fourth and Elev-
enth Circuits be followed by courts addressing Title VII challenges
to fetal protection policies."
During the Survey year, in International Union, UAW v. Johnson
Controls, Inc., the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed that the employer could utilize the business neces-
sity 'defense in fetal protection cases.' 6 The court went further,
however, and held that fetal protection policies also could be upheld
based on the BFOQ defense." Although recognizing that Congress
intended the BFOQ defense to be narrow, the Johnson court none-
theless determined that industrial safety was part of the normal
operation of Johnson Control's business and that Johnson's fetal
protection policy was reasonably necessary to achieving that safety."
In Johnson, International Union, United Automobile, Aero-
space and Agricultural Implement Workers of America ("UAW"),
a number of local unions, and individual employees brought a Title
VII action against Johnson Controls Company ("Johnson").' 9 The
action alleged that Johnson's mandatory fetal protection policy dis-
criminated against employees on the basis of sex because it prohib-
ited fertile women from working in Johnson's battery division. 2°
The policy stated that medical evidence establishes that a woman's
exposure to lead can harm her unborn child because lead in the
mother's blood can be passed to the child through the placenta in
13 International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 886 F,2d 871, 885-86, 50 FEP
Cases 1627, 1637 (7th Cir. 1989), art. granted, 110 S. Ct. 1522 (1990).
14 Id. at 886, 50 FEY Cases at 1637.
15 See id.
1 " Id. at 887, 50 FEP Cases at 1638. The United States Supreme Court heard oral
argument in the Johnson case in October, 1990. See Boston Globe, Oct. 11, 1990, § 1, at 8.
17 See id. at 893, 50 FEP Cases at 1643.
'" Id. at 893, 898, 50 FEP Cases at 1643, 1647.
19 Id. at 874, 50 FEP Cases at 1629.
29 See id. Johnson and its predecessor corporation had established a voluntary fetal
protection policy in 1977, and Johnson adopted the challenged mandatory policy in 1982.
ld. at 875-76, 50 al' Cases at 1630.
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the earliest stages of pregnancy. 2 ' Based on this medical evidence,
Johnson designed its fetal protection policy to exclude all pregnant
and fertile women not only from jobs that involve exposure to lead,
but from any job that, through job bidding or transfer and pro-
motion rights, could lead to another job that could expose them to
lead. 22
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of John-
son. 23 On appeal, the case was argued before a panel of Seventh
Circuit judges, but prior to publication of the panel's opinion, the
majority of the circuit judges voted to hear the case en banc. 24 Upon
rehearing, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit affirmed the grant of summary judgment. 25
The Johnson court began its analysis by examining the central
issue of whether lead poses a risk to the offspring of Johnson's
female employees.26 Both UAW and Johnson acknowledged that
lead presents a substantial health risk to an unborn child. 27 The
court noted that the record before it indeed established that lead
does present such substantial risk." Further, the court observed
that restricting the fetal protection policy to pregnant women would
not adequately serve the policy's protective purpose. 29 In support
of this observation, the court pointed to uncontroverted medical
evidence that suggested that lead continues to have an effect upon
the mother and the fetus long after the mother is removed from
lead exposure. 3° Therefore, the court concluded that a fertile worti-
21 Id. at 877, 50 FEP Cases at 1631.
22 Id. Johnson's fetal protection policy is as follows:
Mt is the [battery] Division's policy that women who are pregnant or who are
capable of bearing children will not be placed into jobs involving lead exposure
or which could expose them to lead through the exercise of job bidding, bump-
ing, transfer or promotion rights. This policy is intended to reduce or eliminate
the possible unhealthy effects of lead on the unborn children of pregnant
employees and applicants. It does not apply to those women who have medical
confirmation that they cannot bear children .
Id. at 877-78, 50 FEP Cases at 1631.
" Id. at 874, 50 FEP Cases at 1629.
24 Id. at 874-75, 50 FEP Cases at 1629.
23 Id. at 875, 50 FEP Cases at 1629.
26 Id. at 879-83, 50 FEP Cases at 1632-35.
27 Id. at 879, 50 FEP Cases at 1632.
29 Id. Specifically, the court noted that the record established that lead in a mother's
blood crosses the placenta and affects the fetus. The court recognized that because lead
attacks the fetus's central nervous system and can slow cognitive development, exposure to
lead is a critical concern. In addition, the court noted that lead exposure can reduce birth
weight, cause premature or still birth, and affect vital organs. Id.
a Id. at 881-82, 50 FEP Cases at 1634.
90 Id. at 882, 50 FEP Cases at 1634.
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an's exposure to lead prior to pregnancy poses significant health
risks to unborn children."
In clarifying the burden of proof standard applicable in fetal
policy challenges, the Johnson court departed from the standard set
forth by the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits. Under that standard,
the employer had the burden of proof to establish the elements of
the business necessity defense." The Johnson court, however, relied
on a recent Supreme Court decision requiring that a plaintiff prove
discrimination as a result of an employment practice." The court
required that, although the employer has the burden of producing
evidence that a valid business reason exists for the challenged prac-
tice, the plaintiff must always meet the burden of persuasion re-
garding the discriminatory nature of the practice."
The court next analyzed the proper legal standard to be applied
in a Title VII action challenging a fetal protection policy." Relying
heavily on the Fourth and Eleventh Circuit cases, the Johnson court
held that the business necessity defense could be utilized by Johnson
defending its fetal protection policy. 36
 The court noted that the
defense allowed the interests of the employer, the employee, and
the unborn child to be properly considered and weighed."
Applying the business necessity defense, the Johnson court held
that exposing fertile women to lead creates a substantial risk to the
health of a fetus. 38 The court further determined that the medical
evidence sufficiently demonstrated that risk to the fetus from lead
exposure is substantially confined to risk created by female employ-
ees who are capable of bearing children." According to the court,
UAW failed to meet its burden of proof in demonstrating that males
exposed to 'lead, as well as females, create a risk to the health of
unborn offspring. 40 The court further noted that Title VII allows
51 Id. at 883, 50 FEP Cases at 1635.
" Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1552-53, 34 FEP Cases 445, 451-
52 (lith Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190, 30 FEP Cases 889, 904 (4th
Cir. 1982).
33 Johnson, 886 F.2d at 887, 50 FEP Cases at 1638-39 (quoting Wards Cove Packing Co.
v. Atonio, 109 S. Ct. 2115, 2125-26, 49 FEP Cases 1519, 1527 (1989)).
34 Wards Cove, 109 S. Ct. at 2126, 49 FEP Cases at 1527 (noting that this allocation of
burden of proof is the same as the allocation made in disparate treatment cases).
35 Johnson, 886 F.2d at 883, 50 FEP Cases at 1635.
5GId. at 883-87, 50 FEP Cases at 1635-38.
37 Id. at 886, 50 FEP Cases at 1638,
35 Id. at 888, 50 FEP Cases at 1639.
39 Id. at 889, 50 FEP Cases at 1640.
4" Id. at 890, 50 FEY Cases at 1641.
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employers to make distinctions based on sex so long as those dis-
tinctions are real and not stereotypical. Finally, the court observed
that UAW failed to meet its burden of proof in establishing that
there are acceptable policy alternatives that Johnson could have
adopted that would effectively accomplish the safety purpose of the
policy while, at the same time, having a less disparate effect on
women. 4 ' The Johnson court noted that if UAW had proven that
less discriminatory means were available to achieve the same goals,
Johnson's existing fetal protection policy may not have been up-
held.42
The court affirmed the Fourth and Eleventh Circuits' judgment
that the business necessity defense can be asserted in meeting a
Title VII challenge to fetal protection policies. The Seventh Circuit
also expanded judicial sanction of these policies, however, by hold-
ing that Johnson's fetal protection policy also could have survived
. scrutiny under the BFOQ defense. 45 Prior to Johnson, the Fourth
and Eleventh Circuit courts had stated that such policies would
likely fail the BFOQ standard."
The Johnson court began its BFOQ discussion by stating that
the relevant analysis is very similar to that made under the business
necessity defense.45 Focusing on one of its own prior decisions, 46
" Id, at 891, 50 FE? Cases at 1642.
" Id. at 890-91, 50 FEP Cases at 1641. The court added, however, that factors such as
cost to the employer would be relevant in determining the effectiveness of any alternative.
In addition, the court placed great emphasis on the theory that "Eclourts are generally less
competent than employers to restructure business practices," thereby affirming that the court
would hesitate to substitute any alternative plan presented by a plaintiff. Id. at 892, 50 FE?
Cases at 1642.
Regarding the standards to be applied in deciding whether an adequate alternative
policy exists, the Johnson court relied on the Supreme Court's Wards Cove decision. The court
stated:
(1) that the UAW bears the burden of presenting specific economically and
technologically feasible alternatives to Johnson Controls' fetal protection policy;
(2) that if the UAW presents such alternatives, the UAW also bears the burden
of demonstrating that its proposed alternative policy is "equally effective [in
achieving] legitimate employment goals;" and (3) that this inquiry is to be
undertaken with the recognition that "factors such as the cost or other burdens
of proposed alternative selection devices are relevant in determining whether
they would be equally as effective as the challenged practices . 	 ."
Id.
4s id at 893, 50 FE? Cases at 1643.
" Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1549 & n.9, 34 FEP Cases 445, 449
& n.9 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1185-86 n.21, 30 FEP Cases
889, 900-01 n.21 (4th Cir. 1982).
as Johnson, 886 F.2d at 894, 50 FEP Cases at 1644.
46 Torres v. Wisconsin Dept. of Health and Social Servs., 859 F.2d 1523, 1527, 48 FEP
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which outlined the requirements of a valid BFOQ defense, the court
stated that discrimination based on sex is legitimate only if the
essence of the business would be harmed in the absence of such
discrimination. 47
 In addition, the court stated that the defense re-
quired a showing that "all or substantially all women would be
unable to perform safely and efficiently the job involved." 48 Ob-
serving that Congress intended the BFOQ defense to be a means
of dealing with genuine differences between men and women, the
court noted that the validity of a BFOQ should be assessed in
relation to the actual business of the employer. 40
 Due to the neces-
sary and inherent hazards associated with Johnson's business re-
quiring the use of lead, the court held that safety is central to its
operation.'"
Ilaving determined that safety is part of the essence of John-
son's business, the court next addressed whether a direct relation-
ship existed between the fetal protection policy and industrial
safety.'' The court had no hesitation in holding that it did. In
determining whether the policy was "reasonably necessary" to
achieve the safety goal, the Johnson court stated that reasonable
necessity requires evidence that the employer had a factual basis
for believing that all or substantially all women capable of pregnancy
would be unable to perform the job. 52
Although Title VII generally requires employers to allow an
individual woman to decide whether a job is too dangerous for her
to perform, the court noted that the Supreme Court has held that,
in unique cases where more is at stake than an individual's freedom
to choose a job, employers are justified in excluding from employ-
Cases 270, 273 (7th Cir. 1988), ceri. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1133, 48 FEP Cases 1896 and 109 S.
Ct. 1537, 49 FEP Cases 464 (1989). In Torres, the issue raised was whether a state Department
of Health and Human Services could further its goal of rehabilitation by excluding men
from specified guard positions in the housing units of a women's prison. Id. at 1530, 48 FEP
Cases at 276. The court held that under special circumstances, such as those presented in
Torres, Title VIE would not necessarily prohibit legitimate discrimination based on sex. Id. at
1532-33, 48 FEP Cases at 277-78.
47 Johnson, 886 F.2d at 894, 50 FEY Cases at 1644 (quoting Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433
U.S. 321, 333 (1977)).
48 Id. The court stated that "an employer [can] rely on the BFOQ exception only by
proving 'that he had reason to believe, that is, a factual basis for believing, that all or
substantially all women would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job involved.'" Id. (quoting Dothard, 433 U.S. at 333).
48 Id. at 894-95, 50 FEP Cases at 1644-45.
58
 Id. at 896, 50 FEP Cases at 1645.
51 Id.
54 Id. at 897, 50 FEY Cases at 1646.
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ment an entire class of persons, such as all women or all men. 53
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals stated that more is at stake
in fetal protection cases than a woman's decision regarding the risks
of employment, notably the risk to unborn offspring. Given the
unique hazards created by the exposure of a fetus to lead, the court
concluded that Johnson's fetal protection policy constituted a valid
BFOQ. 34
In sum, the Seventh Circuit stated that a business necessity
defense should be utilized in meeting a challenge to a fetal protec-
tion policy under Title VII. 55 The employer raising the defense
need only produce evidence supporting that business necessity; the
plaintiff must bear the burden of proof regarding the absence of
the claimed business necessity. If the employer raises the BFOQ
defense instead, the employer must demonstrate that the policy is
reasonably necessary to safety. In Johnson, the court held that John-
son met its burden under either defense, and because UAW failed
to raise any genuine issue of material fact, the court affirmed the
summary judgment ruling against UAW. 66
Three dissents were written to the majority opinion in Johnson.
Judge Cudahy and Judge Posner each wrote separate dissents. 57
Judge Easterbrook also dissented, joined by Judge Flaum. 38
In Judge Posner's dissent, he reiterated that Title VII prohibits
discrimination based on sex unless a BFOQ is reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of the business. 59 According to Judge Pos-
ner, Congress intended the BFOQ defense to be very narrow and
courts have interpreted it narrowly in Title VII jurisprudence.
Judge Posner argued that if the BFOQ defense is given broad
application, the defense will swallow up the reach of Title VII. 6°
According to Judge Posner, the determination of whether any
particular policy could be upheld under Title VII scrutiny should
55 Id. (citing Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 335-37 (1977)).
55 See id. at 898-901, 50 FEP Cases at 1647, 1649.
55 Id. at 901, 50 FEP Cases at 1649.
5" Id.
57 Id. at 901-08, 50 FEP Cases at 1650-55. In a short opinion, Judge Cudahy asserted
that the BFOQ defense is the only available defense to a fetal protection action under Title
VII. Judge Cudahy based this assertion on the fact that the policy advocated by Johnson
involved disparate treatment, rather than disparate impact. Although he recognized that it
would be difficult for an employer to establish fetal protection as a BFOQ, Judge Cudahy
stated that there should be a full trial on that issue. Id. at 901-02, 50 FEP Cases at 1650
(Cudahy, J., dissenting).
58 Id, at 909-20, 50 FEP Cases at 1655-65.
59 Id. at 902, 50 FEP Cases at 1650 (Posner, J., dissenting).
61 Id. at 903, 50 FEP Cases at 1651 (Posner, J., dissenting).
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be based on the facts of the particular case, and should rarely be
made on summary judgment. 6 ' In examining Johnson's policy,
Judge Posner asserted that the policy is far too broad in two re-
spects. First, the policy designates all women under the age of
seventy as fertile, thereby excluding them from employment in the
battery division. Second, the policy precludes any fertile woman not
only from employment in the battery division, but also from em-
ployment in any position that might, through promotion, lead to a
job in the battery factory. Judge Posner noted, however, that these
two provisions could be severed from the remainder of the policy,
allowing the policy to stand. 62 Reiterating that each policy should
be evaluated on a case-by-case basis, Judge Posner recommended
that the district court decision in Johnson be vacated and that the
case be remanded for further proceedings.°
In a lengthy dissent, Judge Easterbrook advocated for a deci-
sion based on statutory law, stating that any expansion of Title VII
defenses should be implemented by Congress, not by the Seventh
Circuit." Judge Easterbrook pointed out that, under Title VII, the
only defense available for a policy that uses sex as the only criterion
is the BFOQ defense. In discussing the Pregnancy Discrimination
Act, Judge Easterbrook stated that the Act mandated that only if
pregnant employees differ from other employees "in their ability
or inability to work," can, they be treated differently with respect to
ern ployment.65
Criticizing the majority's reliance on the Fourth Circuit decision
in Wright v. Olin Corp., Judge Easterbrook accused the Fourth Cir-
SL Id., 50 FEP Cases at 1654. Although requiring the BFOQ defense to be raised, Judge
POsner did not discount the possibility that some fetal protection policies could meet the
burden of that defense. Judge Posner outlined a situation in which such a policy would not
violate the mandates of Title VII. Id. at 906, 50 FEP Cases at 1653. Judge Posner wrote:
If the hazard to the fetus from airborne lead in the mother's workplace is
sufficiently great, if the amount of lead in the environment cannot be reduced
without discontinuing the production of batteries, and if experience demon-
strates that some women witi become pregnant even after being clearly warned
of the hazards to which the fetus would be exposed ... I can find nothing in
the text of the statute, or iti its history or purpose, to prevent an employer from
defending his refusal to allow fertile women to work in jobs in which they are
exposed to dangerous concentrations of airborne lead on the ground that the
refusal is reasonably necessary to the normal (civilized, humane, prudent, eth-
ical) operation of his particular business.
Id.
"2 Id, at 907, 50 FEP Cases at 1655 (Posner, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 908, 50 FEP Cases at 1655 (Posner, J., dissenting).
"a Id. at 908, 910, 50 FEP Cases at 1655-56 (Easterbrook, J„ dissenting).
65 Id. at 909, 50 FEP Cases at 1656 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
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cuit of deciding adequacy of the fetal protection policy on faulty
grounds. 66
 According to Judge Easterbrook, in treating the policy
as sex-neutral in order to accommodate the business necessity de-
fense, the Wright court was concerned only with whether the em-
ployer used sex to further an important societal interest, not with
whether the employer impermissibly used sex as a basis for discrim-
ination. He added that, under Title VII, the focus of any analysis
should be on whether an employer is treating a group differently
based on sex. 67
Judge Easterbrook argued that Johnson's policy did not meet
the requirements of a BFOQ defense. Stating that, as a matter of
law, Johnson's policy did not satisfy the BFOQ standards, Judge
Easterbrook noted that the policy had inadequate objectives that,
in any event, did not apply to all women. Because the purpose of
Johnson's fetal policy. is to protect unborn offspring, the policy
cannot be justified under a defense that requires the policy to be a
necessary qualification for the production of batteries. Under
BFOQ analysis, the policy must relate to a woman's ability or in-
ability to do the work, and not to whether an employer wishes to
protect future generations. 68
Further, Judge Easterbrook argued that, although some women
working in the battery division may become pregnant, and some of
those women may pass lead to their fetuses, Johnson's policy of
excluding all fertile women from working in that division is over-
broad. 69
 As noted by Judge Easterbrook, the fear that some children
would be harmed cannot meet the BFOQ standard that requires
that "all or substantially all women" be unable to perform the job
safely." Judge Easterbrook would hold that risk to a fetus does not
fall within the requirements of the BFOQ defense.
Finally, Judge Easterbrook questioned the majority's conclusion
that the risk to the fetus is transmitted only through the female.
The judge cited evidence that demonstrated that males with high
lead concentrations in the bloodstream also posed a risk to their
offspring. 7 ' Given the conflicting evidence regarding whether males
present similar risks to their offspring, Judge Easterbrook stated
" Id.
67 Id. at 910, 50 FEP Cases at 1657 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
68
 Id. at 912, 50 FEP Cases at 1658 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 913, 50 FEP Cases at 1659 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
" Id.
71 Id. at 918, 50 FEP Cases at 1663 (Easterbrook, J:, dissenting).
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that the court should at least have held a trial to properly weigh
the evidence. 72
Calling the Johnson case the most important sex-discrimination
case since Title VII was enacted in 1964, Judge Easterbrook feared
that the majority decision would enable employers to ignore the
mandates of the statute and allow them to exclude women from a
vast array of industrial jobs." Title VII_ as interpreted by the ma-
jority would create, rather than eliminate, sexual stereotyping in
employment. The flexible reading of Title VII, argued Judge Eas-
terbrook, was, in fact, a renunciation of the statute. 74
The Johnson court undermined one of the primary purposes of
Title VII in failing to ensure equal employment opportunities to
all persons, irrespective of gender. The Pregnancy Discrimination
Act definitively determined that Title VII's prohibition against sex
discrimination applies to pregnancy and pregnancy-related situa-
tions." Given the mandates of these two statutes, any policy that
excludes all fertile women from employment in a significant cate-
gory of industrial jobs violates Title VII. To accommodate the
unique situation in which gender distinctions make a genuine dif-
ference for a specific job, Title VII provides the BFOQ defense to
such a prima facie case of discrimination."
The Seventh Circuit, following the lead of the Fourth and
Eleventh Circuits, broadened the defenses that will be entertained
in Title VII cases challenging facial discrimination. Faced with a
fetal protection policy that.excluded all fertile women from working
in the battery division of Johnson Controls, the court interpreted
the facially discriminatory policy as a neutral one, thereby allowing
the less stringent business necessity defense to be used. Under this
defense, an employer can more easily justify the exclusion of women
from a significant number of jobs, thereby circumventing the in-
tended narrow scope of the BFOQ defense. Fetal protection poli-
cies, however, affect only women, and are therefore facially discrim-
inatory, rather than neutral. The court is mistaken in characterizing
these cases as disparate impact cases when, clearly, the policies
mandate disparate treatment based on sex.
Even if the Seventh Circuit had required the BFOQ defense,
however, it would have upheld Johnson's policy. The court held
72 Id. at 919, 50 17E1' Cases at 1664 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
75 Id. al 920, 50 FEP Cases at 1665 (Easterbrook, J., dissenting).
" Id.
75
 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1988).
76 Id. § 2000e-2(e)(1).
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that such policies can constitute bona fide occupational qualifica-
tions. 77
 One of the ramifications of the Johnson court's decision
regarding the BFOQ defense is that employees will no longer be
able to argue effectively that the business necessity defense should
not be applied in fetal protection cases. It no longer matters in the
Seventh Circuit whether the less stringent defense is allowed if the
policies can withstand scrutiny under the BFOQ analysis. In holding
that the BFOQ requirements could be met, the Johnson court elim-
inated the need to distort the traditional definition of "disparate
treatment" as opposed to "disparate impact." Application of the
business necessity defense, a defense reserved for disparate impact
cases, to fetal protection policies left the validity of those policies in
question. By establishing that it is unnecessary to resort to any
defense other than the one explicitly provided in Title VII, the
Seventh Circuit strengthens the credibility of fetal protection poli-
cies and increases the likelihood that employers will implement such
policies.
In order for a policy to be upheld under the BFOQ defense,
the Seventh Circuit held that an employer must produce evidence
that the challenged policy is central to the essence of the business,
that at least substantially all members of the excluded group are
unable to perform the job from which they are excluded, and that
the policy is reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business. 78
 The court noted that safety, the stated object of the
policy, was part of the essence of Johnson's battery-making business.
Based on medical evidence in the record, fertile women could not
safely perform the job because of the proven risks to potential
fetuses. It followed that the policy, therefore, was reasonably nec-
essary to the normal production of batteries.
Judge Posner, however, noted in his dissent that, even accepting
this framework, Johnson's policy is too broad to stand under Title
VII. As Judge Posner stated, the policy excludes all women under
the age of seventy from employment in the battery division. It is
not realistic or reasonable to conclude that women who have
reached that age are likely to bear children.
Further, the policy excludes fertile women from any job which,
through existing promotion policies, could lead to a job in the
battery division. This is unnecessarily restrictive and discriminatory.
" Johnson, 886 F.2d at 893, 50 FEP Cases at 1643.
" See supra notes 45-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of the court's treatment
of the BFOQ defense.
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If necessary, Johnson could revamp its promotion policy, rather
than prohibit women from working in a vast number of jobs that
pose no health risk to either the employee or any potential fetus.
Given the Johnson court's analysis, it seems that a person charg-
ing that a fetal protection policy is discriminatory will have to show
that the risk to the fetus is not isolated to females, but that males
also present similar risks. Although some evidence of this existed
in the record, the court discounted it because it was based primarily
on animal, not human, studies. Once it is established that both
women and men exposed to high levels of lead can cause harm to
unborn children, any employment policy excluding solely women
could not withstand Title VII scrutiny, In addition, if a plaintiff
presents the court with an alternative plan, which meets the em-
ployer's goal of preserving fetal safety without imposing significant
burdens on the business, a court may substitute the less discrimi-
natory policy for the one advocated by the employer. The Seventh
Circuit made it clear, however, that any court should hesitate to
substitute its judgment for that of an employer. 79
The trend in the circuits clearly is to allow employers to struc-
ture employment practices that exclude women from industrial jobs
that, due to toxic hazards, may endanger the health of a fetus.
Although the well-being of the next generation is of vital impor-
tance, the circuits addressing it have wrongly relied on public policy,
rather than on statutory law. In attempting to make their decisions
fit within the law, they have distorted definitions and issues: The
Seventh Circuit adopted those distortions in extending broad pro-
tection to policies that will, in all likelihood, signal the return to
employment based on stereotype, rather than on individual merit
and decision. The Johnson court's extension of the narrow BFOQ
defense to uphold employment practices that exclude a class of
persons based on sex where sex in no way impairs the class's ability
to perform the job signals a weakening of historic Title VII protec-
tions.
B. * Standards for Sexual Harassment in a Hostile Environment:
Brooms v. Regal Tube Company'
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 provides that an
employer cannot discriminate against an employee based on gen-
fühn,5011, 886 Kai at 892, 50 FEP Cases at 1042.
* By Chicly A. Rowe, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 881 F.2d 412, 50 FEP Cases 1499 (7th Cir. 1989).
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der. 2
 In 1986, the United States Supreme Court in Meritor Savings
Bank, FSB v. Vinson recognized that sexual harassment constitutes
illegal sex discrimination in the workplaces The Meritor Court af-
firmed several lower federal court decisions allowing plaintiffs to
establish Title VII violations based on sexual harassment that cre-
ated a hostile or abusive working environment. 4
Beyond establishing a cause of action for sexual harassment
that creates a hostile or abusive working environment, Meritor did
little to guide lower courts in determining the proper standard to
2
 Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 703(a)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1982 & 1989 Supp.).
Title VII states in relevant part:
[lt is] an unlawful employment practice for an employer . . . to discriminate
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of an individual's race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin . .
Id.
3 477 U.S. 57, 66, 40 FEP Cases 1822, 1827 (1986). See generally Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace: Merkur Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 1986-1987 Annual Survey of Labor Relations
and Employment Discrimination Law, 29 B.C.L. Rev. 215 (1987) [hereinafter 1986-1987 Annual
Survey]. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC") 1980 Guidelines also
recognize a cause of action tinder Title VII for sexual harassment. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)—
(g) (1990). The EEOC guidelines provide in part:
(a) Harassment on the basis of sex is a violation of Sec. 703 or -ride VII.
Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1)
submission to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or
condition of an individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such
conduct by an individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting
such individual, or (3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering
with an individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment.
(b) In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment, the
Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circum-
stances, such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the
alleged incidents occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular
action will be made from the facts, on a case by case basis.
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)—(b) (1990) (emphasis added).
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 66, 40 FEP Cases at 1827. In Meritor, a female bank employee
claimed that her supervisor required sexual favors, which she agreed to perform because
she feared losing her job, and forcibly raped her several times. Id, at 60, 40 FEP Cases at
1829. Meritor acknowledged the validity of hostile environment claims previously recognized
in Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 902, 29 FEP ases 787, 791 (1982) (female police
department employee accused police chief of making sexual advances and inquiries), and
Bundy v. Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 934-45, 24 FEP Cases 1155, 1155-61 (1981) (vocational
rehabilitation therapist contended that supervisor made sexual advances). Id. at 66-67, 40
FEP Cases at 1827 (other citations omitted). The Court also recognized sexual harassment
claims based on the economic quid pro quo type of harassment, in which employment or other
job-related interests are conditioned upon an acceptance of a sexual advance. See Meritor,
477 U.S. at 64-65, 90 FEP Cases at 1826; see also 1986-1987 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at
216.
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be used in assessing whether the work environment created was
actually "hostile."' Commentators disagree as to whether the vague
discussion in Meritor led courts to apply a subjective or an objective
test in ascertaining the existence of a hostile environment. 8 Cur-
rently, many courts have not explicitly adopted either standard, but
rather, have rendered decisions based upon the specific facts of
each case.' The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, however, in the
1986 case of Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Company, clearly articulated
a two-part standard, which included both objective and subjective
components. 8 The Rabidue court stated that the plaintiff must show
5 Sec Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67, 40 FEP Cases at 1827. Moitor held that for a plaintiff to
establish a sexual harassment cause of action, the conduct must be "sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of (the victim's] employment and create an abusive working
environment.'" Id., quoting Henson, 682 F.2d at 904, 29 FEP Cases at 793-94. The Supreme
Court held that the pervasive harassment. and criminal conduct (forcible rape) in this case
was sufficient. Id. In light of the egregious fact situation, the Court did not discuss whether
it used an objective or subjective standard in determining whether this conduct created a
hostile environment. See id.
For articles contending that. Meritor did not require courts to view conduct from the
perspective of a reasonable person, see RICHEY, MANUAL ON EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
LAW AND CIVIL RIGHTS ACTIONS 'IN THE FEDERAL Corners A-78—A-79 (1989) (requirement
that conduct interfere with a hypothetical individual's work performance significantly departs
from Meritor); Quick & Quick, Of Rights and Remedies—Sexual Harassment in the Workplace:
Meritor Savings Bank Ord the Sixth Circuit, 19 Thum) L. REV. 331, 343-44 (1988) (requiring
proof that a reasonable person must be affected by a hostile environment is not in keeping
with Meritor and other courts); Case Note, Merkur Savings Bank v. Vinson: What Makes a
Work Environment "Hostile"?, 40 ARK. L. Ray. 857, 867 (1987) (the Supreme Court majority
seemed to favor a subjective approach to assessing employer's conduct).
For articles suggesting that Meritor did not find the use of a reasonable person standard
to be inappropriate, see Note, Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson: The Supreme Court's Recognition
of the Hostile Environment in Sexual Harassment Claims, 20 AKRON L. REV. 575, 582 (1987)
(although the Supreme Court did not elaborate, other courts have used the viewpoint of a
reasonable victim); 1986-87 Annual Survey, supra note 3, at 222 11.75 (the standard generally
used by federal courts to determine whether conduct is a term or condition of employment
is objective).
7 See Note, Employer: Beware of "Hostile Environment" Sexual Harassment, 26 DUQ. L. REv.
461, 464 (1987) (citing Scott v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 798 F.2d 210, 213 (7th Cir. 1986);
Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 584 F. Supp. 22, 29 (D. Neb. 1983); Ferguson v. E.1. DuPont
de Nemours & Co., 560 F. Supp. 1172, 1198 (D. Del. 1983); Robson v. Eva's Supermarket,
Inc., 538 F. Supp. 857, 861 (N.D. Ohio 1982)). It is also interesting to note that many circuit
courts do not feel required to announce a standard because they defer to the lower court if'
the findings of fact have not clearly been found to be erroneous, See, e.g., Stanton v. Maries
County, 868 F.2d 996, 49 FEP Cases 309, 310-311 (8th Cir. 1989) (female ambulance
dispatcher alleged that she was subject to sexual advances and was eventually raped by the
county sheriff); Jordan v. Clark, 847 F.2d 1368, 1375, 46 FEP Cases 1558, 1563 (9th Cir.
1988) (female administrative assistant accused supervisor of soliciting sex in exchange for
keeping her job and getting promotion), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1006, 48 FEP Cases 1088
(1989).
° 805 F.2d 611, 620, 42 FEP Cases 631, 638 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041,
43 FEP Cases 1056 (1987).
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that the defendant's actions would have interfered with a reasonable
individual's work performance and would have affected the psy-
chological well-being of a reasonable person. 9 Assuming that the
plaintiff meets this burden, the reviewing court must then ascertain
whether the defendant's conduct offended the particular plaintiff,
thereby causing some injury.°
In the dissent to Rabidue, Judge Keith asserted that courts
should view the hostile environment from the perspective of the
reasonable woman." According to the dissent, adoption of this
standard would permit a court to consider the sociological differ-
ences between men and women and still protect employers from
overly sensitive plaintiffs. 12 This standard, according to Judge Keith,
would also prevent defendants from perpetuating attitudes that
may be considered acceptable within the male population, but are
unacceptable and offensive to reasonable women.i 3 Some courts
have adopted Judge Keith's standard, holding that the hostile en-
vironment must be found offensive to a person of the same sex as
the victim, thereby treating equally both male and female parties.
The circuit courts have adopted various approaches to the
hostile environment standard. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
explicitly adopted the Rabidue standard," whereas other circuits
have implicitly adopted its two-prong test.° Some courts, including
g Id.
1 ° Id.
" Id. at 627, 42 FE? Cases at 643 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
' 2 Id. at 626, 42 FEP Cases at 642 (Keith, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)
(citing Note, Sexual Harassment Claims of Abusive Work Environment Under Title VII, 97 HARV.
L. REV. 1449, 1451, 1459 (1984)).
Id. Judge Keith would also prohibit the court from relying on subjective factors
because, as he contends, not only does reliance on such factors make for an unworkable
standard, but in addition, the factors are irrelevant because no woman should be subjected
to an abusive working environment due to a male prerogative which condones such an
atmosphere. See id. at 626-27, 42 FE? Cases at 643 (Keith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
Paroline v. Unisys Corp., 879 F.2d 100, 105, 50 FEP Cases 306, 311 (4th Cir. 1989).
Several lower courts have recently signaled their agreement with the Rabidue standard. See,
e.g., Morgan v. Massachusetts Gen. Hosp., 712 F. Supp. 242, 257 (D. Mass. 1989); Perkins v.
General Motors Corp., 709 F. Supp. 1487, 1501, 51 FEP Cases 1684, 1695 (W.D. Mo. 1989);
Blesedell v. Mobil Oil Co., 708 F. Supp. 1408, 1418-19 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Ross v. Double
Diamond, Inc., 672 F. Supp. 261, 270, 45 FEP Cases 313, 320 (N.D. Tex. 1987).
' 5 The fifth circuit applied a reasonable person standard in Waltman v. International
Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 477 n.3, 50 FEP Cases 179, 187 n.3 (5th Cir. 1989), but did not
explicitly overrule its earlier holding intones v. Flagship International, which directed the court
to look at whether the conduct was offensive to the employee. 793 F.2d 714, 719, 41 FEP
Cases 358, 362 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1065, 43 FEP Cases 80 (1987). The
eighth circuit also appears to adopt a combined objective and subjective standard based on
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the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, have adopted the standard
proposed by the Rabidue dissent, examining the conduct from the
perspective of a reasonable female employee.'°
During the Survey year, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit, in Brooms v. Regal Tube Company, considered
whether the existence of a hostile work environment should be
determined by a subjective or an objective standard. 17 The court
held that a trial court must apply the Rabidue "dual standard" when
examining Title VII sexual harassment claims, taking into account
the likely effect of the defendant's conduct on both the reasonable
person and the particular plaintiff.' 8 In adopting this standard, the
Brooms court stated that it was merely affirming its agreement with
both the court's articulation in the sixth circuit of the proper test
for establishing a hostile environment and its own earlier "intima-
tions" in this area."
In Brooms, Helen Brooms, the plaintiff, brought a Title VII
sexual harassment claim against her employer, the Regal Tube Com-
pany, its parent company, the Copperweld Corporation, and her
supervisor, Charles Gustafson." Gustafson allegedly made offensive
racial and sexual remarks to Brooms, all of which she protested or
ignored. After Brooms informed Regal's Vice President of Gustaf-
son's conduct, Gustafson refrained from unnecessary contact with
Brooms for a period of several weeks but then resumed his former
conduct.`' In one instance, he showed the plaintiff a photograph
displaying an interracial act of sodomy, telling her it represented
Rabidue. See Hall v. Gus Constr. Co., 842 F.2d 1010, 1015, 46 FEP Cases 573, 576 (8th Cir.
1988).
Rh Courts that have adopted the standard outlined in the Rabidue dissent include: Yates
v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2(1 630, 637, 43 FEP Cases 1595, 1600 (6th Cir. 1987) (secretaries
accused supervisor of making improper sexual comments and advances); Spencer v. General
Elec. Co., 697 F. Supp. 204, 218, 5l FEP Cases 1696, 1708 (E.D. Va. 1988) (plaintiff was
victim of sexual advances and environment was pervaded by sexual innuendo, sexually
oriented games, and intimate touching); Fisher v. San Pedro Peninsula Hosp., '214 Cal. App.
3d 590, 609, 262 Cal. Rptr. 842, 852 n.7'(Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1989) (plaintiff could not establish
cause of action for sexual harassment where no action directed against her personally). The
First Circuit Court of Appeals held, in Lipid, v. University of Puerto Rico, that the fact finder
must keep in mind the perspective of both men and women. 864 F.2d 881, 898 (1st Cir.
1988).
12 881 F.2d 412, 419, 50 FEP Cases 1499, 1503 (7th Cir. 1989).
" Id.
t° Id. For the sixth circuit standard, see supra text accompanying notes 8-10 and infra
notes 32-34 and accompanying text. For the prior seventh circuit standard in this area, see
infra notes 30-31.
2° Brooms, 881 F.2d at 416, 50 FEP Cases at 1500.
21 Id. at 417, 50 FEP Cases at 1501.
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the talent of a black woman and that she had been hired for the
purpose of performing such acts. After this incident, Brooms filed
a complaint with both the Illinois Department of Human Rights
and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission. 22 Several
months later, Gustafson showed Brooms a photocopy of a picture
involving bestiality, asserting that the picture represented the way
she "was going to end up."23
 As Brooms attempted to snatch one
of the photographs, Gustafson grabbed her arm and threatened to
kill her. She threw coffee on him and, in the course of running
away, fell down a flight of stairs. Brooms did not return to work at
Regal and, after leaving work, suffered a debilitating depression
allegedly caused by Gustafson's repeated abuse.
Brooms filed suit in the Northern District Court of Illinois,
charging the defendants with sexual harassment in violation of Title
VII, racial discrimination, and the torts of intentional infliction of
emotional distress and negligence. 24 On the charge of sexual ha-
rassment, the district court concluded that the plaintiff could prove
the occurrence of sexual harassment. 25 Although the district court
denied her motion for front pay,26 the court concluded that the
plaintiff had been "constructively discharged" and was therefore
entitled to back pay. 27 Copperweld and Regal appealed the district
court's judgment on Brooms' sexual harassment charge, contending
that the court erred in applying a subjective standard in determin-
ing whether the defendants had subjected the plaintiff to a hostile
work environment. 28
The appellate court affirmed the district court's holding, agree-
ing that Gustafson's conduct constituted sexual harassment, and
22 Id.
25 Id.
24 Id. The court found that the plaintiff could not maintain a cause of action under
section 1981 due to the Supreme Court's holding in the 1981 case of Patterson v. McLean
Credit Union, in which the Court held that conduct by an employer relating to the terms or
conditions of employment was not actionable under this statute. Brooms, 881 F.2d at 424, 50
FEP Cases at 1507 (citing Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 109 S. Ct. 2363, 49 FEP Cases
1814 (1989)). The plaintiff's claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and neg-
ligence were also dismissed. Id. at 426-27, 50 FEP Cases at 1508-09.
25 Id. at 417, 50 FEP Cases at 1501 (7th Cir. 1989). The court, however, held that the
plaintiff could not prove that Regal and Gustafson's actions had been in retaliation to her
filing discrimination charges with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. Id.
26 Front pay is intended to compensate victims for the promotions which they would
have received but for the discrimination which occurred. See SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOY-
MENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 1434-35 (2d ed. 1983).
27 Brooms, 881 F.2d at 417, 50 FEP Cases at 1501-02.
26 Id. at 418, 50 FEP Cases at 1502.
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clarified its standard for judging whether particular types of con-
duct create a hostile work environment. 29 The Brooms court relied
on its prior holding in Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., stating that, in
effect, it had previously adopted a combined subjective and objec-
tive standard. 3° The Brooms court claimed that by both affirming
the district couri's opinion in Scott and noting the effect of the
conduct upon the particular plaintiff, the court had already adopted
a two-prong standard for the seventh circuit. 3 '
The Brooms court also expressed its agreement with the court's
adoption in the Sixth Circuit of a combined subjective and objective
test." The Brooms court reiterated the standard established by the
Sixth Circuit in Rabidue, holding that a plaintiff must prove that a
defendant's conduct would have interfered with the work perfor-
mance and well-being of a reasonable individual, and that such
conduct actually offended and caused some injury to the particular
plaintiff) The Brooms court also cited with approval the Rabidue
court's assertion that the EEOC guidelines support this hybrid test
by emphasizing both an individual probative inquiry and an eval-
uation of the totality of the circumstances."
The Brooms court noted that the district court had employed a
predominantly subjective standard in determining whether Gustaf-
son's conduct interfered with the plaintiff's work performance and
29 Id. at 419, 50 FEN Cases at 1503.
'" Id. (citing Scott v. Sears, Roebuck & Co„ 605 F. Supp. 1047, 1056, 37 FE? Cases 878,
884 (N.D.111. 1985), aff'd, 798 F.2d 210, 213-14, 41 FEP Cases 805, 808 (7th Cir, 1986)). In
Scott, the district court held that the question of whether the plaintiff was sexually harassed
was an objective determination, and the court should therefore focus on the defendant's
conduct, not upon the plaintiff's reaction, 605 F. Supp, at 1056, 37 FEP Cases at 884 (citing
Jennings v. D.H.L. Airlines, 101 F.R.D. 549, 551, 34 FEP Cases 1423, 1425 (1984)). On
appeal, the court did not comment on the district court's standard, but applied a more
subjective rationale, addressing the particular plaintiff's ability to function on the job. Scott,
708 F.2d at. 214, 41 FEP Cases at 808.
Brooms, 881 F.2d at 412, 50 FEP Cases at 1502.
' 2 Id., citing Rabidue, 805 F.2d 611, 620, 42 FEP Cases 631, 638 (fith Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 43 FEP Cases 1056 (1987).
' Id. The Rabidue court's list of ohjective and subjective factors to be considered includes:
the nature of the alleged harassment, the background and experience of the
plaintiff, her coworkers, and supervisors, the totality of the physical environ-
ment of the plaintiff's work area, the lexicon of obscenity that pervaded the
environment of the workplace both before and after the plaintiff's introduction
into its environs, coupled with the reasonable expectation of the plaintiff upon
voluntarily entering the environment.
Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 620, 42 FE? Cases at 638,
34 Brooms, 881 F.2d at 419, 50 FEP Cases at 1503 (citing Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 621 n.5,
42 FE? Cases at 638 ti.5). For a statement of the referenced EEOC guideline, 29 C.F.R,
1604.11(b), sec supra note 3.
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whether the plaintiff actually suffered an injury." The Brooms court
also stated that, although the district court did not explicitly con-
sider the effect of the conduct on a reasonable person, it implicitly
applied an objective test in determining whether the plaintiff had
a valid sexual harassment claim." The Brooms court, however, as-
serting its own ability to draw legal conclusions from the lower
court's findings of fact, also applied the objective prong of the
Rabidue test to this case.37 The appellate court held that Gustafson's
offensive conduct would have affected both the work performance
and the psychological health of a reasonable employee. 38 The con-
duct, according to the appellate court, constituted sexual harass-
ment based upon the district court's application of the subjective
test and its own application of the objective test. 39
In explicitly adopting the standard prescribed by the Rabidue
majority, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has contributed to
a trend making it more difficult for alleged victims of sexual ha-
rassment to bring a cause of action under Title VII. Under the
Brooms standard, it is not enough for the plaintiff to assert that she
was offended by the defendant's conduct and thereby suffered
injury as a result of working in a hostile environment. In addition,
the plaintiff must prove that the hypothetical, reasonable individual
would have been disturbed by the work environment. 40 Although
the Brooms court did not state its reasons for accepting the Rabidue
standard rather than selecting a different criteria for determining
the existence of a hostile environment,'" in Rabidue, the court did
attempt to justify its use of both subjective and objective factors by
claiming that, in so doing, it was according protection to both plain-
tiffs and defendants. 42 The Rabidue court also stated 'that its ap-
" Brooms, 881 F.2d at 419, 50 FEP Cases at 1503.
3" Id. According to the appellate court, the district court clearly applied the subjective
prong of the standard, examining Gustafson's actions to determine if they interfered with
Brooms' ability to perform her work and if she suffered an actual injury. Id. at 419, 50 FEP
Cases at 1503. The district court did nut explicitly discuss the effect of these actions on the
reasonable person although the appellate court stated that this part of the test did play an
implicit role in the district court's holding. Id.
" Id. at 420, 50 FEP Cases at 1503. The district court's findings of fact established that
Brooms was the victim of sexual remarks and pranks, and "that her problems with Gustafson
made her phobic about the company and that she found it intolerable." Id. at 420 n.2, 50
FEP Cases at 1503 n.2.
3" Id. at 420, 50 FEP Cases at 1503.
]9 Id.
4" Id. at 418, 50 FEP Cases at 1502.
41 Id. at 419, 50 FEP Cases at 1503,
Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620, 42 FEP Cases 631, 638 (6th Cir.
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proach was not inconsistent with the EEOC guidelines, which ref-
erence both the individual nature of the inquiry and the totality of
the circumstances.'"
Commentators have voiced much dissatisfaction over the ap-
propriate standard for determining the existence of a hostile envi-
ronment. Some authors have criticized a pure subjective standard
because a hypersensitive plaintiff could penalize a defendant for
conduct that was not intentionally offensive and that courts would
not hold to be offensive if directed at a more reasonable individual."
Others have stated that by adding a more objective component, the
balance is shifted toward the defendant, creating a steep hurdle for
plaintiffs. A standard such as set out by'both the Rabidue and Brooms
courts, which includes both subjective and objective components,
has engendered concern that courts will fail to evaluate sexual
harassment from the viewpoint of the most likely victims—women."
A gender neutral standard would foreclose claims that would meet
the subjective test of offending a particular female employee be-
cause it would fail to take into account the difference between male
and female perceptions of appropriate conduct in the workplace."
The approach of the Rabidue dissent attempts to remedy this
flaw by suggesting that courts should evaluate hostile environment
cases from the perspective of the reasonable female.47 Although
Judge Keith's approach may satisfy critics who are concerned with
differences in perception of conduct based on sex, no standard that
relies on evaluating conduct in terms of what would be offensive to
the reasonable individual in the prevailing work environment can
1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041, 43 FEP Cases 1056 (1987). The Rabidue court acknowledged
that under this standard, it was possible that (1) a plaintiff who was personally affected by
conduct which would not offend a reasonable person would not be able to state a claim and
(2) the same conduct may or may not be found actionable depending on the personality of
the plaintiff' and the prevailing work environment, Id.
43 Id. at 621 n.5, 42 FEP Cases at 638 n.5 (discussing 29 C.F.R. 1604(h)). See supra
note 3 for the text of the regulation.
44 See, e.g., Case Note, supra note 6, at 867; Note, supra note 7, at 464.
'13 S. OMILIAN, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN EMPLOYMENT 14 (1987).
43' See Rabidue, 850 F.2d at 626, 42 FEP Cases at 638 (Keith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part); see also S. OMILIAN, supra note 45, at 14-15.
Conduct that is viewed as offensive to females may be seen as harmless or innocent by
males. Case Note, supra note 6, at 867-68; Note, supra note 12, at 1451,
" Rabidue, 850 F.2d at 627, 42 FEP Cases at 643 (Keith, J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part). This standard has received much support in the legal community. See,
e.g., S. OMILIAN, supra note 45, at 14; Holtzman & Trelz, Recent Developments in the Law of
Sexual Harassment: Abusive Environmental Claims After Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson, 31 ST.
Louis U.L.J. 239, 258 (1987); Note, supra note 46, at 1459.
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truly fulfill the mandate of Title VII. 48 In addressing the Rabidue
district court's contention that Title VII was not intended to trans-
form the "social mores of American workers," Judge Keith correctly
noted that offensive conduct cannot be condoned simply based
upon the finding that it is part of the prevailing work environment."
Conduct that may appear reasonable in the context of the work
situation because it follows the status quo nevertheless may be dis-
criminatory and, therefore, create a hostile work environment for
the plaintiff. Simply adding the gender distinction to the reasonable
person standard, however, will not serve to alleviate this problem if
a reasonable woman has been conditioned to accept discriminatory
behavior as part of her working environment.
Rather than meekly accepting the status quo by stating that
Congress did not intend Title VII to change work environments in
which sexual jokes, conversations, and pornography are tolerated, 5°
the court should have adopted the perspective of the individual
working in the environment that Title VII aspires to create; an
environment in which there is no discrimination based on gender. 51
The existence of a hostile work environment then would not depend
upon whether the conduct involved was offensive in the particular
work situation, but, instead, upon a more fundamental vision of
rights that the court should protect regardless of what might seem
acceptable to a reasonable person. Translating this standard into
objective/subjective terminology, the court would evaluate conduct
based upon whether it was offensive to a reasonable person func-
tioning in a setting in which discrimination is not acceptable to
411 See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30, 3 FEP Cases 175, 177 (1970).
According to the Griggs Court:
The objective of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the
language of the statute . . . . Under the Act, practices, procedures or tests
neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained
if they operate to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices.
Id.
49 Rabidue, 805 F.2d at 626, 42 FEP Cases at 643 (6th Cir. 1986) (Keith, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Rabidue v. Osceola Refining Co., 584 F. Supp. 419,
430, 36 FEY Cases 183, 191 (E.D. Mich. 1984)). According to Justice Keith:
To condone the majority's notion of the 'prevailing workplace' 1 would also
have to agree that if an employer maintains an anti-semitic workforce and
tolerates a workplace in which 'kike' jokes, displays of nazi literature and anti-
Jewish conversation 'may abound,' a Jewish employee assumes the risk of work-
ing there, and a court must consider such a work environment as 'prevailing.'
I cannot.
Id.
so See id.
SL See supra note 2 for the relevant section of Title VII.
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reasonable people. If the conduct fails to be acceptable in this
context, then it should not be condoned, and the plaintiff who is
subjected to this type of behavior should be allowed to sustain a
cause of action.
The Brooms court's unreasoned adoption of the Rabidue two-
part standard perpetuates the acceptance of the status quo in de-
termining what constitutes a hostile work environment. The outlook
of a reasonable person in the current work environment simply
assesses what conduct is acceptable based on current social mores;
it does not evaluate those social mores to ask whether they constitute
the environment to which Title VII aspires. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Brooms has merely followed the Rabidue court's
short-sighted view by defining a hostile environment, based not only
on subjective concerns, but also on current perceptions. Courts
should envision an environment in which gender discrimination
does not exist and evaluate claims based on that view.
III. ACE DISCRIMINATION
A. * Age Discrimination in Employee Benefit Plans and the Scope of the
Section 4(1)(2) Exemption: Public Employers Retirement System
v. Betts'
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"
or the "Act") forbids arbitrary discrimination by public and private
employers against employees on account of age.' Under section
4(a)(1) of the Act, it is unlawful for an employer to discriminate
based on an individual's age with respect to the compensation,
terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.' Section 4(f)(2),
however, exempts age-based distinctions made pursuant to the
terms of any bona fide employee benefit plan that is not in reality
a subterfuge for circumventing the purposes of the Act. 4
* By Robert Mirabella, Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW.
' 109 S. Ct. 2854, 50 FEP Cases 104 (1989).
2
 Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ** 2-16 29 U.S.C. §1 621-634 (1974).
29 U.S.C. § 623 (a)(1). Under this section, it is unlawful for an employer: "[to] fail or
to refuse to hire or discharge any individual or otherwise discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of
such individual's age . ."
4
 This section of the ADEA makes it unlawful for an employer:
[to] observe the terms of . . . any bona fide employee benefit plan such as a
retirement, pension, or insurance plan, which is not a subterfuge to evade the
purposes of this chapter, except that no such employee benefit plan shall excuse
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In the 1977 case of United Air Lines, Inc. v. McMann, the United
States Supreme Court first interpreted the meaning and scope of
the section 4(f)(2) exemption. 5
 In upholding a mandatory retire-
ment plan for employees reaching the age of sixty, the Court held
that a benefit plan established before the effective date of the ADEA
could not be a subterfuge because there could be no intent to evade
the purpose of the Act.6 The Court further held that post-Act plans
maintaining age-based distinctions did not need to be justified by a
business purpose.' In 1978, however, Congress specifically amended
the ADEA to prohibit age-based mandatory retirement plans,
thereby overriding the McMann result. 8
 Circuit courts have since
split on whether the reasoning supporting the McMann decision,
namely exempting pre-ADEA plans from the purview of the ADEA
and denying the need to justify age-based distinctions with a valid
business purpose, remains good law.°
During the Survey year, in Public Employers Retirement System v.
Betts, the United States Supreme Court held that the McMann in-
terpretation with regard to pre-Act plans under section 4(f)(2) re-
mains controlling precedent. 1 ° In Betts, the Court relied on McMann
to uphold a benefit plan that: (1) denied disability benefits to em-
ployees over sixty; and (2) maintained a floor of thirty percent of
final average salary for disability recipients without providing a
corresponding floor for age and service retirees." The Court fol-
lowed the McMann proposition that employee benefit plans estab-
the failure to hire any individual, and no such ... employee benefit plan shall
require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual . . . because of
the age of such individual ..
Id.
See 434 U.S. 192, 195-203, 16 FEP Cases 146, 148-151 (1977).
6 Id. at 203, 16 FEP Cases at 151.
7 Id.
Pub. L. No. 92, 81 Stat. 602 (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(2) (1986)). Congress
amended § 623(f)(2) in 1978 by adding at the end of the section the clause: "and no such
... employee benefit plan shall require or permit the involuntary retirement of any individual
... because of the age of such individual .. . ." Id.
9 Compare Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Cargill, Inc., 855 F.2d 682, 685-
86 (10th Cir. 1988) (pre-ADEA plan cannot be a subterfuge of the Act) and Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Comm'n v. County of Orange, 837 F.2d 420, 422-423 (9th Cir. 1988)
(McMann reasoning still good law despite congressional invalidation of result) with Betts v.
Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities, 848 F.2d 692,
694 (6th Cir. 1988) and Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Fox Point-Bayside School
Dist., 772 F.2d 1294, 1302-03 (7th Cir. 1985) (pre-ADEA plan only "presumptively" not a
subterfuge to evade Act).
'° 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2861, 50 FF.P Cases 104, 107-108 (1989).
II Id. at 2861, 2869, 50 FE? Cases at 108, 113.
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lished before the enactment of the ADEA are beyond the purview
of the ADEA." The Betts Court also relied on McMann to hold that
age-based distinctions in benefit plans do not need to be justified
by a business purpose.' 3 Thus, the Betts decision establishes that a
post-Act plan will be exempt under section 4(f)(2) as long as it does
not violate the express provisions of the Act."
The appellant in Betts was the Public Employees Retirement
System of Ohio ("PERS"), a state program established in 1933 to
provide state and local government employees with retirement ben-
efits. PERS provided two types of benefits for government employ-
ees. First, PERS provided age-and-service retirement benefits to
those employees who had accumulated a certain amount of service
time and had reached a certain age.' 5 Second, PERS provided dis-
ability retirement benefits to employees under sixty years of age
with at least five years of service.' 6
Under the original PERS scheme, because age-retirement em-
ployees and disability-retirement employees received benefits based
on the same formula, it did not matter which form of retirement
payments a retiree received.' 7 In 1976, however, two years after the
ADEA became applicable to the states, Ohio amended the PERS
scheme to provide that disability payments would not fall below a
minimum of thirty percent of a retiree's final average salary.' 8 The
State did not adopt a corresponding provision providing a floor
percentage for those retirees receiving age and service benefits.i°
The appellee in Betts, June M. Betts, was hired as a speech
pathologist by an Ohio government agency in 1978. Due to a de-
teriorating health condition, Betts retired from this job seven years
later at the age of sixty-one. 2° Because she was over sixty when she
retired, she was only eligible for age-and-service retirement benefits,
and consequently was denied disability benefits despite her medical
12 Id.
la Id. at 2861, 50 FEP Cases at 107.
14 Id. at 2865-66, 50 FEP Cases at 1 l I.
16 Id. at 2858, 50 FEP Cases at 105. Employees could receive age•and-service retirement
benefits if they had: (a) 5 years service credit and were at least 60 years old; (b) 30 years of
service credit; or (c) 25 years of service credit and were at least 55 years old. Id.
16 Id. The requirement that disability recipients be under age 60 was first put into effect
in 1959. Id. at 2854, 50 FEP Cases at 105.
17 Id. at 2859, 50 FEP Cases at 106.
l8
1° Id.
2° Id. at 2859, 50 FE? Cases at 105-06. Ms. Betts had a choice of retiring or taking an
unpaid medical leave, and she chose to retire. Id.
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condition. Betts would have received more than twice her monthly
age-and-service payments under the disability payments scheme
because of the thirty percent floor. In response to the PERS ruling,
Betts filed suit in federal district court in Ohio, claiming that PERS
violated the ADEA by refusing to grant her application for disability
retirement benefits. 2 '
The United States District Court for the Southern District of
Ohio granted summary judgment for Betts, holding that PERS
could not avail itself of the section 4(f)(2) exemption of the ADEA. 22
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed
the district court's decision, adopting the district court's analysis. 23
The circuit court agreed that if an employee benefit plan contains
age-based distinctions, there must be "a substantial business pur-
pose" for those provisions.24
 The circuit court held that McMann
was not binding precedent, concluding that Congress had expressly
repudiated McMann in its 1978 amendment to the ADEA. 25
The United States Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap-
peals' decision. 26
 In reaching its conclusion, the Court confirmed
the vitality of the McMann proposition that a pre-ADEA employee
benefit plan cannot be a subterfuge of the Act. The Court reiterated
the position it had taken in McMann that the word "subterfuge"
must be given its ordinary meaning as a "scheme, plan, stratagem
or artifice of evasion." 27
 Pre-ADEA plans can never be a subterfuge,
the Court concluded, because a plan established before the Act
could not have been made with the requisite element of intent to
evade the Act.
21
 Id. at 2859, 50 FEP Cases at 105-06.
22 Id. The court relied on an interpretive regulation of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission (EEOC), the agency that enforces the ADEA, which provided that in
order for employee benefit plans to qualify under the § 4(f)(2) exemption, any age-related
reductions in benefits must be justified by the enlarged cost of providing these benefits to
older employees. Because PERS could show no business/cost justification, the district court
held the § 4(f)(2) exemption inapplicable. Id, at 2859, 50 FEP Cases at 106.
25
 Betts v. Hamilton County Rd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities,
848 F.2d 692, 694-95 (6th Cir. 1988).
" Id. at 694.
25
 Id. Judge Wellford, in a dissenting opinion, opined that the McMann decision was
controlling and that the court therefore erred in refusing to exempt PERS from the ADEA.
Judge Wellford reasoned that because PERS was a pre-Act plan it could not be a subterfuge
used to evade the purposes of the Act. He also rejected the majority's reliance on the EEOC
interpretive regulation, asserting that nothing in the language of the statute required a cost
justification for age-based reductions in benefits. Id, at 699-700 (Wellford, J., dissenting).
26
 Public Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 109 S. Ct. 2854, 2860, 50 FEP Cases 104,
105, 106.
47 Id. at 2861, 50 FEP Cases at 107.
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The Court rejected Betts' argument that given the 1978
Congressional amendment to section 4(f)(2), which effectively over-
ruled the McMann result, the reasoning of McMann was no longer
good law." The Court justified its reliance on McMann's interpre-
tation of "subterfuge" on the grounds that, although Congress may
have changed the result of McMann, it did not insert a definition
of the term "subterfuge" in the ADEA, nor did it modify section
4(f)(2) other than by adding the clause barring mandatory retire-
ment plans. 29 Thus, although conceding that there were indications
that Congress may have intended to overturn McMann completely,"
the Court held that the PERS rule denying disability payments for
workers over age sixty could not be challenged as a subterfuge
because the rule was established before the ADEA became appli-
cable to the states."'
Having reaffirmed McMann with respect to pre-ADEA plans,
the Court proceeded to hold that the PERS thirty percent floor for
disability payments was not similarly protected from ADEA chal-
lenges." The Court stated that because PERS was amended to
include a 30% floor in 1976, after the ADEA became applicable to
the states, no "remarkable prescience" would have been required
by PERS to attempt to evade the ADEA. Thus, the Court held that
the automatic rule of McMann was inapplicable to this portion of
the plan."
Having determined that the McMann rule regarding pre-ADEA
plans did not shelter the PERS plan from attack, the Court next
addressed Betts' contention that section 4(f )(2)'s exemption for
bona fide benefit plans only protects age-based benefit reductions
that are justified by an increased cost of providing benefits for older
workers." Betts argued that unless PERS could show a business
purpose for not enacting a similar floor for employees over age 60,
the plan did not qualify for the section 4(f)(2) exemption."
2/1
39 Id. at 2861, 50 FEP Cases at 107-08.
" Id. at 2861, 50 FEP Cases at 107; see 124 CONG. REC. 7881, 7888, 8219 (1978) (remarks
of Senators Hawkins, Javits and Waxman). Senator Hawkins stated, "the conferees specifically
disagree with the Supreme Court's holding and reasoning in [McMinn], particularly its
conclusion that an employee benefit plan which discriminates on the basis of age is protected
by section 4(f)(2) because it predates the enactment of the ADEA." Id.
si Id. at 2862, 50 FEP Cases at. 108.
32 Id.
S3 Id.
." Id.
" Id,
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Betts put forth two arguments supporting this interpretation
of the section 4(f)(2) exemption, both of which were rejected by
the Court. First, Betts relied on an interpretive regulation issued
by the Department of Labor, and later adopted by the EEOC, that
required a cost justification for age-based distinctions in benefits. 36
The Court, however, dismissed this regulation as contrary to the
plain language of the ADEA. In dismissing,the regulation, the Court
relied on the McMann interpretation of the term "subterfuge,"
pointing out that under McMann, "subterfuge" requires a subjective
element of intent to evade the purposes of the ADEA. Because the
regulation in question failed to acknowledge, this requirement, the
Court reasoned, no deference was due to the regulation, as it was
clearly contrary to the plain language of the statute it was inter-
preting."
Betts also argued that the language of the section 4(f)(2) ex-
emption implies a cost justification requirement for age-based dis-
tinctions in employee benefits. 38
 Section 4(f)(2) states that an ex-
emption is available to any bona fide plan, "such as a retirement,
pension, or insurance plan . . . ."39
 Betts argued that these listed
plans are all similar in that the costs of maintaining the benefits rise
with the age of the beneficiaries. Thus, Betts argued, Congress
intended the exemption to permit employers to decrease benefits
to older workers only to the extent necessary to equalize the costs
of providing benefits to older and younger workers. 4°
The Court rejected this argument as well, reasoning that the
types of benefit plans listed in section 4(f)(2) were only given as
examples of qualified plans, as indicated by the prefatory words
"such as."' The Court also observed that there was•no evidence to
show that Congress selected these specific plans because they each
involve an increased cost of providing benefits as the age of the
beneficiaries increases. The Court noted that many potentially ex-
4° Id. The Department of Labor was the agency initially charged with enforcing the
ADEA. Id.
" Id. at 2863, 50 FEN Cases at 109.
5" Id. at 2864, 50 FEN Cases at 110.
5" See 29 U.S.C. § 623(F)(2). See supra note 4 and accompanying text for the text of
section 4(f )(2).
4° Id. at 2864, 50 FEN Cases at 110.
'	 Id.
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empted plans, such as defined-contribution plans, 42 do not share
this characteristic."
Having rejected Betts' interpretation of the section 4(f)(2) ex-
emption, the Court next endeavored to determine the meaning of
the term "subterfuge" as applied to post-Act plans." The Court
determined that among the numerous purposes of the Act, the
purpose implicated in Betts was the elimination of arbitrary age
discrimination. Thus, the Court concluded, a benefit plan is not a
"subterfuge" unless it discriminates in a manner prohibited by the
express provisions of the Act." Simply stated, section 4(f)(2) ex-
empts benefit plans as long as they do not discriminate in nonfringe-
benefit aspects of the employment relationship. This interpretation,
the Court reasoned, reflects Congress' judgment that age-based
restrictions in benefit plans do not constitute "arbitrary age discrim-
ination," because Congress specifically established section 4(f)(2) to
exempt them. 4 "
Although the Court acknowledged that it was broadening the
scope of employer discretion in fashioning benefit. plans, the Court
contended that it was not emasculating the "subterfuge" limitation. 47
The Court reasoned that any attempt to evade the restrictions of
the Act by disguising forbidden discrimination as age-based differ-
entials would disqualify a plan from the section 4(f)(2) exemption.
The Court, however, shifted the burden of proving an employer's
actual intent to discriminate to the employee. As justification for
this result, the Court analogized to the similar burden shifting that
occurs under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which
prohibits discrimination in employment, including seniority sys-
tems." Noting that Betts did not meet the burden of showing that
PERS intentionally discriminated in a non-benefit aspect of em-
ployment, the Court held that granting summary judgment against
her would be inappropriate. The Court therefore remanded the
case to give Betts an opportunity to show a genuine issue of material
fact on this matter."
42 See id, at 2864 n. 5, 50 FEP Cases at 110 n. 5. A defined contribution plan is one in
which the employer's contribution is fixed, and the cost of making contributions for any
given employee is completely unrelated to that employee's age. Id.
43 Id. at 2864, 50 FEP Cases at 110.
44 Id. at 2865, 50 FEP Cases at 110-11.
's Id. at 2865-66, 50 FEP Cases at i 11.
46 Id. at 2866, 50 FE? Cases at 111.
47 Id. at 2867-68, 50 FEP Cases at 112-13.
4" Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (1982)).
" Id. at 2869, 50 FEP Cases at 113.
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In a dissenting opinion, Justice Marshall vehemently asserted
that the result reached by the majority mistakenly immunizes almost
all employee benefit programs from liability under the ADEA. 5°
Justice Marshall contended that the majority's construction of sec-
tion 4(f)(2) leaves older workers unprotected from baseless discrim-
ination in employee benefit plans." Justice Marshall agreed with
Betts' assertion that section 4(f)(2) should be read as limiting the
exemption to those plans where unequal treatment of older workers
is justified by a plausible business purpose.
According to Justice Marshall, the first part of § 4(f)(2) (listing
the three examples of qualifying benefit plans that entail rising costs
with age) and the second part (the "subterfuge" limitation) should
be read as a synthetic whole. 52 Under this reading, Justice Marshall
reasoned, it was apparent that Congress intended to include a cost
justification requirement wherever employers reduced benefits to
older workers. Justice Marshall contended that there was absolutely
no support for the majority's interpretation in the legislative history
of the statute. Further, he argued that because of section 4(f )(2)'s
ambiguity, the Court should defer to the interpretive regulation
promulgated by the EEOC. 53
 Therefore, Justice Marshall con-
cluded, unless PERS could show a business purpose for its age-
based distinctions, it should be denied a section 4(f)(2) exemption. 54
The Betts case promises to have a significant impact on the
provision of public and private employee benefit plans. Under Betts,
any bona fide benefit plan established before the enactment of the
ADEA is entirely exempt from the purview of the Act. The impact
on post-Act plans, however, will also be substantial. Under the ma-
jority's interpretation of section 4(f)(2), employers have broad dis-
cretion to make age-based distinctions in benefit plans without any
business purpose. As long as the benefit plan does not violate the
express provisions of the Act, it will be unassailable by employees
under the ADEA.
In addition, plaintiff employees also have a very high burden
of proof to meet following the Betts decision. The plaintiff must
allege and prove the employer's actual intent to engage in "arbitrary
age discrimination" in nonfringe-benefit aspects of the employment
50 Id. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
51 Id. at 2870, 50 FEP Gases at 114 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
52 Id. at 2871, 50 FEP Cases at 115-16 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
" Id. at 2874, 50 FEP Cases at 117-18 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
54 Id.
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relation. Thus, even where an employee has been the victim of age
discrimination, proving the requisite element of intent under the
Betts standard will be problematic.
After Betts, pre-Act plans are insulated from being labeled "sub-
terfuges" and thus automatically receive the section 4(f)(2) exemp-
tion. The majority's only ground for this conclusion lies in its read-
ing of the term "subterfuge" as requiring a subjective element of
intent. But the crucial question here is when does an employer need
to harbor the requisite intent for a benefit plan to be a "subterfuge?"
The majority clearly envisions only post-Act plans as being capable
of harboring this intent and precludes the notion that a benefit plan
established before the ADEA could be intended by an employer to
be a "subterfuge" to the Act. This conclusion appears flawed, be-
cause an employer maintaining a pre-Act plan may intend to cir-
cumvent the ADEA presently, even if that was not the employer's
intent when originally fashioning the benefit plan. Given that Con-
gress established the ADEA to combat age discrimination, it would
seem beyond question that the injury suffered by an employee
discriminated against pursuant to a pre-Act plan is as egregious as
the injury suffered by an employee pursuant to a post-Act plan.
The majority's insulation of all pre-Act plans from ADEA scrutiny
will preclude workers under such plans from protection against age
discrimination.
In ,the second major prong of the Betts decision, the Court
establisfied that age-based reductions in employee benefits will no
longer be required to be justified by the higher cost of providing
benefits to older workers. Once again, the rights of older workers
are endangered by the Betts result. The employer is given the ab-
solute ability to reduce arbitrarily the fringe benefits provided to
older workers without running afoul of the ADEA. After Betts, an
employer is insulated from ADEA scrutiny as long as it does not
discriminate in nonfringe-benefit aspects of the employment rela-
tionship. This result seems unfathomable given the purpose of the
ADEA to combat age discrimination in the workplace. 5'
As put forth by Congress, the section 4(f)(2) exemption ac-
knowledges that employers should be free to account for the dif-
ferences between older and younger workers in fashioning em-
ployee benefit plans. This exemption, however, undoubtably was
not intended to sanction employers' unjustifiable reductions of older
55 Id. at 2854, 50 14,11
 Cases at 105.
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workers' benefits. Given the ambiguity of section 4(f)(2), Justice
Marshall is correct in concluding that the Court should defer to the
legislative history of the Act, as well as the EEOC's interpretation
of the Act, and adopt the cost justification requirement. In its cur-
rent form, the Betts result provides employers broad discretion to
make unfair age-based distinctions in employee benefit plans. 56
56
 The "Older Workers Protection Act," a comprehensive amendment to the ADEA, has
been passed by the United States Senate and is currently in debate before the House of
Representatives. See 136 CONG. REC. H8614-02 (daily ed. Oct. 2, 1990). The proposed
amendment would specifically overturn the Betts result, construing the ADEA's prohibition
against age discrimination in "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment."
to encompass employee benefits and employee benefit plans. Id. The amendment would also
shift the burden of proof from the employee, as concluded by the Bats court, to the employer,
to prove that it has provided equal benefits to, or incurred equal costs in providing benefits
to, all workers. Id.
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